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Abstract
Losing Louisiana: Race, techno-science, and the disappearing geographies of the lower
Mississippi River Delta
by
Monica Patrice Barra
Advisor: Jeff Maskovsky
Based on eighteen months of ethnographic and historical research in southeast coastal
Louisiana (USA), this dissertation explores the racial histories, engineering and scientific
practices, and geophysical processes that have shaped land loss and coastal restoration in the
lower Mississippi River Delta. Rather than treating land loss simply as a natural process or
matter of environmental restoration, this ethnography examines its cultural, material, and
political dimensions, especially for communities of color that have already experienced long
histories of loss — of property, livelihood, and political rights. A focus on the geophysical
transformations of the river - dictating land growth, sinking, and movement - shows that past and
contemporary unequal and uneven racial geographies are not merely forms of environmental
racism shaped by colorblind coastal planning practices. Rather, they form at the nexus of
colorblind coastal science, long histories of racial discrimination, and natural forces to produce
and reproduce racial inequalities. This dissertation argues that the lower delta landscape is both a
laboratory for experiments in environmental engineering for scientists and political autonomy for
communities of color. And, more broadly, that natural geologic processes are key actors in the
production of racial inequities, particularly as ideas of nature and natural processes are captured
and sustained by restoration efforts. Evidence is drawn from ethnographic research interrogating
iv

what land loss and protection are and might be, and examining uncertainties about the likelihood
of nature-based restoration and planning techniques exacerbating economic and geographic
vulnerabilities for communities of color.
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For my grandfather, who held up the world of his family. And to the people living in coastal
Louisiana who remind me that home is always worth fighting for.
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I. Accretion
In geology, accretion is the process by which new material is added to an existing
landmass. In delta geomorphology, delta land growth happens through regular deposition of
sediments carried in the alluvial rivers that feed into coastal areas, where they form deltas. The
Mississippi River has built over 25,000 square miles of land over its lifespan in the past 7,000
years, leaving fan-like, delta splays across the area that is currently coastal Louisiana. Sediment
is key to the delta land accretion process. With every spring flood the river overbanks, depositing
new sediments over old. The largest sediments are deposited next to the river, accreting its
natural levees or ridges, and finer sediments make their way further down into coastal marshes.
As marsh accretes so does vegetation. And as vegetation and ridges accrete, so do human
populations. Human settlement has concentrated on the highest ground in coastal Louisiana, next
to the current and old channels of the Mississippi River on the sediment loaded ridges. The
gradual build-up of layers of fresh sediment offsets equally powerful forces of subsidence, or
sinking, that are also at work in riverine deltas like those found in south Louisiana. Over the
course of its lifetime the Mississippi River built the familiar boot like shape of south Louisiana's
coastline through these processes of accretion and subsidence.
The relationship between land growth and subsidence has never been stable, but is
instead subject to constant change, be it of the whims of the Mississippi River to find a shorter,
steeper route to the Gulf of Mexico or the quest of landowners and engineers to keep the river
from overtopping its banks and meandering to another place. These processes have inspired
writers to describe coastal Louisiana like a layer cake of Jell-O, reflecting the tenuous terra firma
physical nature of the lower delta.
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As humans and levees became a more marked part of the lower delta landscape, however
the capacity of river sediments to reach surrounding wetlands was severed. This offset the
balance of land building and sinking processes in the coastal delta area: gradually, subsidence
began to outpace land accretion. By the end of the twentieth century, land loss in the lower
Mississippi River Delta region became so pronounced that many scientists proclaimed it a crisis
and the canary in the coal mine of climate change.
The arc of these changes is perhaps best captured by the tryptic of images below:

Image 1: Three visions of the lower Mississippi River: geophysical processes, human settlement, and engineering.

The first, a map of the historical meanderings of the Mississippi River produced by geologist
Harold Fisk in 1944; the second, a map of the French arpent system of parceling out alluvial land
in long lots for plantation development in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and the third,
a diagram of a hypothetical flood event on the lower Mississippi River developed by the US
Army Corps of Engineers in the mid-twentieth century to help them predict and manage an
elaborate suite of infrastructures to prevent catastrophic flooding on the lower river.

2

This dissertation moves between the aspirations and material conditions of these maps of
geophysical processes, human settlement, and engineering. It examines the nature of land, loss,
and geophysical processes as they have encountered and become transformed by scientific and
social historical processes over the past century. Akin to the accretion of the lower delta, this
dissertation traces the material and social layers that come together to accrete a contemporary
coastal Louisiana whose land loss crisis has made coastal Louisiana the subject of national and
international attention on the impacts of anthropogenic climatic and geologic change and
unprecedented environmental restoration. Though loss is in many ways at the center of this
ethnography, sediment and processes of making landscapes and people are equally the subject of
this work. Moving between loss and accretion, this dissertation aims to hold in tension changing
human and geophysical worlds as each reaches into and cuts across the other.

3

Introduction
Paradise lost
Standing at almost six feet tall with a round belly and voice hoarse from smoking a pack
or two of cigarettes a day, Dale is the unofficial leader of a small collection of black fishing
communities that dot the eastern bank of the Mississippi River. The east bank rests on the last
sliver of inhabited land on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River as it gradually merges with
the Gulf of Mexico. Dale, like many other residents of the east bank, traces his ancestry to a
mixture of indigenous as well as free and formerly enslaved migrants to the area. As a member
of one of several black communities in a parish (county) distinguished by a complex history of
colonialism and state imposed racism, he associates land loss not only with marsh, mud and
water, but with struggles for political rights and equal access to the area's natural resources.
Today, his home rests on the sinking edge of Louisiana's 2,000 square miles a year land
loss crisis (Couvillon et al. 2011, 2017), a major geophysical shift exacerbated by confining the
Mississippi River behind 1,600 miles of levees, extensive natural resource extraction, and rising
sea levels. Dale's home is also at the epicenter of the state's most ambitious coastal restoration
projects: Large-scale river diversions that propose to cut into the twenty-three foot high
Mississippi River levees, allowing the river to reconnect with, and hopefully rebuild, its
fragmented coastal marshes. Yet the geophysical models scientists, technocrats, and policy
makers use to explain land loss and land restoration are almost entirely disconnected from the
experiences and knowledge that residents like Dale hold. This disconnect not only makes Dales
and others reluctant to work with scientists and state officials, but convinces them that the world
class science used to "save" coastal Louisiana is nothing but "voodoo science," as Dale puts it destined to destroy the bayous and livelihoods of Dale's family and community. In this
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perspective, projects to restore a disappearing coastline appear as the next in a long line of
attempts to dispossess geographically and politically marginalized people like Dale of land,
water, and political power.
"You don’t understand what this place used to be," Dale insisted as we discussed how he
had seen land, water, and people change over the course of his life on the east bank of
Plaquemines Parish. Whether through projects for flood control, environmental restoration, or
land loss, his community and many others in the bayou region experience the suite of dynamic
changes to the coastal environment that combined to take away livelihoods and cultures deeply
embedded in the coastal landscape. Lamenting the loss of a coastal landscape that could sustain
him and his community, Dale turned to me with a serious gaze as we spoke to make sure I got
the message: "I was serious when I said it used to be paradise…a paradise!"

Losing Louisiana
Land loss is a symptom, not a cause, of racism, capitalism, and white supremacy. The answer is
not always located in technology and engineering.
-Presenter, Climate Justice in Louisiana Workshop, 2017
From the periods of colonization and slavery to the postindustrial era, the coupling of
science and technology to the exploitation of land and labor along the lower Mississippi River
have co-constituted deep social inequalities for Dale and several communities living on the edge
of Louisiana’s coastal land loss crisis. By the beginning of the twenty first century, the combined
impacts of 1,600 miles of levees, extensive natural resource extraction, and rising sea levels have
transformed almost 2,000 miles of coastal wetlands into open water, making coastal land loss
Louisiana’s most persistent environmental crisis (Couvillion et al. 2011, 2017).
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Image 2: Map of land loss and land gain with the 2017 Louisiana Coastal Master Plan under a "medium" sea level
rise scenario. Area in yellow is the primary field site, Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana (Louisiana Coastal Protection
and Restoration Authority, 2017).

Accelerated rates of wetland and marsh subsidence, or sinking, are associated with the
synergistic effects of the process of delta formation and subsidence, wherein a river delta's
natural growth accretes (builds) land until the river changes course, abandoning the old delta
lobe to subside while a new delta lobe is generated at the terminus of the river’s new path. The
Mississippi River has created five different deltas, or delta lobes, over the past 5,000 years. The
current configuration of the Birdsfoot Delta below New Orleans is the result of an unprecedented
feat of riverine engineering by the US Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter the Corps) in the
twentieth century to lock the river into its current channel and keep it from changing course. If
the river would have been allowed to shift course away from its current location this would have
meant abandoning almost three centuries worth of economic investment and urban development
that accompanied the colonization of Louisiana by French, Spanish, and American settlers
(Reuss 1995, McPhee 1989, Barry 1997). For the sake of the regional and national economy, the
river had to stay put.
6

As a result of impounding the Mississippi behind an elaborate system of levees, dams,
and other flood control structures, the river's capacity to sustain and replenish coastal lands was
shut down. Because the river can no longer overtop its banks to accrete land, coastal marshland
that would otherwise be sustained by frequent inundation from the river began subsiding at
accelerated rates. Sinking in deltas, to be sure, is a normal geophysical phenomenon. Yet it was
not until the past thirty years - and the particularly devastating hurricane season of 2005 - that
policy makers, scientists, elected officials, coastal residents and the rest of the nation fully came
to realize the extent of the slow burning environmental crisis afoot in Louisiana. All of that
murky water and watery grass was not only home to diverse coastal ecosystems that support a
robust commercial fishing industry, lucrative deposits of oil, gas, and other natural resources,
and home to a wealth of culturally diverse bayou people: it was the built-in buffer to protect
coastal communities and more urbanized areas like New Orleans from devastating storm surges
associated with hurricanes that make their way through the Gulf of Mexico (Day et al. 2007). If
Louisianans could not figure out a way to stop the bleeding of coastal lands and begin the
reparative work of restoring the coast, the Gulf of Mexico would soon be at their front doors,
along with the guaranteed risk of the next hurricane completely flattening the coast.
Much of the disappearing coastal land is home to south Louisiana’s poorest and most
politically marginalized communities of color. They are on the front lines of the coastal land loss
crisis, bearing the brunt of the environmental, economic, and personal risks associated with
subsiding land and rising seas. Many of the communities that live on these exposed bayous and
marshes at the edge of the land loss crisis are descendant from European landowners,
dispossessed indigenous groups, enslaved laborers from Africa, free people of color and other
migrant groups that have converged in Louisiana's bayous over the past three centuries of
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colonial settlement (Brasseaux 2005, Hirsch and Logsdon 1992, Austin 2006). The cultural and
economic relationships of these diverse groups to the lower delta landscape are shaped by
constant change from geomorphological processes linked to the movement of the river, which
acts as a geologic force in its own right as a land building machine. Their relationships to this
place are also constituted by the brutal processes of transforming the lower Mississippi River
Delta and coastal landscape from a dynamic and inhospitable place into a manageable and
profitable one. This transformation relied on an admixture of racialized worldviews that provided
the ideological fodder and labor force and an emerging field of riverine and coastal engineering
and natural science to transform and confine the river's natural processes. Today, the descendants
of individuals and communities whose lives and land were transformed through colonial
encounters, plantation economies, and natural resource industries constitute the majority of the
coastal communities watching coastal landscapes gradually sink out from under them.
Yet, as policymakers, scientists, and technocrats charged with developing regional
strategies for keeping pace with, and hopefully outpacing, coastal land loss move forward with
ambitious and expensive projects for repairing Louisiana’s damaged and degraded wetlands,
their capacity to address questions of history, power and inequality in their accounts of and
solutions to the land loss crisis are scant at best. In part, this is because the geophysical models
scientists, engineers, and environmental planners work with are largely disconnected from the
frameworks that inform vernacular explanations and experiences of land loss. This disconnect
dually emerges from the seemingly isolated instantiations of the region’s racial histories and its
equally long history of engineering the lower river. That is, the extent to which science and
engineering is connected to the broader environmental and racial history of the region often
remains elusive or difficult to track within contemporary conversations about confronting the
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unprecedented extent of climate and geologic change. These transformations are characteristic
not only of Louisiana’s distinct geomorphology and settler colonial history, but the extent to
which humans have dramatically transformed the Earth in the Anthropocene.

Earth making, race making
Broadly, this dissertation is focused on understanding how meanings of and practices of
making racial difference are constituted within and through a landscape overdetermined by
natural processes, science, and engineering. It mobilizes a historical and ethnographic framework
to examine how the material movements of water, sediment, and marsh, are connected to the
racial histories and experiences of communities of color in the region and scientists drawn
together by Louisiana's contemporary land loss crisis.

Image 3: Map of Plaquemines Parish listing several of the towns references in this dissertation and the location of
proposed river sediment diversion projects (Harris Bienn, 2018).
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I focus, in particular, on several black communities1 that occupy the frontline of the coastal land
loss crisis in Plaquemines Parish and rest in the footprint of Louisiana's ambitious technoscientific experiment to re-route large portions of the Mississippi River in order to restore the
sinking coastal landscape.
Each chapter probes the relationship between people and place, examining the means
through which experiences of exclusion and autonomy for communities of color living along the
lower reaches of the Mississippi River are configured and reconfigured through transformations
of the geophysical contours of the lower delta landscape. I do so through an analysis of the
uneven development of racial inequalities in the coastal landscape and its connection to regimes
of environmental management and engineering that have attempted to stabilize shifting lands,
waters, and race relations in the region over the past two hundred years.
The wider ethnographic and theoretical scope of this dissertation is situated in
understanding the material and political nature of coastal land loss through the experiences,
desires, and expectations of communities of color and scientists drawn together by this pressing
environmental issue. Land loss is the kernel around which each section of this dissertation builds.
What land and loss means to these different groups, this dissertation suggests, frames how they
respectively understand projects of environmental restoration and the attendant material and
social impacts restoration science can bring to coastal Louisiana.
Instead of treating land loss simply as natural process or matter of environmental
restoration, however, I examine its cultural, material, and political dimensions, especially for

A note on race terminology: Participants from my research in Plaquemines Parish often used the terms African
American and black interchangeably. I predominately use the term black to describe communities as this was the term
most frequently used among residents who identify as variously African American, Creole, and mixed-race. I will
elaborate further on these terminologies and the instability of racial categories as they are used by residents at several
points in the dissertation.
1
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communities of color that have already experienced long histories of loss - of property,
livelihood, and political rights. A dual focus on the geophysical work of the river - dictating land
growth, sinking, and movement - and the political and scientific circumstances through which
the river's role changes in the coastal environment shows that past and contemporary unequal
and uneven racial geographies are not merely forms of environmental racism shaped by
colorblind coastal planning practices, but deeply entwined with practices of making and
contesting racial difference. As such, this dissertation is not an ethnography of coastal
restoration. Rather, it is an ethnography about the ways racial and more broadly social difference
is geographically and materially constituted, and the specific role that the physical and
engineering sciences play in the uneven development of the lower delta region.
My use of the terms geography and landscape draws on scholars in anthropology and
geography concerned with the ways the physical environment operates at the material and
symbolic level to constitute meanings of place and people (Kosek 2006, Ogden 2011). Reflecting
the three part approach to defining space outlined by the work of Henri Lefebvre (1991), I
understand geography as spanning three distinct realms: physical locations and their material
attributes, such as physical constitution of levees or processes of marsh subsidence;
representations of material environments, such as maps, models, and diagrams; and the lived
ways that people and social processes are embedded in a particular place, such as the ways ideas
of personal and collective identity in bayou areas are tied to subsidence fishing. I use landscape
as a way to denote the interconnections between these different geographies in addition to using
it as a geographically specific term. This builds on the contemporary work of environmental
anthropologists that use the term landscape to draw attention to the relationships or assemblages
forged between different forms of knowledge about the environment, be it traditional or
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scientific, processes of social reproduction, and the material conditions or qualities of the
environment (Ogden 2011). Like the strata or layers of sediment that build up and sink down in
the delta, conceptualizing coastal Louisiana as a social and material landscape enables me to give
ethnographic and critical attention to the various human and non-human entities and ideological
frameworks that cut across and co-produce one another. Following Ogden (2011), the
ethnographic moments I chose to highlight in this dissertation attempt to "re-inscribe the human"
(29), and specifically the racialized social relations, into the study of environmental restoration.
Mobilizing the terms geography and landscape enable me to "grapp[le] with their
[material and symbolic] relatedness," to quote Kosek (2006, 23), holding differently situated
groups and material environments in tension with each other. In the case of coastal Louisiana,
this approach creates a pathway to explore connections between histories of underdevelopment
and political disenfranchisement for black and other minority communities in the region and the
ways physical manipulations of the coastal landscape. More specifically, this approach provides
a way to examine how ideas about what nature is or is not, and how it should act (i.e. how to
manage the river for flood control) were in part forged by and constitutive of racial inequalities.
These are inequities that emerge in patterns of geographic segregation, political
disempowerment, allocation of economic resources, and everyday encounters with racism for
black and other minority residents. My ethnographic work focused on understanding these place
based inequities and the ways they cut across public debate and techno-scientific understandings
of land loss, protection, and restoration. This theoretical approach enables me to track and
amplify the messiness of political encounters that have reshaped the lower delta landscape and
the terms of discrimination and political empowerment for coastal communities.
Drawing from eighteen months of research, this dissertation argues that geologic and
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deltaic processes forge meanings of racial difference as they encounter and are reconfigured by
physical sciences and engineering and communities of color. The lower delta landscape is both a
laboratory for experiments in environmental engineering for scientists and political autonomy for
communities of color. And, moreover, I argue that natural geologic processes and the
environment itself - land, water, sediment - are key actors in the production of racial inequities,
particularly as ideas of nature and natural processes are captured and sustained by restoration
efforts. In other words, what ideas of nature or natural processes and restoration are, where the
material and social begin and end, and the ways (in)justice for black communities is or is not
made by environmental science and engineering, are contested issues among and between
residents and scientists. The contestation between these ideas and practices is where land loss
and environmental restoration enact political struggle that exceeds the question of land loss or
land gain. These tensions are at the core of this dissertation.
With these arguments in mind, this dissertation aims to make several theoretical
interventions into the relationship between the production of racial formations, science, and the
work or agency of non-human landscapes.

Race as an environmental formation
Circuits of science, nature, and difference conceal, yet violently situate, non-white communities.
- Geographers (Woods and McKittrick 2007, 2)
First and foremost, this dissertation re-frames coastal land loss and restoration as the most
recent iteration of a long history of environmental engineering in the lower delta region that
operates to simultaneously stabilize material processes and racial difference. The environment in
this regard - the landscapes of mud, marsh, salt and freshwater - and ideas about what it is and
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how to manage it, are key mechanisms through which racial difference is geographically and
socially established and contested. Race, in other words, is as much an environmental formation
constituted through the material qualities of the lower delta and engineering practices as it is an
ideological and political entity forged by racialized world views steeped in eugenicist biological
and social sciences and global capitalist development entwined with environmental practices
(Omi and Winant 1994, Johnson 2013).
My theoretical formulation of race draws from several interrelated but distinct
conceptualizations of the construction of racial difference in the US. In Omi and Winant’s (1994)
work on racial formations, biology and the biological sciences shape the fundamental basis of
racial difference in the US. From here, ideas of racial difference rooted in biological distinctions
defined by racialized blood (i.e. the one drop rule) validates the network of social and political
structures that sustain inequality between groups. Beliefs carried by European colonists that nonEuropeans were of a fundamentally different species from themselves grounded the connection
between scientific rationality (as well as religious and moral values) and interpretations of
“others” as a fundamentally and inherently different race. These understandings of racial
difference structured all kinds of social relations in the colonial US, and continue to constitute
patterns of economic inequity and racialized spatial segregation today. To this end, Omi and
Winant argue that race has "always been at the center of the American experience” (Omi and
Winant 1994, 6) even as we move into a post-Civil Rights era of colorblind racism that is purged
of outright racist and segregationist language and policy (Bonilla-Silva 2015).
The particular thread of Omi and Winant’s definition of racial formations I extend in this
dissertation is the role of the sciences, or rather scientific rationality and reason, as a persistent
aspect of what continues to produce racial difference. Scientific authority, in this regard, has as
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much impact on shaping meanings of racial difference as do beliefs about biological difference.
Science and scientific reason are at the center of how racial inequalities are forged and justified.
Even though it is widely accepted today that race is shaped by social and historical processes and
not biology, scientific rationality and reason continue to play a role in sustaining many of the
institutions that uphold structures of racial inequity. In the context of disappearing coastal
Louisiana, I argue that contemporary manifestations of uneven development of and
underinvestment in black communities are as much forged by slavery era beliefs about biological
and social difference as they are by spatial practices that built racial inequality into the landscape
through the work of an emerging field of riverine and coastal engineering and science that was
enabled by a racialized social order.
In order to articulate the relationships between environmental engineering and sciences
and the production of racial difference, I mobilize critical work on the racial geographies and
ecologies of the plantation. Recently, scholars in geography have drawn attention to the distinct
spatiality and afterlives of the plantation as an environmental and social technology central to the
production and maintenance of racial inequality in the US, particularly for black communities in
the US south and coastal areas (McKittrick 2013, Woods 1998, Kahrl 2012). This body of
scholarship reflects popular conceptualizations of racial formations as iterations of historic,
social, and political processes, yet foregrounds the ways plantation environments and their
ecologies - swamps, plants, topography, etc. - are used as tools of racial oppression by
landowners (i.e. racialized labor necessary for plantation crops like sugar) and political
autonomy and freedom for enslaved workers. For example, Sylvia Wynter’s writing on the plots
given to enslaved Africans on plantations to grow their own food to feed themselves or take to
market to sell reminds us that the environment was used on the plantation not only as a
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mechanism of oppression and exploitation, but also the fodder to cultivate resistance to the
material and social structures of racial oppression, and the racist, capitalist values the plantation
embodied (Wynter 1971). Trouillot and other scholars echo her work, insisting that the
plantation never existed in its ideal social, environmental and technical form despite being a race
making machine (1998, 16; see also Woods 1998, McKittrick 2006, 2013). By this, Trouillot
points to the ways the racial environmental logics of the plantation also encompassed counter
logics and cultural formations for enslaved workers that were, in large part, activated through
engagements with material worlds of the plantation landscapes.
Drawing from writing on racial formations and the plantation opens up the space for
thinking about the ways structural racism does not operate as a totality in tandem with
manipulation of the environment. Scholars emphasize that the plantation was an aspirational
racial and environmental institution that did not necessarily achieve its ideal forms in its
remaking of the earth or the cultural life of enslaved laborers. Rather, the plantation and its
mutation into other social spatial institutions was never a complete project, particularly for
racialized subjects who “moved in counter purpose to fatal coupling of power and difference”
(Hall 1992, 17 quoted in Gilmore 2002, 16) seemingly fixed within the landscapes of eighteenth
and nineteenth century plantations.
In this framework the environment is not overdetermined by the values and possibilities
of racial, global capitalism and geophysical processes. Rather, the environment exists as a
malleable entity that is at times serving the mechanism of white capitalist supremacy and, in
other moments, modes of black resistance. Even today, the relationship between the environment
and political autonomy for many of the black communities I conducted fieldwork with was
robust. Following the insights of my participants, I theorize the environment as a tool for racial
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oppression and resistance. Yet, at the same time, as I conducted research I learned how little
control landowners, scientists, and communities of color have over sediment, salinity, and marsh.
As such, it seems most apt to consider the environment a kind of “play thing,” to borrow from
anthropologist and novelist Zora Neale Hurston (1935), that moves in and out of different
entanglements with coastal communities but always exceeds the expectations and constraints
groups attempt to place on it. The unruly and malleable agency of the environment is especially
poignant in coastal, former plantation areas that are situated in some of the most dynamic
geophysical regions of the US.
I do not, however, treat past or current patterns of underdevelopment within
communities of color in the region as over-determined by the material characteristics of the
environment or circumscribed by localized ecological factors, as early work in environmental
anthropology suggests (Rapport 1967, Steward 1955, Milton 2013). Rather, I see the
relationship between the manifestation of racial and cultural difference and the deltaic
landscape as entangled within a dynamic, dialectical exchange that can simultaneously
recapitulate disproportionate structural inequalities and material vulnerabilities for people of
color - such as excessive flood risk or unequal access to federal flood mitigation grants (Adams
2011, Browne 2015) - and generate possibilities for resistance and alternative ways of knowing
and interacting with the lower delta landscape. To this latter point, I follow the guidance of
scholars such as Clyde Woods, Katherine McKittrick, and to a certain extent the work of early
black social scientists working in the region such as Zora Neale Hurston and WEB DuBois, to
excavate the ways black communities have used the environment to challenge deeply
entrenched racisms and social hierarchies. Whether described as “blues geographies” (Woods
1998, 2007), “plantation futures” (McKittrick 2014), or just plain “stories” or “lies" (Hurston
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1935), these traditions or alternative epistemologies of race, racism, social relations, the
environment, and plain old everyday life also shape landscapes and people in the U.S. South.
My approach to theorizing the relationship between race and the environment inflects
with but ultimately deviates from contemporary research on environmental racism and
environmental justice. This work focuses on the ways structural racism disproportionately
exposes communities of color to risk, toxicity, and natural disasters (Pulido 2000, Checker 2005,
Austin 2006, Adams 2011, Browne 2015). Instead, I analyze coastal land loss and restoration not
only for its uneven impact of environmental harms on black, brown, and other minority groups,
but for how meanings of racial difference and racial inequalities are maintained and challenged
through the management and configuration of the lower delta landscapes. Environmental
inequities, in this regard, are not merely a reflection of structural oppression that exists outside of
the environment. Rather, the use and manipulation of the environment - and ideas about nature
emanating from the natural sciences - is central to the projects of race making (Moore et al.
2001, Kosek 2006, Brahinsky et. al. 2014). As such, this dissertation argues that the environment
does not merely index racial difference but is a key means through which it produced. The
unruliness of the environment is a testament to the volatility and contingency of racial formations
and racialized environmental struggles.

The work of physical science and engineering in the production of racial formations
Time and again, race and nature stake claims to commonsensical truth […] Their sense of
universality both makes race and nature continually available for naive rediscovery and
continually obscures the historical conditions that make and remake them.
- Geographers (Moore et al. 2003, 4)
Until we come to grips with the reasonableness of racism, we will continue to look for it on the
bloody floors of Charleston churches and the dashboard cameras on Texas highways, and
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overlook it in the smart sounding logics of textbooks, policy statements, court rulings, science
journals, and cutting edge technologies.
- Sociologist (Benjamin 2016, 148-149)
In addition to the racist social and political structures that define south Louisiana's social
and material landscape from the plantation era to the present, the natural and engineering
sciences played a key role in the constitution of the lower Delta's racial formations. Building on
an understanding of racial difference as co-constituted through human modifications of the
environment, this dissertation reconstructs a history of riverine and coastal science and
engineering within the context of the region's racial history in order to highlight the role these
seemingly non-racialized practices played in production of the coast's uneven development.
Re-framing the history of engineering the lower Mississippi River Delta as a practice of
race making provides the necessary historical context through which to analyze the ways
contemporary environmental restoration efforts articulate with historic and unfolding racial
inequality. It also helps spell out the different ways science has been and continues to be enrolled
in the creation of racial difference. This is a connection, echoing the above quotes, that is often
obscured by the language of science and commonsense understandings of racism as solely
manifesting through overtly racialized violence. Tracing these connections, I expand upon
ethnographic analyses of the practices and institutions that enshrine the "reasonableness of
racism" outside of the explicit language of racism or racial difference. My focus on the
relationship between the natural and earth sciences and the reproduction of racial inequality is
meant to build on theorizations of the relationship between racial inequality, scientific reason,
and power. This approach to interpreting the relationship between science and society is crucial
within the context of analyzing climate change, which doubles down on the integrity and
authority of the natural and climate sciences.
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Several of my chapters reconstruct racial and environmental engineering histories in
order to demonstrate how scientific logic emanating from engineering the Mississippi River and
its surrounding communities is central to the project of making and maintaining racial difference.
Focus on environmental engineering projects is not only meant to show uneven development in
the lower delta region, but elaborate how each is enabled through the other. This
conceptualization of the relationship between science and racial formations acknowledges that
ignoring the racial histories of the coastal environment in restoration and climate change
adaptation efforts runs the risk of reproducing racial inequities (Kahrl 2012, Hardy et al. 2017).
Despite the fact that past and contemporary riverine sciences do not transact in the language of
racial difference, however, this does not equate to their past or current participation in the
creation of racial inequalities as solely colorblind. In south Louisiana, techno-scientific practices
are cultivated and perfected alongside the formations of uneven development in the lower delta
region. As historians have pointed out, the evolution of engineering the lower river landscape has
gone hand-in-hand with the economic and environmental formations that rely upon racialized
social hierarchies as a mechanism to develop the science of flood control (Lomax 1993, Barry
1997, Woods 1998) and, more recently, environmental restoration.
The routineness and reasonableness of the facts and matters of racial inequality in an era
of colorblind racism make scholarship in science and technology studies (STS) a powerful
companion to analyzing racial formations. As a field of critical inquiry into the practices and
ideologies that produce facts and, more broadly, common sense, STS scholars demonstrate that
the production of scientific knowledge is historically situated and contingent (and thus fragile to
rupture or paradigm shifts) (Haraway 1991, Kuhn 1962, Latour 1991). Scientific knowledge and
its production, this body of scholarship argues, exist within circuits of power that rely on
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relationships to networks and practices outside the laboratory to lend authority and durability to
the production of scientific facts and truths that organize the so-called "natural" order of things
(Foucault 1970, 1980; Latour 1983, Callon 1984, 1987). Critical STS literature thus provides a
valuable methodological and theoretical pathway into reconstructing the social production of
scientific facts and the means by which their authority is made and sustained (Latour 2005).
While STS scholarship focused on the transformation of matter into fact and ordering
facts into knowledge highlights the obligatory work that needs to be done make facts,
scholarship on racial formations in the biomedical sciences dwells more deeply with the question
of values and ideologies as they become built into the machines and experiments of scientists
(Benjamin 2016, Braun 2014). As critical race science studies scholars argue, when scientific
outcomes map on to racial inequalities, the impact of race - or the difference that racial
difference makes - is not an aberration within an experiment but the result of following scientific
methods and protocols. In other words, if the outcomes of an experiment map onto or reflect
racial difference, it indicates that race is not solely an outcome of an experiment but an aspect of
what constitutes that experiment's production.
The case of disparate land values across race in coastal Louisiana is an apt example.
When the state attempts to implement coastal projects like the Master Plan they use cost-benefit
analyses that take into account the economic values of properties across the coastal area to see
where they can get the most "bang for their buck" when they build coastal projects. Because
black and other minority owned coastal properties have little value when compared to wealthier
(sub)urbanized areas farther inland, this almost single-handedly guarantees that communities of
color will be more greatly exposed to coastal risk (Marino 2018). Beyond this, though, it also
creates another mechanism through which minority owned land continues to be economically
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and politically devalued. Indeed, creating projects aimed at making the "most good" for the most
people will continue to generate the structures that keep racial and economic hierarchies in place.
To do so normalizes these inequalities and points to seemingly race neutral things like land
values or flood risk as non-political, non-racial entities that create racial difference.
Within the context of my research, bringing a critical race focus to bear on the practices
of scientists and engineers is a means of trying to understand the production and circulation of
the "reasonableness of racism” (Benjamin 2016, 148) as it continues to map onto the coastal
landscape in forms that do not look the same as they did under the eras of slavery or Jim Crow
(c.f. Bonilla-Silva 2015). This work points us towards critical examinations of the role that
seemingly non-racialized practices play in the reproduction of racial difference and inequality.
Scholars analyzing racial formations within the biomedical sciences have taken up this challenge
in important ways through examining how discourses of public good or advancing
scientific knowledge can overshadow the ways researchers and medical practitioners continue to
expose people of color to bodily harm without ascribing particular meaning to racial difference
(Clarke et al. 2010, Epstein 2007, Benjamin 2013, Hatch 2016). The questions that frame this
research do not focus on racial animus but on the persistent racial inequalities produced
in tandem with biomedical research and, in the case of this dissertation, coastal science.
Through several chapters in the dissertation, I highlight how regimes of environmental
management intersect with racial politics, piecing together some of the ways scientific
manipulations and understandings of the coastal environment encounter struggles among
communities of color for economic and political autonomy. Such an approach to theorizing the
relationship between the natural and engineering sciences and race encompasses figuring out
ways to understand what social values and understandings of race and racism shape techno-

22

scientific work. Several of my chapters highlight exchanges among scientists and residents about
what racial difference means in the context of coastal restoration, what it looks like, and to what
extent race or black communities matter at all in scientists' and policymakers' visions for the
future of coastal Louisiana.
By tracking the interconnections between engineering the coast and histories of racial
politics as they are entangled with these scientific practices, I aim to show that science and the
common sense understandings of the environment that it produces have long been
operationalized to materialize the disenfranchisement and displacement of communities of color.
Within this framework, I situate science and engineering as key actors enrolled in the production
of a racialized coastal landscape. Science and engineering, in this regard, are not merely
manifestations of colorblind science. Rather, I argue that science’s interaction with and
manipulation of the environment in the landscape of the lower delta has never stood apart from
racial histories and ideologies. Through a focus on scientists, engineers and planners working
towards building socially and physically feasible futures for coastal Louisiana, this framework
encourages scholarly inquiry into the ways scientific discourse and practice "upgrade" (Benjamin
2015) and contribute to the normalization of racial hierarchies through climate change policy and
technical innovation.

Tracking the work of land, water, and sediment
Building on these formulations of the relationship between science, race, and
environment, much of my ethnographic and historic research points to the multifaceted roles
land, water, sediment, and other non-human entities play within the broader context of coastal
restoration and racial histories of the region. This dissertation tracks the unique role that these
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materials play within broader conversations about coastal land loss in Louisiana, particularly as
their meaning and role is interpreted among the residents and scientists in coastal Louisiana.
Recent scholarly interest in the political life of the non-human world has expanded
anthropological inquiry into the agency of the material world. This work aims to take seriously
the social life of non-humans, whether objects or animals, as they shape the broader human
world. Such an approach can reflect the spiritual and ideological worlds of certain groups (Kohn
2013, deCastro 2004) or provide deeper inquiry into the mechanisms that inform scientific
discovery (Helmreich 2009, Latour 1983). The latter is particularly pertinent for my scientist
participants whose encounters with the material world of the fluctuating delta frequently
challenge the restoration framework that informs their research.
Rather than taking the physical landscape as a passive backdrop to social change, I follow
the different ways sediment, water, and marsh encounter and participate in the production of
social life on the coast. More specifically, I analyze the materiality of the coastal region not only
as a reflection of racism and the racial capitalist state in the U.S. or as examples of normative
geophysical processes, but as key actors that co-produce the possibilities of social and
geographic exclusion for communities of color living along a disappearing coastline and the
material fodder for equity and justice. As such, this dissertation follows the ways racial inequities
and oppression are forged within and through the arrangement of the lower delta landscape. But
it also foregrounds how communities of color appropriate and engage with these landscapes in
ways that contest institutionalized racism and scientific expertise.
With this framework in mind, I do not situate my approach squarely within the realm of
post-humanist/non-human ethnography. Rather, this ethnography examines how land, water, and
other elements of the geophysical environment are wrapped up in mechanisms that reproduce
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racism and the possibilities of autonomy and freedom for communities of color. In this regard, I
highlight the ways the non-human entities are entangled within asymmetrical relations of power
in the human world (Ogden 2012, Cruikshank 2005) and the extent to which the agencies of
materials like sediment and marsh resist or exceed the expectations of my human interlocutors.
This approach to theorizing the political life or agency of land and water does not seek to
flatten differences between human and non-human actors. Rather, it attends to the multiple ways
each is reconfigured by the experiences and interpretive frameworks of my participants within a
framework that foregrounds social inequities among human groups. As such, I situate the relative
work or agency of land and water within broader histories of coastal restoration science and/or
regional race relations shaped by uneven power relations in order to understand how changes in
the physical world of the coast sustain or combat racial inequalities and scientific authority. This
dissertation thus challenges the uncritical view of nature that is prevalent in recent scholarship of
the more-than-human and suggests that the way coastal lands and waters react to climate change
and other human changes creates a new layer of seemingly colorblind racism for coastal
communities of color to contend with. Or, as some residents from Plaquemines Parish suggested,
opportunities for social and racial justice.
Together, these theoretical interventions into the ways we conceptualize the
relationship between race making and environmental sciences and engineering suggest that the
disproportionate impact of accelerating geological change on communities of color, and the
techno-scientific projects enrolled in these transformations, is a deeply material and political
phenomenon. Beyond providing another racial or environmental history of the region, this
project argues that racial formations are constituted through their relationships to science-based
practices and vanishing land, pointing towards the ethical and political questions that
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accompany climate change and its attendant human and geologic shifts. This ethnography of
land loss and land restoration thus demonstrates how the natural sciences and engineering
intervene in the production of racialized spaces in new ways that are constitutive of the lower
delta in the twenty-first century.

Research design
Ethnographic fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted over a period of eighteen
months between 2015 and 2017 in southeast Louisiana with extended fieldwork in Plaquemines
Parish, Baton Rouge, and New Orleans. I conducted fieldwork among three primary groups: 1)
Coastal restoration scientists - geologists, ecologists, engineers, social scientists - who worked on
various aspects, past and present, of coastal restoration research and planning; 2) residents from
black/mixed-race communities in Plaquemines Parish as well as non-black residents; and 3)
individuals working with regional environmental non-governmental organizations and
foundations heavily involved in coastal restoration efforts.
My fieldwork schedule varied depending on the time of year and particular projects or
issues that my participants were involved in at the time. Among each of these groups I had
several key participants who were my touchstones for keeping abreast of issues relevant to the
wider group as well as my points of entree to meeting other participants. A typical day could
include attending a public meeting hosted by the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority (CPRA) either at the state capitol in Baton Rouge or at a bait shop in south
Plaquemines Parish, helping run a summer camp for youth in Plaquemines Parish, attending
meetings with natural science colleagues concerning ongoing scientific research projects,
chatting with residents at a graduation party or family barbecue, or attending a coastal education
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and leadership training session hosted by regional NGOs.
In order to conduct fieldwork among natural and social scientists, I worked as an intern at
the Coastal Sustainability Studio at Louisiana State University and as a research assistant at the
Water Institute of the Gulf, a nonprofit coastal research organization that specializes in working
with the state on aspects of their coastal restoration program. Working alongside participants
here gave me a first-hand look into the culture of coastal restoration science in Louisiana and
helped introduce me to the wide range of scientists working across academic, NGO, and private
sectors who are either currently or have previously been involved in some aspect of coastal
restoration research and planning. Participant observation with these groups took the form of
collaborating with them on ongoing research projects, often as the "human” or social science arm
of a project. I typically spent at least two days per week over the course of my fieldwork at their
offices in Baton Rouge or out in the field with research teams, where I worked as a field hand on
data collection out in coastal marshes or on the Mississippi River. I also conducted more
traditional social science research during my time with the Water Institute, including conducing
and facilitating interviews and focus groups and helping to write-up qualitative data and findings
from research in coastal communities. Working with the Water Institute provided me with many
opportunities to see the everyday practices of making science for coastal restoration and enabled
me to develop a rapport with colleagues based on our collaborations and shared working
environment.
Compared to the more structured interactions with scientists, my time with residents in
Plaquemines Parish took on a variety of forms over the course of my fieldwork. As a sparsely
populated and geographically elongated parish, there are few very large hubs of communities in
the eastern and southern ends of the parish (see image 3). Most of the towns my participants live
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in are more akin to hamlets: Three-to four-block long with 50-100 residents. To provide a sense
of scale, the town of Ironton, one of several almost all-black communities my participants hailed
from, has no more than fifty or sixty residents. It is on the west side of the Mississippi River. On
the east side of the river, I worked in a stretch of the parish that encompasses four small towns Phoenix, Davant, Pointe à la Hache, and Bohemia.

Image 4: Barbeque for the MLK Day celebration in Pointe à la Hache, LA (photo by author).

There are approximately 300 residents, not all of whom live there full time, stretched across that
eighteen miles of parish on the east side of the Mississippi River. The high school on that side of
the river graduated three classes of students during my fieldwork. The largest graduating class
was fifteen, the smallest, seven. Despite its small size, many residents are very politically
engaged. Because there is only a handful of community organizations, primarily church based,
28

that are intermittently active throughout the year, I often attended public meetings for local
council districts, church meetings, birthday parties or other community celebrations alongside
regularly working with community organizations when they needed a hand for events such as
summer camps, fundraisers, and other activities. During slower times of the year, such as the
summer or after Mardi Gras, I would find time to meet and visit with residents, visits that would
sometimes turn into more formal semi-structured interviews.
In addition to informal conversations and working with coastal communities in my
capacity as a social scientist and friend, I also followed several Plaquemines residents as they
participated in environmental education and leadership training activities aimed at empowering
vulnerable coastal communities to take more proactive roles in coastal planning efforts.
Conducting participant observation in these spaces enabled me to see how local environmental
groups attempt to confront inequality and the uneven impacts of land loss and restoration
projects with marginalized communities. Ethnography in these spaces also provided the
opportunity to witness how residents speak back to powerful environmental groups as each work
towards crafting a vision of southeast Louisiana’s future based on changing relationships to land
and water.
Through participant observation with these groups, I tracked several key topics and
themes: the disciplinary and experiential frameworks they used to analyze and explain the
physical and political causes and consequences of land loss and the stakes of re-engineering the
Mississippi River to build new land; the political dimensions of unfolding land
restoration projects and mobilization of scientific expertise; and the ways meanings of racial
difference and inequity are historically, and at present, tied to the coastal landscape and
environmental infrastructures that have changed the lower delta region.
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After the first year of fieldwork I began arranging more formal, semi-structured
interviews with participants from across my field sites. By the end of 2017 I conducted
approximately forty interviews with participants across all groups, with many interviews taking
place over multiple meetings over the span of several months. In interviews as well as informal
conversations with residents and community groups, I began by inquiring into their perspectives
and understandings of the current land loss crisis and gradually opened the interview into a
broader set of questions about the meaning of land and water to black communities in the parish
and to individual families in particular. Because the history of race relations in Plaquemines
Parish is documented in limited sources, many of my interviews also focused on the nature of
race relations in the parish in the past and at present.2 I would often approach the topic by
reflecting on my own research about the history of slavery and segregation in the parish as means
of introducing a subject that is not often discussed among residents with non-black, outsiders.
Once residents noted my interest and understanding of the parish’s racial history, they would
begin to share stories with me, helping me to understand their personal experiences as well as
their broader view on race relations in the parish. Several of these interviews turned into more
formal oral histories that focused, for example, on the history of civil rights organizing in the
parish as well as everyday race relations.
Race, in general, is an unstable category. Coastal Louisiana is an incredibly rich example
of this. While most of the communities of color I worked with generally refer to themselves as
black or African American, many of my participants often noted how racial categories do not
map easily onto their communities or their skin color. The black/white distinction in south

With the support of a grant for the Louisiana Endowment for the Humanities, I began to formally conduct and archive
oral histories with several leaders from the black fishing communities in Plaquemines Parish. These materials are
scheduled to be released for public use in 2019 through the Louisiana Sea Grant Program at Louisiana State University.
2
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Louisiana was a fiction imposed upon mixed race groups beginning with Jim Crow and still
holds strong today, particularly in white spaces (see Hirsch 1992). Among black communities,
though, participants are quick to point out their whiter looking relatives, or mention the ways
hair texture makes strangers sometimes think they are Latino or Native American. Many
residents, depending on the day, will alternatingly identify as Creole, Native American, black, or
just "all mixed up," as one participant noted to me. Within black communities, having a fine
tuned definition of what race someone is seemed largely irrelevant. Even distinctions between
Native American groups and black or Creole groups is, at times, relatively elusive. "I know two
sisters in the same family," one participant noted to me as we talked about racial categories in
Plaquemines Parish. "One identifies as black and the other as Native American. But they are full
blood sisters!" Such stories capture the arbitrariness of racial categories, particularly in the
context of everyday and family life for black residents in this region. Yet, in the context of public
meetings or outside the confines of someone's home, black/white distinctions emerged as
politically relevant. This was especially the case when questions about equity emerged around
environmental issues.
Among scientists, I inquired into the relationship between geological research, coastal
engineering, and the political life of scientific research, particularly as it pertains to the uneven
human impacts of land loss and restoration. Many of these conversations occurred over multiday trips into the marsh or over coffee or a meal after work. I typically asked about how they
came into their field of study, what their experiences were conducting research in Louisiana and
elsewhere, and what has been unique about their work on coastal land loss. After getting to know
several scientists, I would breach the topic of the politics of their research which, due to the fact
that coastal restoration is as much a political and scientific issue at this point, was a frequent
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topic of conversation among scientists anyway.

Image 5: Fieldwork in the marsh (photo by author).

This opened an avenue for me to probe deeper into their knowledge of the wider historical
and political contexts of coastal restoration and the communities projects their research supports
and ultimately impact. This included questions about impacting not only communities of color,
but also Native American, economically impoverished groups, and fishermen in coastal areas. As
I spent time with geologists and engineers, I found that many were sympathetic to "historically
disadvantaged groups," to borrow their terminology, if not outright critical of the specters of
discrimination surrounding the use of their research by the state. Several scientists were willing
to talk about these topics. Furthermore, many of my scientist participants understood science as
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political to a certain extent, but each carried distinct perspectives on what that means for
coastal restoration practices in Louisiana in general and for themselves as individuals.

Ethnography of race in "non-racial" spaces
In many ways, the challenge of studying racial formations and racial ideologies - the
interpretive frameworks used by members of dominate and subordinate racial groups to explain
or challenge racialized social orders (Bonilla-Silva 2018, Hall 1980) - is that a researcher cannot
simply distribute a survey about racial beliefs and feelings to participants. Following the work of
Bonilla-Silva (2018) and social scientists examining the relationships between race, science, and
the environment (Kosek 2006), I engaged participants and data with an eye towards
understanding the meanings ascribed to land, water, science, and race alongside analyses of what
those accounts do or accomplish in the context the seemingly post/non-racial space of the natural
and geophysical sciences and the changing material conditions of a sinking coastline.
It is worth taking a moment to talk about tracking and engaging race in coastal Louisiana
at this moment in time. Race and racism are certainly not the typical terms residents, scientists,
and environmentalists frequently invoke when they hold public meetings or have personal
conversations about land loss and environmental restoration. A handful of particularly outspoken
community leaders from Plaquemines Parish would sometimes confront the topic of race and
racial inequities head on in these spaces, but more often than not race is not a frequently invoked
subject of conversation. Reflecting on my time in Plaquemines Parish I see this as an expression
of the parish’s history as well as reflection of the wider political moment in the U.S. when
invoking race and racism is somewhat more the terrain of a younger generation of political
activists from across the racial, ethnic, class, and geographic spectrum than it is in smaller, rural
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areas where the population of elders greatly outnumbers that of a younger generation. The bulk
of my middle aged and older participants, while connected to the New Orleans metro area yet
still very “country” as they were often described, were careful when talking about or invoking
race as a matter of concern for any particular issue - be it jobs, levee construction, social
services, flood insurance, or coastal restoration.
As I indicated above, I often found it useful to open up a conversation about race first,
mainly through reference to the parish’s racial histories that are fairly well known by black
residents in the parish in addition to my own questions about race in the present. Do these
histories matter today? I would sometimes ask. Or, are there particular challenges black
communities face when it comes to dealing with all this coastal land loss activity? Once
I indicated that I thought race mattered, residents would often take the time to talk with me on
the subject. As I got to know people better, and kept showing up in the community, some
resident would tell me, in a friendly manner, that Plaquemines is a “conservative parish” and that
I should be careful with who I talk with about what. After one community meeting that was a
forum for candidates running for local elected office, one woman told me that she wanted to ask
a question about racism in the parish, mostly in terms of lack of resources in black communities,
but was afraid to say the question out loud for fear that the audience might think she was playing
the “race card.” People would sometimes find ways to allude to race in the meetings I attended
about the coast, often in the form of “people who look like me” or “our minority fishermen.”
Such language is not unsurprising in a post-Civil Rights era southern town and in spaces where
there would be a mix of all races among residents and public officials.
To be sure, Plaquemines is a conservative parish. Nevertheless, as I spent time with black
residents and leaders I found that even though race was infrequently directly invoked, black
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residents still understood many of the reasons why their communities lack the same resources or
political powers of other areas of the parish is connected to historic and ongoing racism in the
parish. These inequalities manifest today as deep economic, racial, and geographic segregation
between the northern, white end of the parish closest to New Orleans, and the economically poor,
environmentally vulnerable southern and eastern ends of the parish where many communities of
color live. The southern and eastern ends of the parish rest outside of the 100-year flood
protection levees installed around the perimeter of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005
yet they are ground zero for the state's most ambitious coastal restoration projects. The
combination of these factors makes many residents feel they are valued for little more than being
a speed bump to slow the impacts of hurricanes on New Orleans and a laboratory to further
design experiments to protect more valuable communities to the north.
While discussing race, racism, and social inequality with black residents was not always
straightforward, they were topics many residents had close personal understandings of and
experiences with. Approaching these topics more broadly with scientists, however, was not
simple. The challenge among my work with scientists and environmentalists to a certain extent
was that a myopic focus on delta geomorphology and defending scientific expertise and integrity
left little room to think about the ways race and other forms of social inequality might be
impacted by their work. Beyond this, it is a challenge to begin a conversation about science and
discrimination without sounding accusatory as a social scientist. As with residents, though, I
worked my way into this by situating the curiosities that drove me to my research. To begin these
conversations with scientists, I would usually share a bit about the history of segregation
and inequality in Plaquemines to frame my questions. For many scientists, it was an introduction
to the racial history of the parish their research is conducted within and the first time they ever
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thought about how racial inequalities might be implicated in their work or the work
their research enables. I found it helpful to share some of my experiences in Plaquemines with
black residents or moments in public meetings to ask scientists questions about their perspective
on the wider political life of their research and how their work, intentionally or not, comes to
impacts the lives of people of color. To my surprise and relief many of my scientist informants
were open to these conversations and indeed very curious to learn more about the communities I
worked with in Plaquemines. They often had very thoughtful responses to my questions, taking
the opportunity to share their interpretations of the nature of their disciplinary training and its
shortcomings for confronting tough "political" questions as one of my participants called it.
In addition to conducting participant observation among two very different yet
significantly interconnected groups, I also spent time in regional archives to broaden my
understanding of the history of Plaquemines Parish, particularly the history of its plantation and
other natural resources economies and the broader history of river management in the region. I
also conducted a series of oral history interviews with black residents and reviewed
local histories written by residents in order to gain a sense of everyday life for black residents
living through the Jim Crow era into the present. This history is scant in secondary source
writing by scholars, so conducting oral histories was a unique opportunity to build an archive of
material on black life in the parish and contribute to a growing record of black life in
Plaquemines Parish.
There is more secondary source material on the history of coastal restoration than
histories of race relations in Plaquemines Parish. I relied on academic articles and oral history
interviews conducted by myself and other researchers and documentarians that have followed
the evolution of coastal restoration science and planning since the 1960s in order to
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piece together the history that situates the current culture of restoration science and planning in
coastal Louisiana.
Together, this multi-sited, multi-method approach enabled me to dive into very different
social worlds brought together by coastal subsidence, erosion, and restoration processes. While I
anticipated that the cultural, historic, and disciplinary backgrounds of scientists and communities
of color would be very different (which they are), what I found by moving between groups was a
shared sense of the moral and ethical obligation to confront challenging technical and political
questions that accompany land loss and the role of science in particular, even if members of
these groups hold diverse understandings of what these processes and entities are. To approach
my framing questions in this way enabled me to look for connections as much as frictions among
groups. This method yielded findings that focused on the experiential and disciplinary
frameworks that situated different interpretations of race, land loss, and restoration tactics that
challenge what might one might anticipate as a "scientists versus residents" reification of
participants in my research.

Chapter overview
This ethnography is guided by geological processes and concepts that articulate with the
physical and social histories and practices that draw together race making and place making in a
disappearing landscape. Each section historically and ethnographically probes the connections
between experiences of racial belonging and dispossession, science and technologies for
configuring deltaic landscapes and people, and the physical transformation and social meanings
of land and water.

37

The first section, subsidence - the processes by which delta sediments compact and sink
under the weight of pressure from water, vegetation, and new sediment deposits - situates
contemporary environmental restoration efforts in the lower Mississippi River Delta within the
context of a longer history of science, land, and water coming together to entrench deep racial
inequalities into the lower river landscape. Chapter one begins with an inquiry into the race and
place making technologies of the plantation as a particular kind of techno-scientific and socioecological formation that mobilizes science and racial hierarchies as instruments of
environmental change. It provides a history of the region beginning with nineteenth century
sugar plantations along the river that highlights key connections and shifts between
environmental engineering and racial histories as they have unfolded within the eras of slavery,
Jim Crow, and post-Jim Crow development and its parallel eras in river management from
navigation, to flood control, and environmental restoration. It ends by examining the emergence
of land loss as a geophysical problem and how re-routing the Mississippi River came to occupy
the center of the state's newest environmental restoration program. By tracing the evolution of
riverine and coastal engineering and racial histories, I highlight the ways people of color living
on the grounds of old plantations and contemporary restoration sites understand the
historic relationship between racial belonging and inequality and scientific configurations of the
lower river landscape.
Chapter two focuses on distinct interpretations and experiences of land, loss, and water
for black residents living in Plaquemines Parish. It examines the ways the coastal landscape is
used to alternatingly dispossess black communities and empower them to challenge racism and
access political power in what one participant described to me as the “most racist parish” in
Louisiana. Diving into the multiple meanings of land loss residents carry that extend beyond
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coastal subsidence and erosion, this chapter suggests that the relationship between communities
of color and environmental change are not circumscribed by geophysical processes of land
subsiding or disappearing, as popular narratives of coastal land loss in Louisiana typically
convey. Rather, it is through a longer history of racialized relationships to the environment, on
land and in the water, that these communities come to understand the political and racial stakes
of land loss and restoration.
Together, these chapters offer a political ecology of racial formations, coastal engineering
science, and land loss in the lower Mississippi Delta that situates ongoing political
struggles scientist and residents face as they navigate new proposals for once again transforming
the geophysical and social landscapes of the lower river region.
The second section, inundation - a situation of overflow, as when a river overtops its
banks and overwhelms neighboring ecosystems - focuses on the political dilemmas emerging
around proposals and technologies currently being used to justify the construction of large river
sediment diversions for restoring sinking and eroding wetlands next to several communities of
color. Chapter three examines the political life of predictive models used to study and implement
river sediment diversions for coastal restoration. Drawing on ethnographic interviews with
scientists and participant observation at conferences, public meetings, and other events, this
chapter tracks the contested emergence of predictive models in restoration science circles, how
they came to occupy the center of the state's land loss strategies, and the critical perspectives
scientists, policy makers, and residents hold about predictive models as contrastively speculative
or realistic simulations of land restoration processes. The chapter ends by examining the ways
expertise is politicized and contested around the distinct kinds of hypothetical, versus material,
environmental knowledge models create.
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Chapter four builds off the historic materials from chapters one and two to examine how
black communities living in the footprints of proposed sediment diversions interpret the stakes of
becoming a laboratory for coastal restoration. Drawing from ethnographic interviews with
residents and scientists and participant observation from public meetings, this chapter examines
the ways different groups interpret the unequal impacts of this large environmental infrastructure
project in light of its biophysical functions and the impacts of previous environmental restoration
projects on communities of color in the region. To do this, the chapter follows the ways members
of historic black communities living in the pathway of river sediment diversions contest the
techno-scientific terms of restoration associated with the project and, instead, re-frame the river
diversion as a matter of racial and economic justice.
The final section, avulsion - the geological process by which a river changes course,
finding a more direct route to the sea - examines the reconfiguration of restoration within an
ongoing suite of experimental design thinking practices as the newest technology aimed at
democratizing coastal planning and cultivating resilience for coastal communities facing
uncertain future impacts of coastal land loss and restoration. I follow the ways coastal planners
attempt to foster resilient citizens through strategic training and engagement strategies to enable
bottom-up, democratic practices for re-imagining coastal environments. The chapter argues that
coastal co-design and empowerment strategies used by regional NGO groups reinforces
apolitical relations between the state and citizens that critical scholars of resilience identify as
neoliberal and apolitical, but also pushes against this prevailing critique by attempting to merge
practices for political organizing into new frameworks for developing coastal leaders.
The conclusion revisits some of the theoretical themes from the introduction and
highlights the ways close, ethnographic research about coastal land loss and restoration reveals a
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complex set of relationships between people and the coastal environment that exceeds restoration
frameworks. I argue that research among communities of color reflects that the deltaic landscape
is suffuse with the capacity for racial oppression and political autonomy for groups. And,
furthermore, that the materiality of water, marsh, and sediment does not easily configure to any
one group's desires, be that challenging racist institutions or achieving large-scale restoration of
the coast.
I end by reflecting on the possibilities of coastal restoration becoming a project to
promote social and racial justice in addition to land building and environmental protection.
Following the arc of this dissertation I suggest, as my participants do, that configurations of the
environment and uses of science and engineering have long been active in the production of race
and social life in the lower delta. With that in mind, I posit that taking a more explicit stance
towards embracing these histories might enable practitioners of coastal restoration to see their
work as a larger project for ameliorating persistent geographic and social inequities along the
Louisiana coast.
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II. Subsidence
While forces of accretion fuel land growth in the Mississippi River Delta, the weight of
riverine sediments also causes deltaic land to sink in on itself in a process called subsidence.
Subsidence is the alternate side of land accretion in deltas with the two processes, in theory,
offsetting the impacts of each other. Since the settlement and extensive modification of the lower
Mississippi River Delta, however, subsidence has come to outpace the Mississippi River's
capacity to accrete new land. Though scientists know that subsidence is always happening and
that it is exacerbated when new sediment cannot reach coastal marshlands, rates of subsidence
across the deltaic plain are difficult to understand and predict. As one geologist noted to me
while out collecting sediment samples one day: "subsidence is spatially variable as hell .... we
know almost nothing about it."
The first two chapters of this dissertation examine the emergence of accelerated coastal
land subsidence - land loss - as a geophysical problem confronted through various socioenvironmental formations in the coastal region. Beginning with a close investigation of the social
and material ecologies of the plantation, I look at the histories of river and environmental
engineering and the emergence of the region's racial geographies, highlighting their intersecting
histories. Following the movements of land, water, science, and people, this section lays the
foundation for how racial histories and the lower delta environment are inscribed onto each
other.
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1. From plantation to restoration: People, land, and water in the lower river region
A plantation's future
The first time I set foot inside Woodland Plantation, an old sugar plantation house turned
bed and breakfast in Plaquemines Parish, it was on a hot morning in August 2015. I was there to
attend the fifth meeting of the Expert Panel on Sediment Diversions. The Expert Panel meeting
was organized by the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA), the
state’s centralized coastal planning agency that was established in the wake of Hurricane Katrina
in 2006. The meeting was convened by the Water Institute of the Gulf, a non-profit coastal
research organization started in 2012 to aid the state in developing the scientific research
necessary to execute aspects of its ambitious plan to abate coastal land loss. The Expert Panel, a
group of non-Louisiana scientists, were gathered to review and advise on the state's proposed
construction of a several large river sediment diversion projects intended to help quickly rebuild
sinking coastal land. The diversion in question for the day was slated to be built just a few miles
up the road from Woodland Plantation.
As I drove down the four lane highway that follows the curves of the Mississippi River
south from New Orleans that morning I passed refineries, coal storage facilities, citrus and
produce stands, and several small communities of homes tucked between outcroppings of trees
by the side of the highway. The sky was a hazy blue that faded into an expanse of green and
brown marshes along the flat, sweltering horizon of the lower delta. It was clear enough to see
elevated fish camps3 miles away precariously perched above the marsh. Freight ships passing by

3

Fish camps are vacation and weekend homes in coastal areas used by visitors to the area for recreational fishing.
They are often ten to twenty feet up in the air on pilings out in the marsh.
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in the Mississippi River looked larger than life, looming over the sunken coastal lands as if they
were floating over the river and the marsh.

Image 6: Road down to south Plaquemines Parish (photo by author).

On my way down to the meeting I had a brief phone call with Mr. Percy, a local leader
from one of the African American fishing communities on the east bank of the river
in Plaquemines Parish. I had contacted him earlier that week about spending time in some of the
more sparsely populated east bank communities and mentioned the Expert Panel meeting to him.
"What meeting you talking about?" He didn’t have it on his schedule but assured me that he
would try to get over there with a few neighbors from the east bank.
I eventually found my way into an old church converted into an event space at Woodland
where the meeting was already underway. It was standing room only when I arrived. I
recognized a few people from the handful of CPRA meetings I attended over the summer as well
as community outreach folks from local environmental non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and
several prominent coastal scientists. Elaborate stained glass windows let the summer light stream
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in as presenters took twenty minute turns updating the Expert Panel on their research via a
PowerPoint screen set up where a pulpit would have been if the space had not been turned into a
bar to serve guests of the bed and breakfast. The building, I later found out, was an old church
salvaged from another area plantation, Magnolia. The Woodland Plantation's claim to fame is
that its silhouette graces the label of the Southern Comfort bottle, a popular whiskey-based liquor
from south Louisiana.
Presenters discussed aspects of the research, planning, and construction of the MidBarataria Sediment Diversion, the cornerstone of the state’s plan for saving the coast. The river
sediment diversion structure wagers that a strategic and controlled breech in the Mississippi
River levee can transport the necessary sediment from the river to adjacent marshes to slow their
sinking and erosion to the point where there could be no net loss of coastal land in the state maybe even the possibility of net land gain.4 Despite the apparent simplicity of mimicking
natural deltaic land building processes5, since its incorporation into the state's Master Plan in
2012, the Mid-Barataria Diversion - colloquially known just as "the diversion" - has been the
subject of intense debate between scientists, planners, and local residents. The bulk of
disagreement about the diversion has come from commercial fishermen who see the periodic
release of 250,000 cubic feet per second of river water (approximately one fourth of the entire
volume of the Mississippi River at New Orleans) into coastal marshes and estuaries as the death
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At this point in time, the state was still hopeful that river sediment diversions would enable them to offset the pace
of land subsidence and erosion, and perhaps even outpace sinking with new land building. These predictions, based
on research compiled for the 2012 Coastal Master Plan, were significantly scaled back with the release of the 2017
Coastal Master Plan and its findings that sediment diversions would, at best, be able to maintain land at present.
Within a year after this particular meeting, the state would begin publically stating that sediment diversions, while
still necessary, would not be able to build and sustain as much land as they had initially hoped back in 2012.
5
In delta geomorphology, rivers regularly overflow their banks, depositing varying sizes of sediment that gradually
accrete, or build-up, into new land. The sediment diversion structure attempts to reproduce this process, albeit
through a highly engineered river control structure that would be monitored and operated by local and state
agencies.
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knell of their industries, communities, and way of life. That much freshwater, many fishermen
and residents argue, will kill the brackish (part salty, part fresh) estuaries that sustain Louisiana's
seafood industry and expose coastal communities to new flood risks. The CPRA and many of its
scientists, though, believe the diversion is the only hope Louisiana has to save a quickly
disappearing coast; and, furthermore, that because the diversion imitates the delta's land building
functions, it is a safe bet for restoring disappearing land. What makes matters complicated for
scientists, though, is that a sediment diversion has never built anywhere in the world: so even
though there is much anticipation among scientists about how the diversion will theoretically
function, nobody knows from experience what a river sediment diversion will actually do to the
delta and the people who live there once it is built.
"We are independent and objective,” the spokesperson for the Expert Panel announced as
they transitioned between speakers. The group of experts - engineers, water management experts,
ecologists, and social scientists - met periodically since 2014 in order "to provide expert advice
and guidance on key issues that pertain to river diversions, recognizing that diversions are an
essential restoration tool in coastal Louisiana” (The Water Institute of the Gulf 2014). For every
meeting, the panel of twelve experts is flown in from all over the country for two days to
participate in events, field visits, and one public meeting to discuss the state of research on the
environmental and social impacts of sediment diversions. Meetings like this one were largely
composed of presentations from The Water Institute of the Gulf, the US Army Corps of
Engineers (the Corps), CPRA, and a suite of environmental NGO groups actively
supporting research that substantiates the land building potential of river sediment diversions.

46

As scientists presented on the latest results of their efforts to model the biophysical
impacts of the diversions, Expert Panel members grilled them with questions about
communication with coastal residents and certainty about the reliability of recent model outputs.
"Our concern from the beginning," one panel member said at the end of an engineer's
presentation, "is that the communities think our models are incorrect, so we should focus on
certainties. We to be real with ourselves. We can predict certain things better than others."
"And," another panel member chimed in, "there continues to be a significant shortcoming
in social analysis."
Reference to people - variously referred to as social impacts, human impacts, or human
dimensions - in the series of presentations was scarce. Sediment, computational models, and
ecological change dominated the conversation. Reflecting on my drive down, I could somewhat
understand why: Plaquemines is rural parish where sightings of people and communities can be
few and far between.
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Image 7: South Plaquemines Parish landscape looking from the west to the east (photo by author).

Yet the artifacts of people and their interactions with the lower river environmental were
everywhere: from winding spines of river levees following the river out to the Gulf of Mexico to
protect against seasonal river flooding, to the collection of raised creole style buildings that dot
the Woodland Plantation property that were architectural reminders of the property's time as a
sugar plantation, the topography of water, infrastructures, and marsh are deeply entwined with
the human history and evolution of the region.
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Image 8: An abandoned raised creole style plantation house in Plaquemines Parish (photo by author).

This latter point was particularly striking to me as the Expert Panel danced around the idea of
devoting critical attention to the potential negative social and economic impacts of transforming
this lower river area by re-routing the river.
How strange, it seemed to me, to wade into a conversation about social impacts
associated with engineering the environment from the center of an old sugar plantation. Like the
seemingly empty landscape of southern Plaquemines Parish, many of the experts at the meeting
saw the room as a venue to share and test ideas about managing land and water. Not, on the other
hand, to ask about the human histories forged within and alongside the past and future
transformations of the deltaic environment and the eerie material and symbolic resonance of
planning the future of the region once again from the epicenter of capitalist, colonial
development that rests on the fulcrum of a racialized social world.
If, following the writings of scholars analyzing the histories and afterlives of plantations
throughout the US South and Caribbean, the plantation is an "ongoing locus of anti-black
[racialized] violence," (McKittrick 2013: 2-3), what does it mean to plan for abating coastal land
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loss or addressing the social and economic impacts of environmental engineering from the
epicenter of the racialized socio-ecological and economic orders of the plantation? That is, what
does it mean to plan for the future of the coast from the symbolic center of "black death" (ibid.)?
Is restoration and the "rule of experts" (Mitchell 2002), the plantation’s future?

Entwined histories
Sitting there that August day I considered the very material ways expertise,
environmental technologies, and racial histories converge in unexpected ways in Plaquemines
Parish and how these encounters are configured anew in the era of coastal land loss and
restoration. If we understand the plantation itself as a distinct type of socio-ecological formation
that entrenches racial hierarchies within and through ideas of racial difference and technoscientific material practices (Stewart 1991, Troulliot 2006, McKittrick 2011, 2013), coastal
restoration is seemingly the plantation's newest reconfiguration within Louisiana's coastal
landscape. Following the lead of McKittrick (2013) and others, what new race and place making
practices emerge through the discourse and practice of restoration and in what ways does it
resonate with the plantation "logics" of the past?
This chapter investigates this theoretical question by examining the interdependencies
and cleavages forged between land, water, and people in the lower delta region from the
plantation era of the mid-nineteenth century to the contemporary era of environmental
restoration. It provides a history of the region that highlights key connections and shifts between
environmental engineering and racial histories as they have unfolded within the eras of slavery,
Jim Crow, and post-Jim Crow development and its parallel eras in river management from
navigation, to flood control, and environmental restoration. Tracing this chronology and the
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ways participants living on the grounds of old plantations and contemporary restoration sites
understand the context and stakes of these shifts, this chapter answers several interrelated
questions: How are racial geographies forged through the transformation and management of
land and water? What are the key continuities from past to present that link racial and deltaic
geographies together? And what role does shifting regimes of science and engineering play in
shaping meanings of racial difference within and through the lower delta landscape?
Focusing on these questions, this chapter offers a political ecology of racial formations in
the lower Mississippi Delta that situates the current nexus of coastal land loss, scientific
expertise, and local resistance to contemporary restoration science and policy within the historic
and theoretical framework of the plantation and its possible futures. Drawing upon scholars who
analyze the plantation as a key site for the production of racialized violence and resistance
(McKittrick 2011, 2013, Woods 1998, Troulliot 2006, Wynter 1971, Stewart 1991), I argue that
contemporary struggles among groups living in the footprint of ambitious environmental
restoration projects are prefigured by the distinct racial and techno-scientific ecologies of the
plantation. By doing so I do not seek to fetishize the plantation as a discreet place or concretized
site for the reproduction of racialized violence. Rather, I am interested in probing what kind of
racial environmental formation the planation is as a unique technology that weaves racial
difference into the coastal landscape. Along these lines, I explore how its logics are upgraded
and transposed into contemporary environmental restoration science and practices and posit what
their racial consequences might be. Just as models of surveilling black bodies have migrated
from the slave ship to contemporary regimes of securitization (Browne 2015), this chapter argues
that technologies of riverine and environmental engineering are a key part of what has built
racial inequality into the coastal landscape from the plantation era to the present. This enables us
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to see the production of racial difference as something forged through human-environment
relationships mediated by environmental and engineering knowledge alongside racist ideologies.
With this framework in mind, I find it instructive to pose the question McKittrick raises
in her meditations on the use and futures of the plantation: "What are some notable
characteristics of plantation geographies and what is the stake of linking a plantation past to a
present?" (McKittrick 2013, 4). And how, furthermore, can the plantation "open-up a discussion
about [contemporary] black life" (ibid. 5). The focus of these questions is not on the literal
reproduction of the economic, environmental, and racial relations of the nineteenth century
sugar, cotton, or rice plantations of the U.S. South. Rather, I see these question oriented towards
defining and tracking the migration of plantation and its logics as they manifest in environmental
restoration. To ask, in this regard, what the plantation's futures might be suggests moving within
and beyond the historic space-time of the plantation and focus on how techniques/technologies
for race and place making are constituted today, and to what extent they resonate with the
plantation as a foundational technology of production for racial difference. In short, to think with
the plantation, especially from the U.S. South, is to ask how "[racial] subjugation and land
exploitation go hand in hand”6 (McKittrick 2013, 11) in historical and contemporary contexts.
Following this lead, I use the plantation as a conceptual tool to raise questions about
connections between the present and the past, and transformations between land and water,
people and power, that have defined the contours of racialized belonging and exclusion in the
changing deltaic environment. And, furthermore, I used the plantation to explore what the role

6

While McKittrick's work focuses particularly on black geographies and the experience of enslaved Africans and
their descendants, it is not only black but racial subjugation more generally that goes hand in hand with land
exploitation. This reflects the ways the plantation is as much a settler colonial institution as a it is a race and place
making institution (see Trouillot 2006).
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earth and engineering sciences play as key modes through which environmental change is made
and given meaning.
Drawing on historic and ethnographic research, this chapter moves through moments of
encounter between techno-scientific practices for managing the lower river and shifts in racial
politics of Plaquemines Parish, where river diversions are located. By doing so, I examine
continuities between past and present, land and race, science and politics, that permeate into the
current era of environmental restoration and the experiences of residents who see environmental
restoration through specific historic and political moments.

Plantation pasts
The Woodland Plantation is one of a handful of plantations in Plaquemines Parish that
has managed to hang on through the barrage of hurricanes that has gradually destroyed traces of
the region’s plantation economies over the course of the twentieth century. Back in the
nineteenth century, Woodland was one of several regional sugar plantations and home to one of
the most technologically sophisticated mills in the parish. Although today it is predominately
host to out of town recreational fishermen who come from outside of Louisiana to fish the waters
surrounding the river and its estuaries, Woodland's historic connection to the cultivation of sugar
and slavery is not far out of the minds of several African American residents of the parish. I
would rarely, if ever, see leaders from the black community in the building and with many
residents telling me they refuse to attend any event there. “It’s disrespectful,” one woman noted
when I asked her about spending time there for meetings. Others, if they did go there, would note
in side conversations how strange they felt in that space. As a community organizer from one of
several black communities in the parish noted: “Yes, we know there is no longer slaves, but
still…they had to have the meeting in a plantation?”
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In the context of the lower delta region and the wider U.S. South and Caribbean, the
plantation is a central site and concept through which to analyze the vexing connections between
racism, capitalism, and the environment. In his analysis of the evolution of the sugar economy in
the eighteen and nineteenth century, Sidney Mintz draws attention to social and economic
interconnections between colonial empire, relations of desire, taste, and capital, that brought
together colonial center (Europe) and outpost (the Caribbean) into an early formation of
globalization and capitalism (Mintz 1985). As a "pillar of capitalism,” the plantation underscores
the complex transformation of nature and people into malleable and extractable resources in
order to sustain relations of capitalist production and global trade (ibid., Woods 1998, 6).
In simplest terms, the plantation is a mode of transforming land “within the context of a
racial economy” (McKittrick 2013, 8), with a racialized social order supplying its ideological
foundation. It is also a project of earth and water moving, especially in the wetlands landscapes
of Mississippi River Delta, which depended on science and engineering operating in tandem with
a racialized social and economic order in order to remake landscapes and bodies into "machines"
(c.f. Stewart 1991) to extract resources from the landscape.

Socio-technical ecologies of sugar
Plaquemines plantation country reflected these characteristics. Enslaved Africans
outnumbered white and non-white landowners in the parish by almost two to one on the eve of
the Civil War. The disproportionate population of enslaved Africans working on the region's
sugar plantations provided the brute labor force that was mobilized to tame a violent and
unpredictable deltaic landscape and pilot elaborate techno-scientific experiments for cultivating
and enhancing sugar harvests.
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South Louisiana's sub-tropical climate made it a somewhat ideal, although complicated,
location for the establishment of sugar plantations, which dotted the entire length of Plaquemines
Parish from the 1700s through the early twentieth century. The dominance of sugar dramatically
reshaped the demographics of the coastal region from one of primarily displaced migrants from
Nova Scotia, those who would later become Cajuns, and indigenous groups that settled in the
region due to violence and displacement from American colonializing forces to the north, to a
landscape of landholding French and Anglo settlers (Austin 2006, Brasseaux 2005). At the
height of sugar's development in Plaquemines Parish in the mid-1800s there were 4,779 slaves in
the parish, compared to the 2,611 white and colored residents in the parish, with many of the
enslaved at work on large sugar plantations and mills and the other 615 dwellings recorded in the
local census.7
Some of the largest and most technologically sophisticated sugar plantations were located
in Plaquemines Parish. Magnolia Plantation, just down the road from present day Woodland
Plantation, was one of the largest plantations in Louisiana in the 1850s at approximately 2,213
acres with 950 of that in cultivation with extensive refining machinery (Sitterson 1938, 198).
Since it began producing sugar in 1844 Magnolia, like other area plantations, primarily relied
upon slave labor in addition to migrant and low-wage labor, to keep the production up and
running. As an extension of the sugar empires of the Caribbean which began to decline after the
Haitian Revolution in 1791, sugar began to boom in Louisiana as plantation owners where able
to gain more technical knowledge of refining techniques from former plantation owners who fled
Haiti (Follett 2005).

7

Plaquemines Parish Census, 1850. The parish boasted nineteen sugar houses at this time (Sitterson 1938).
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Compared to cotton, rice, or indigo plantations present in lower Mississippi region, sugar
plantations were “part farm and factory” (Whitten 1984, 482), making them technologically
complex agricultural and scientific endeavors. The production of sugar was a highly industrial
process that, despite its reliance on mechanized production, also required a significant ablebodied workforce to be the “sugar machines” that would facilitate the harvest, boiling, packing,
and other labor-intensive practices that came along with industrial sugar production (Follett
2005, Abbott 2009). Geographically situated farther north from sugar production in the
Caribbean meant a shorter growing season for sugarcane complicated by vulnerability to frosts,
drought, and riverine flooding that accompanied trying to settle plantation ecologies and social
worlds into the lower delta landscape (Abbott 2009, 280-283).
As critical work on the social-spatial and economic formations of the plantation point out,
even though plantation logics manifest in diverse ways across plantation spaces, key qualities
that define it include: 1) it is self-sustaining and replicable in form as a technology, 2) it
transforms land within the context of a racial economy, 3) it is a process eminent to the
production of racial formations and racial subjugation (Wynter 1971, Stewart 1991, Woods
1998, Trouillot 2006, Johnson 2013, McKittrick 2014). Sugar plantations in Plaquemines Parish
were not exception to these rules as planters navigated technological innovation, environmental
constraints, and racial hierarchies to produce their harvests. The technical processes and
challenges of refining sugar, managing water flow and distribution on fields, and attempting to
streamline labor is a hallmark of how local historians write about the antebellum sugar industry
in Plaquemines. Plantations and mills across the parish were “implemented with the most
modern scientific sugar making machinery of the day, and was manned by more than 100 slaves”
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(Meyer 1981, 59). Central sugar mills and refineries were established on the parish on both the
east and west banks.
Regional historians refer to many of the plantation owners in Plaquemines as the
"scientific sugar planters," (Meyer 1981, 81-82) who, like many other sugar plantation owners in
the region, were at once "scientific cane farmer and manufacturer" (ibid., 57). To designate
plantation owners as scientists enacts a rhetorical distancing from their role as plantation owners
alternatingly enslaving and employing low-wage black labor. The first Federal Department of
Agriculture Sugar Experimentation Station on was established on Magnolia Plantation in
Plaquemines Parish, which supplied local planters with research scientists where new cultivation
equipment - cane cutters, loaders, slings and derricks - was developed (Heitmann 1986, 287;
Meyer 1981, 62). Planters in Plaquemines were at the epicenter of the region's sugar knowledge
economy, editing prominent journals and furnishing laboratories and schools devoted to
disseminating the scientific and technical expertise necessary for the industry's "modernization"
to planters and their families (Heitmann 1986, 293). Working together, the cultivation of sugar
knowledge and technological innovation facilitated the industry's growth as much as enslaved
and post-emancipation low-wage labor and availability of coastal land did.

Racial geographies of sugar plantation
While the technical details of operating sugar plantations are often elaborated upon in
historic documents, understanding the nature of race relations on these incredibly labor intensive
plantations is not as straightforward. As enslaved and later low-wage laborers, black residents
were "instruments of environmental manipulation" wherein the flow of water, in particular, was a
mechanism of social control upon which the entire economic world of the U.S. South rested
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(Stewart 1991, 54). The plantation system, in this regard, was the tool that "shaped and
consolidated" racialized structures of power in the region, and did so through the demands of
landowners and the environment itself (ibid).
What is preserved of old landowner's journals and papers predominately describes
relations between landowners and slaves amicable. Working often six and sometimes seven days
a week, records from Magnolia and other plantations in the region often characterize
relationships between owners and slaves as positive, with landowners going out of their ways to
allow slaves to cultivate gardens, allowing pregnant women to do “lighter” work, and even
providing medical attention to sick or hurt slaves (Stitterson 1938, Whitten 2005).8 Journals from
plantations documenting life in the 1880s and 1890s in Plaquemines describe many of the “loyal
negroes” who stayed with families after emancipation and continued to be "part of the family."
Florence Dymond, daughter of sugar planter John Dymond, reflecting on her youth during this
time period, perhaps best captured the ethnographic vantage of post-war plantation life cast
through the halcyon vantage of white landowners and their families:
Picture the place as it was then. The sugar cane fields, a waving sea of green as far as the
eye could reach; the “big home” (our residence); the sugar house; the plantation store;
two overseer houses…. the negro church, used weekdays for a school house, and some
ten or twelve houses for Italian laborers, father being the first man in Louisiana to employ
Italians agriculturally.9
Many of the homes for immigrant and black laborers were located in the back, marsh side, of the
properties, next to the "drainage machines" that regulated water levels on the property. The
Dymond's had some seven hundred men, women and children at work on a daily basis and

8

As one historian analyzing the journals of Magnolia Plantation highlights: “The Negros on Magnolia were well
housed, well clothed, and well fed…the work on Magnolia, as on most antebellum sugar plantations, was arduous
and continuous. The field hands were kept at work from sunup till sundown six days a week throughout the year [yet
the journals were] remarkably free from accounts of slave misdeeds and punishment” (Sitterson 1938, 200-201).
9
Florence Dymond papers, Manuscripts Collection 453, Louisiana Research Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial
Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118.
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during grinding time the number rose to over a thousand. Florence Dynmond's memoir describes
former slaves who had become part of their family, cooking and sharing meals and a handful of
celebrations, for holidays and weddings, with members of the Dymond family. Proximity to
whiteness or white temperaments among black workers on the plantation stood out to Florence.
One particular man, Joe, Florence described as a "black boy who, though he might have black
skin, sure had a white heart." He was so loyal to the family, she described, that when he died
"we, the white friends of his childhood, bought a white marble headstone to mark his grave."
The Civil War, however, stirred unrest among slaves in the parish even under the
ostensibly generous conditions some planters kept their workers under. Those working on the
Woodland and Oakland Plantations, journals note, “refused to work unless they received pay,”
with many stating that they are “half fed and half clothed” (Sitterson 1938, 207). Such
characterizations stand in stark contrast to representations of life on Magnolia and other
plantations as "free of slave misdeeds and punishments" (ibid.). Unrest among enslaved workers,
particularly during and in the months following the end of the Civil War indicated the desire
among workers to change working conditions on regional plantations. Yet many ended up
continuing to work on former plantations, where they were able to purchase small parcels of land
and establish churches that would become the center of social life and gradual steps towards
social and economic autonomy (Edwards 2017). The establishment of a wage labor system after
the war and the extension of right for freedmen to acquire land, although subject to racism and
limited access, led to many formerly enslaved workers establishing black communities on former
plantations in the region (Austin 2006, 675, see also Lanza 1990). Within these spaces, access to
the resources of the coastal area shaped cultural and subsistence patterns that structured everyday
life for many black communities in Plaquemines after the Civil War.
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Although racial difference was left largely intact socially and economically, the
Reconstruction Era brought a brief period of political power to black residents from the parish.
As Florence's journals take note of, the election of black leadership to the state legislature under
Reconstruction was palpable enough for her father, a powerful politician and sugar planter, to
perceive it as a threat to the structure of existing white leadership. In 1891, she described parish
representation in the legislature as “black as the ace of spades [...] the sheriff of the parish was a
negro, as was the clerk of court. The judge was white but a republican.” As Florence's journals
reflect, African Americans - and those of African descent who would be considered mixed race
and/or creole - were members of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1868. African
Americans registered voters at the time greatly outnumbered white voters in the parish. Between
1868 and 1896 voters elected several African Americans into local and state leadership,
including: a state senator, state representatives, police jurors, school board members, a sheriff,
and a clerk of court (Edwards 2017, 35).
The end of the Reconstruction Era and withdrawal of union troops from southern states,
however, opened the pathway for many white southern lawmakers to begin rolling back the
political and civil rights extended to African Americans. Coupled with the Plessy vs. Ferguson
“separate but equal" doctrine established in 1896, which further empowered white lawmakers to
sustain racial segregation, legislators began re-writing laws to restrict voter registration through
the use of literacy tests and landownership requirements. This dramatically reduced the number
of African American voters, and many white voters, in Plaquemines and other parts of the U.S.
South. When new voter restrictions were passed in 1898, the number of black registered voters in
Plaquemines Parish plummeted from 3,862 in 1896 to zero in 1898 (Edwards 2017, 51, 53). The
loss of these political victories coupled with the geographic isolation of Plaquemines set the

60

stage for staunch Jim Crow policies to dominate local politics and institutions. The social spatial
logics of the plantation began to transform during this time period as Jim Crow segregation and
environmental and riverine management policies gradually reconfigured the relationship between
communities of color, white rule, and an increasingly unruly and destructive river.

River technologies: Control and accommodation
The military engineers of the Commission have taken upon their shoulders the job of making the
Mississippi over again—a job transcended in size by only the original job of creating it [...] One
who knows the Mississippi will promptly aver—not aloud, but to himself—that ten thousand
River Commissions [...] cannot curb it or confine it, cannot say to it, Go here, or Go there, and
make it obey . . . it is but wisdom for the unscientific man to keep still, lie low [...] Otherwise one
would pipe out and say the Commission might as well bully the comets in their courses and
undertake to make them behave, as try to bully the Mississippi into right and reasonable conduct.
-Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi (1883, 206)10
As much as the Civil War and its attendant changes to economic and racial structures
destabilized the racialized economy of sugar plantations in Plaquemines Parish, frequent and
intensifying riverine flooding and hurricanes perpetually threatened to put sugar plantations out
of existence. Under French rule, the first levee built along the lower Mississippi River in New
Orleans in 1717 was about three feet tall and 5,400 feet long. At this point until 1875, the
responsibility for the creation and maintenance of levee systems was set upon individual
landowners and local governments with minimal federal control of the river save for maintaining
it as a "public highway" for interstate commerce (Reuss 1995, 9). Without a robust and
standardized levee system in place, river floods and crevasses - breeches in natural and human
made levees when water pressure becomes too high and weak points and the levee fails - were

10

This particular Twain quote was brought to my attention by Schneiderman, J. S. (2015). Naming the
Anthropocene. Philosophia, 5(2), 179-201.
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some of the most pressing environmental threats in the region. Between 1801 and 1927 there was
a flood on the Mississippi River every two and half years with at least seven major crevasses
recorded below New Orleans during that time period (Davis 2000, 88). Local landowners did
what they could to prevent floods from inundating their property by constructing levees, small at
first and increasingly larger, to hold back the waters, but this was often a futile process.
Crevasses discharge large amounts of water and sediment over areas that can span over
several hundred square miles. In delta geomorphology, crevasses are the natural ways that deltaic
rivers build land, creating new sub-deltas with each crevasse. In the plantation country of south
Louisiana, however, such breaks were dire economic and social problems for residents. To be
sure, levees were an integral part of the settler geography of the region. But many early levees
were crudely and haphazardly built by plantation owners who poorly constructed, monitored, and
maintained their levees (Davis 2000, 94). The installation of small irrigation structures, such as
flumes to irrigate fields, compounded the vulnerability of levees that were not high enough to
prevent overtopping, or fortified enough to prevent seepage and bank collapse, all of which
combined to generate fairly weak levee systems prone to being “overtopped and broken [by the
river] with ease" (Davis 2000, 94).
The ragging torrent of the river during a crevasse would easily sweep away structures,
destroy crops, and anything else in its path. Once opened, a crevasse in the levee cannot be
repaired until the water levels on both sides of the break are equal, or the water levels decline.
This meant that when levees were breeched, the crevasses would often stay open for a significant
amount of time, from several months to several years. During a crevasse in 1858 at Magnolia
Plantation, “eighteen hands worked constantly at the draining wheels in the ditches keeping the
water from getting too high” (Sitterson 1938, 205). Keeping the water at bay was no small
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endeavor. Finding the weak points in levees, the river would frequently crevasse or break
through in similar spots over time as well.
Though the US Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) was established in 1802, Congress
was slow and reluctant to incorporate flood control measures into its purview because it seemed
to be a federal investment in private property. Yet, as the costs of riverine flooding and levee
maintenance became higher and more frequent, Congress attempted to figure out ways to help
riverine areas to fund more comprehensive flood control systems.11 After devastating floods
along the lower river valley in 1874 and the Corps could no longer ignore the need to devise a
comprehensive strategy for managing the Mississippi River despite ongoing debates among
engineers about how best to approach flood control.
In 1879 the Mississippi River Commission (MRC) was created to ensure the maintenance
of navigation corridors along the lower Mississippi and generate a more systemic approach to
levee construction in order to “prevent destructive floods” (USACE, n.d. timeline, Davis 2000,
98). The establishment of the MRC branch of the Corps marked a significant transition in the
management and regulation of water in the lower river region. The question of how levees would
change the hydrology of the river, however, continued to be a vexing question for engineers
faced with pressures to protect economically valuable lands along the lower Mississippi River.

11

The Swamp Lands Acts of 1849 and 1850 was the first federal intervention into flood control initiatives. Through
this legislation, the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Missouri, were given ownership over swamp and
overflow lands in their respective state. This land could subsequently be sold off to private landowners to generate
the funds to construct regional levee projects overseen by local levee boards, who would take the lead on regulation
and maintenance of levee systems (Davis 2000, 97). As “quasi-public corporations,” local levee boards had the
power to levy taxes, bonds, and use ceded lands to raise local funds for levee maintenance and work (Davis 2000,
98-99), which would come to include mineral rights leases once oil and gas was discovered on the Louisiana coast
in the early twentieth century. The local police jury in Plaquemines Parish initially took control of ensuring property
owners in the parish were maintaining levees, roads and other infrastructures on their properties, creating laws
regulating the dimensions, rules for their maintenance, and local taxes to pay for constructions and care (Pabis 2001,
64). Landowners had to follow the regulations of the policy jury particularly for levee construction as flood control
was a persistent threat (Whitten 1984, 480).
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Manipulating the river meant intervening in deltaic land building processes, specifically the
river's annual cycle of overflowing its banks and depositing sediment in marshes and low-lying
alluvial land next to the river channel. River engineers, at this point, were yet to come to
consensus about what the hydraulic and geomorphological impacts of levee construction might
be on the lower river delta.

Levees
A levee is nothing more than earth mounded into a hill to contain water.
- Historian (Barry 1997, 40)
Driving through the Delta, you hardly ever see the river, but the levee is always close by, a great
green serpent running through woods, swamps, and farms, with towns nestling close to its slopes
[…] It flanks and confines the giant river all the way from Cairo, Illinois, down past New
Orleans, more than a thousand miles as the crow flies, but immeasurably longer as its thirty-toforty-foot-high embankments, one on each side, follow the endless winding of the stream […] It
was the principal human response to the titanic power of the great river. The century of labor it
cost, the shelter it provided, and the rich and cruel system it fostered shaped the history of the
region […] It’s impossible to imagine anything as big as the Mississippi levee, and, even more
soul-endangering, to realize these huge dykes were erected by manpower, in major part by black
muleskinners urging on their teams with wild world calls that are the only clearly African
melodies we have found in the United States.
- Folklorist (Lomax 1993, 212)
One of the fundamental struggles of the MRC when it was established was whether or not
to take a stance on engineering the river with a policy of building outlets for relief on levee
structures during floods or whether to take a levees only control stance, an approach the
benefitted navigation above flood control. It was a choice between controlling or accommodating
the river (c.f. Barry 1997).
Planters, motivated by immediate economic interests of building levees, were not
concerned with the longer term geophysical impacts of levees, which included disrupting the
annual flood cycles of the river that replenishes alluvial land and increasing flood levels on the
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river (Pabis 2000, 65). This latter concern - that levees would create higher and more dangerous
floods - was an issue engineers could not readily come to consensus about. Local engineers tried
to encourage a different approach to managing the river by using outlets to accommodate the
river's cycle of annual flooding. This approach, however, could not temper the desires of planters
to control and manage the river, even if it was grounded in hydrology and physics. To propose
outlets, as some early engineers did, was largely characterized as “contrary to the spirit of the
age; to the spirit of improvement which would reclaim and cultivate, that would convert every
swamp and fen into abodes of wealth and into cultivation fields” (Pabis 2001, 66). Planters'
desires to manage the river through flood control reflected and perhaps in no small part
influenced the Corps’ eventual adoption of a levees only policy that would come to dominate
federal regulations of river levees (Pabis 2001, 65). In this regard, plantation economies and
ecologies set the course for the evolution of river engineering sciences from the late nineteenth
century into the early twentieth century.
Reflecting the "spirit of the age" and the desires of engineers and landowners who pushed
strongly for the closure of all outlets and crevasses on the river, the first federal funding for flood
control went to levee fortification and repair. The resolution to follow a levees only pathway
forward, however, did not lay to rest disagreements among engineers about how best to deal with
the river. As early as 1828, engineers noted the need for outlets along the lower Mississippi
River to deal with overflow from the river. Some engineers even went as far as to suggest tearing
down existing levees as the best mechanism curb devastating flooding levees seemed to cause
(Reuss 1995). Famous debates between military and civilian engineers working for the Corps,
Eads and Humphreys, embodied warring ideologies among engineers about how to best manage
the river for navigation, flood protection and, to a certain extent, geomorphological processes
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(Reuss 1995, Barry 1997). To be sure, almost all engineers understood that a levees only policy
could have dire hydrologic consequences, predominately by exacerbating riverine floods. Yet
competition and prestige swayed some engineers into wavering on their conclusions about the
impacts of levees and outlets, particularly Corps engineers that desired to distinguish their work
from civilian engineers.12 As historian John Barry aptly writes: “In the century of engineers, the
study of this writhing river began as a scientific enterprise. The resulting policy became a
corruption of science. Indeed, the policy was scientific only in that it began an immense, if
unintended, experiment with the forces of the river” (Barry 1997, 91).
Despite the political debates, the Corps moved ahead simultaneously testing and building
a new knowledge base about the river and engineering processes as low-wage labor forged
engineers' experimental ideas into the landscape of water, mud, and marsh. Hydrographic and
topographic surveys of the river only became systemically collected towards the end of the
nineteenth century and experiential knowledge drawn from working on and with the river took
time to build. Engineers who studied other deltaic environments or engineering regimes in other
parts of the world understood that confining the river behind levees could certainly help the river
self-scour, or dig its own channel for navigation. To do so would remedy the persistent shoaling
problems the river presents. Engineers who supported this approach were convinced that outlets
might slow the velocity of the river, allowing sediments to drop and concentrate, creating sand
bars, impinging upon navigation and potentially exacerbating floods. Yet applying the laws of

12

Both Reuss (1995) and Barry (1997) go into extensive depth about the warring egos of Corps and civilian
engineers during this crucial time period for river management. Their work sheds light on the political contexts early
river engineers were swept up within while attempting to establish engineering standards for managing the river.
Both authors highlight how the decision of the Corps, specifically Humphreys in his 1861 report, to use a levees
only approach clearly contradicted his earlier work, which suggested that outlets were a necessary part of river
management. In order to gain prestige and distinguish himself from his civilian engineer competitors, he doubleddown on his levees only policy.
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physics from other deltas did not always play out as expected in on the Mississippi River. As
Charles Ellet wrote in a report to the Corps in 1851, which was echoed then subsequently
retracted by Humphreys in a report years later, the levees-only approach was a: “delusive hope,
and most dangerous to indulge, because it encourages a false security […] the water is supplied
by nature, but its height is increased by man. This cause is the extension of the levees” (Ellet
1851 quoted in Barry 1997, 45).
Nevertheless, the levees went up, in what would be the first of several engineering
experiments without precedent on the lower Mississippi River. As Florence Dymond recounts
when "Uncle Sam finally stepped in and the Mississippi River Commission took charge
contractors now [began using] enormous dredges in building these high levees." By the time she
was an adult the Corps had increased the levees around her home to fourteen feet.
The levees only policy would dictate the Corps' flood control strategies until 1927 when
larges flood on record in the Mississippi Valley tore this engineering ideology down. Record
rainfall in the upper Midwest and Ohio River Valley watersheds in spring 1927 set in motion the
largest river flood on record for the Mississippi River. As water moved from regional tributaries
to the main channel of the Mississippi River, the river swelled, over-topped, and breeched a
nascent federal levee system along the lower Mississippi River Valley, inundating 27,000 acres
of land and displacing over 600,000 residents. It was a watershed moment for the Corps and the
nation to reconsider the techno-scientific wisdom of upholding a levees only policy as a social
and material contract with the river (Barry 1997).
Though the 1927 flood was catastrophic, floods in 1911, 1912, and 1916 in the lower
river region put pressure on the Corps to both accelerate their efforts to bring levees up better
flood control standards and reconcile the persistent question of whether or not to create outlets -
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places for the river to overflow its channel in a designed, controlled areas - as an aspect of river
engineering regimes (Reuss 1995). A levees only policy was largely favored because it provided
for flood control and, in theory, could help keep the navigation channel open in the river.
Protecting landowners and navigation appeared to be a win-win situation. But forces of
hydrology and physics on the river were not so quick to comply with expectations of the Corps
and residents. Confining the river behind levees meant the river could not spread out during
times of flood. Instead, the river would rise-up, building pressure behind levees, levees the Corps
was feverishly trying to raise in pace with the river, transforming what could be an even keeled,
horizontally stretched out flood over alluvial lands into torrents of pressurized breaks and gouges
in levees.
“So much depended on the levees,” one Corps historian aptly notes. “They enabled
development and largely defined - and confined - the socioeconomic order. Life itself depended
on the strength and height of these earthen fortresses” (Reuss 1995, 46). Life in the lower
Mississippi River Delta region not only depended on the levees, but also the entrenchment of
racial hierarchies throughout the region in the wake of the Civil War and Reconstruction in order
to hold delta communities together economically, socially, and geophysically. Control over the
river meant the capacity to reclaim land that could sustain the southern "plantation bloc" (Woods
1998) through containing water and classed and racialized social relations along with it (ibid.,
Barry 1997, 96).
Building and maintaining levees required a tremendous amount of labor and the forces
that repaired, built, and expanded levee systems along the lower river during this time period
were mostly black, formerly enslaved workers and immigrant labor from Europe (Barry 1997,
102). As with the sharecropping system that replaced forced slave labor in the Delta, black and
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poorer workers were more or less forced into levee work under conditions that mirrored
plantation slavery. This meant that laborers were placed in situations that resembled indentured
servitude which, compounded with Jim Crow legislation that criminalized vagrancy,
homelessness, and unemployment, ensured that landowners had the labor forces they needed to
keep the river at bay and maintain their agricultural lands and economies. Levees, though, were
still "earth mounded to a hill" (Barry 1997, 40) and perpetually exposed to cycles of deterioration
that made the racialized workforce that maintained the levees as indispensable to regional
landowners as the levees themselves. The future of the delta as an economically viable region
and way of life, was thus intimately entangled with the laborers who "raised the levees" (Barry
1997, 121,192-193). As folklorist and historian Alan Lomax notes in his collection of material
from the region:
It is almost inconceivable, yet nonetheless true, that at one stage these huge earthworks
were piled up a barrowload at a time by men pushing wheelbarrows [...] If a man
happened to stumble and fall into the pit with his load, "why they just dump the next dirt
on him and leave him there - cover him on up and just forget him - I've seen that happen"
one old-timer told me (Lomax 1993, 214).
Lomax's depiction of the experiences of levee workers in the delta reminds us that the
construction of levees sustained a strange and cruel admixture of racism and settlement forged
within elusive geophysical processes. The levees, in other words, held in place water, land, and
racial hierarchies.
During slavery, Reconstruction, and the early decades of Jim Crow, it was the task of
black workers to raise, repair, and expand the levee system through back-breaking labor along
with highly charged racial encounters between black workers and white overseers, especially
during flood events when tensions ran high (Barry 1997, 192-193). Correspondences from
landowners at the time attest to the grueling work in levee camps, which was frequently done by
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“wheelbarrows and iron scoop shovels drawn by mules" by low-wage black, immigrant, and
sometimes convict labor.13 As one writer for the Atlantic visiting a levee repair crew on a cotton
plantation in Mississippi in 1922 noted, "nothing could be more interesting, so far as racial study
goes, than to see five or six thousand free negroes working on a weak point [in the levee] under
ten or twelve white men [...] yet the work is done not out of any feeling of obligation but out of a
traditional obedience to the white man" (quoted in Barry 1997, 193).
While the ascription of obedience of black workers is questionable, it is certainly clear
that the capacity to execute experiments for engineering the river was forged through thoroughly
racialized social and alluvial landscapes that extended the plantation's technologies of race and
place making into realm of riverine science and engineering. In this regard, projects for flood
control sustained a tenuous social and environmental order, inheriting and altering a plantation
logic that relied on racial hierarchies and techno-scientific knowledge to keep regional
economies in motion. Powerful local leaders and members of the Corps were equally invested,
albeit in different ideological ways, in sustaining a flood control system predicated on the
demands of racialized economy, yet the river persistently eroded the stability of these approaches
to stabilizing environmental and social order in the delta.

Spillways
Though the plantation economies of the nineteen century in Plaquemines Parish were on
the decline compared to cotton plantations farther north in delta region of western Mississippi,
the parish was also confronting the economic and social challenges periodic flooding of the river
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Florence Dymond papers, Manuscripts Collection 453, Louisiana Research Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial
Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118.
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induced. As formerly lucrative sugar plantations and mills closed due to periodic destruction
from hurricanes, floods, and an increasingly competitive international market, the discovery of
oil, natural gas, and sulphur domes under the parish provided a renewed and seemingly
inexhaustible trove of resources for a parish. When the exploration of oil began in and onshore in
the marshes and waters surrounding Plaquemines, former sugar plantations were carved up into
smaller scale plantations and farms for agricultural production (truck farming). Landowners
began growing cucumbers, tomatoes, corn, lettuce, figs, and citrus, employing black and lowwage workers on their land. Immigrants from eastern European, particularly Dalmatian,
Croatian, and Yugoslavian migrants, began developing commercial oystering outfits in south
Plaquemines, and laying the foundation for a robust seafood industry in the parish that would
soon become supported by a network of docks, oyster processing and packing facilities, and
railroads and boats that would ship Plaquemines seafood to New Orleans and the rest of the
world (Jeansonne 1977, Meyer 1982, Austin 2006, Foulk 2009, Davis 2010).
The chief strategist behind the economic and political transformation of Plaquemines
Parish at this time was Leander “Judge” Perez, a political leader who was the former attorney
general of Plaquemines and neighboring parishes who stepped into his infamous role as a semidictator and “political boss" of the parish in the early 1920s (Jeansonne 1977). His reputation as
a fiercely states rights, pro-segregationist leader made him emblematic of a style of political
leadership in the U.S. South that mobilized racism in the service of economic advancement for
the upper, landowning class of white men who cleaved beliefs about the fundamental moral and
biological differences between black and white Americans in order to entrench their political
power and fill their personal bank accounts. Perez, in this regard, was not remarkable compared
to his counterparts across the South.
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To jump start the parish's struggling economy in the 1920s, Perez re-structured parish tax
systems through “quasi-constitutional amendments” that centralized all debts and taxes and
secured local control of parish lands under the jurisdiction of local levee boards up to twelve
miles out into the Gulf, which generated significant wealth for the parish (Jeansonne 1977,
Meyer 1981, 69). The creation of his personal Delta Corporation acted as the third party
negotiator between oil and gas companies and the parish made Perez and his family incredibly
wealthy. Perez’s leadership style ensured that the exploitation of natural resources through the
creation of new parish laws and the entrenchment of the separate but equal doctrine ensured that
the old racial and environmental formations of the parish in the nineteenth century were
sustained as the parish turned towards its coastal marshlands to cultivate new financial resources
for the parish.
Despite the unfolding of his political empire, Perez could not necessarily control the
whims of the river. While Perez was busy building his racial and economic empire, storms and
river floods continued to dog the engineers and local landowners. A river flood in Plaquemines
Parish in 1922 created a crevasse over 1,000 feet wide, flooding the entire west bank of the river.
On the other side of the river during the same flood event, a crevasse 1,500 feet wide at Poydras
“resulted in a wall of water 115 feet high - as tall as an eleven story building” (Davis 2000, 93;
Barry 1997, 164-5). These periodic and drawn out floods destroyed the crops of several
plantations with their inundation of river water.
Though the crevasses in Plaquemines relieved pressure on the New Orleans levees, the
1922 flood was the latest in a line of periodic floods that began breaching the Corps' ideological
commitments to the levees only policy (Reuss 1995, 95). Under pressure from a higher and more
dangerous river and the Orleans Levee Board, the Louisiana legislature authorized a
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constitutional amendment in 1924 to allow the trustees of the Orleans Levee Board to acquire
land on the east bank of the Mississippi River in Plaquemines in order to construct the first
spillway on the Mississippi River. A 33,000acre site selected for a spillway about sixty miles
below New Orleans, near Pointe à la Hache (the parish seat) on the former site of the Bohemia
Plantation. At the time of its proposal, the land where the Bohemia Spillway was slated to be
built was owned by the local parish levee district - the Grand Prairie Levee district - and a
collection of multi-racial and multi-ethnic farmers, trappers, and oystering families who lived off
the surrounding marshes.
The history of how the Orleans Levee Board acquired the land for the Bohemia Spillway
is a topic that continues to be a source of frustration and resentment for many residents I met
living in the southern and eastern ends of the parish. Many residents living near the site today
recall stories of their grandparents and great grandparents being forced off their land in order to
save New Orleans. It was an "experimental spillway" Lizzy Keldrich, whose family owned
several properties where the spillway was eventually built, noted to me as we discussed the
matter one afternoon. She has spent years in regional archives following a trail of topographical
surveys, property deeds, and levee board and Corps documents in order to piece together exactly
how her family and others were forced to ceed their land to the Orleans Levee Board and the
extent to which the Bohemia Spillway ever functioned as engineers intended it to. "The levee
board took advantage of landowners, threatening them, so many felt they had to give their land
away for the safety of their families" Lizzy explained to me.
At the time, the spillway area was home to several oystering communities composed of
European immigrants as well as entirely black settlements, according to historic records and oral
histories (Plaquemines Deep Delta Genealogical Society 1984). As with the establishment of
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other levee districts in the region, land transferred from the state to the levee districts was
intended to raise funds for the construction and maintenance of levee and flood control structures
through making it subject to taxation and, in the case of Plaquemines, leasing lucrative mineral
rights to oil exploration companies.
The extent to which the spillway was meant to function as a "demonstration project to
show that spillways were the answer to the Corps levees only problem" or a means of acquiring
access to marsh areas with significant oil deposits, reflects the checkered history that surrounds
the Corps' first spillway project. Lizzy's question echoed conversations I had with other residents
like Ms. Carmen, who still lives in the unincorporated town of Bohemia, just above where the
spillway was built. Chatting about the fishy geophysical justification for the construction of the
spillway with her one morning she rhetorically asked me, "why would you make a spillway in
the natural spillway of the delta?" I smiled. She didn't answer, but turned her face towards me
and opened her eyes wide, emphasizing her disbelief in the justification the Corps gave her
family back in the 1920s. Having just made 89 years old, Ms. Carmen grew up with talk of the
spillway controversy in her ear.
The use of the spillway for flood control was questionable from the start. "It will be a test
of spillways upon which there has been a wide divergence of engineering opinions" the local
newspaper reported in 1926, also noting that "property owners in the area have not suffered
financially because the Orleans Levee Board has paid them approximately $400,000 for their
property."14 According the legal documents, 3% of the land for the spillway was acquired by
expropriation, 48% by purchase in lieu of expropriation, and 49% by transfer of public lands
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from the state.15 Once land was clear of residents, the spillway was constructed by means of an
eleven-mile artificial break in the river levee that was designed to work as an overflow valve
when the river reached flood stage at Pointe à la Hache (Reuss 1995, 100-101). Cuts in the back
levees, the marsh side, were also made in order to facilitate the flow of river water out to the
Gulf of Mexico by way of Breton Sound.
The Orleans Levee board points to its timely first use during the devastating 1927 floods
on the Mississippi River. Yet politically powerful businessmen in New Orleans did not bank on
the Bohemia Spillway to save their city in 1927. Instead, the arranged to have the river levee at
Caernarvon, about 40 miles upriver from Bohemia, to be dynamited, displacing thousands of
residents from lower St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parish and destroying their properties in order
to save the levees around New Orleans (Barry 1997). To be sure, overflow from the river most
certainly would have crossed into the Bohemia Spillway in 1927, yet the approval of the
dynamiting of the levee farther upriver throws reflects that there was little faith that this first
spillway could actually protect the city from the worst river flooding it was ever threatened with.
As was established in the decades following the creation of the Bohemia Spillway,
however, there was no doubt that the land the levee board acquired for the spillway was rich in
oil and gas revenues. Questions about techno-scientific integrity of the project, however, did not
come to a head until decades later when descendants of families who lost property in the
construction of the Bohemia Spillway attempted to recuperate family land and mineral rights.
While half to the land was “purchased in lieu of expropriation,” descendants of former residents
of the Bohemia Spillway and legal cases re-examining the terms of the property transfer to the
Orleans Levee Board in the decades following the creation of the spillway establish that many of
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the purchases happened under “threat of expropriation” and, furthermore, questioned the extent
to which the spillway was ever actually used in this intended manner hydraulic manner - that is,
to relieve pressure on levees in New Orleans from river floods.16
During court proceedings attempting to return expropriated land to descendants in the
1980s, the Orleans Levee Board claimed that the spillway had worked at least nineteen times
since its completion in 1926. ''What it does in simple terms is lower the water level at the city of
New Orleans by close to half a foot when it's in operation,” they explained during legal
proceedings (Marcus 1986). Yet this was clearly not the entire story. ''The history on it," one
Orleans Levee Board member recounted in the early 1980s, "was there was a Grand Prairie
Levee District in Plaquemines Parish and the people didn't pay their taxes and it went broke. The
State Legislature asked the Orleans Levee Board to pay off the debt and to buy the land for the
spillway” (ibid.). The Orleans Levee Board were certainly able to make money of the land:
between 1929 and 1981 mineral revenues from the spillway amount to over $43 million.17 When
cases were heard to return property to the heirs of Bohemia Spillway land, courts estimated that
the spillway was worth approximately $5 million annually in mineral revenues (ibid.).
The checkered history of the Bohemia Spillway set an unfortunate precedent for the
Mississippi River Commission and local levee boards as they underwent an ideological shift
from their levees only policy to the levees and outlets policy during this time period. The
demands to establish Bohemia confirmed engineers and landowners' worst fears that a levees
only approach would not be a permanent solution to managing floods on the river. Beyond this, it
further established that flood protection was entangled with more than just lowering water levels,
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but that flood control would necessitate sacrificing certain coastal communities (c.f. Maldonado
2018) living in geographically expedient areas in order to provide flood protection for the wider
public. As such, Bohemia set a precedent for the Mississippi River Commission and local levee
boards to take what legal and semi-legal means necessary to acquire the land under the guises of
flood protection and the nature of geophysical processes. Once again, delta geomorphology - the
material processes as well as scientific knowledge about it - became a means of entrenching
racial and class inequalities into the lower delta landscape.
Lands where subsequent spillways were established in the years following the Bohemia
experiment often ended-up following a similar pattern: cutting-through poorer communities of
color on the basis of geophysical and engineering sense and science. The construction of the
Bonnet Carre spillway above New Orleans in 1932 (Scallan 2012, Deveraux 2014) and
Morganza Floodway above Baton Rouge in 1954 (Chermaie and Pastier 2012) were all
established on family land, churches, and graveyards, with many of the displaced residents and
land belonging to the descendants of formerly enslaved African Americans. Only in the past few
decades have these histories become excavated and confronted by the Corps, families, and local
historians.18 Yet explicit connections to forms of racism and discrimination in the revisionist
histories of the Corps remain implicit. It is, in other words, largely interpreted as unfortunate in
public record that spillways had to be built through these communities and perhaps the terms of
acquiring land were questionable. Yet these are still the areas where building spillways for the
Mississippi River made, and continues to make, the most geophysical and political sense.
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Since 2012, the Corps has attempted to work with archeologists on a plan for the preservation and
memorialization of the sites of the Kenner and Kugler cemeteries within the Bonnet Carre Spillway above New
Orleans. See: http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Mississippi-River-Flood-Control/Bonnet-Carre-SpillwayOverview/Cultural-Environmental-and-Natural-Values/Kenner-Kugler-Cemeteries/
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It is important to note, though, that the Jim Crow context circumscribed the social
conditions that made the shift from levees only to levees and outlets - from control to semiaccommodation - possible. It provided the social norms and political willpower to expropriate
land from poorer landowners and African American communities in order to protect the
economically and politically powerful urban centers in the region, making land and lives
available to become the spaces of accommodation for excessive water. Landowners who could
fight having floodways put thorough their lands banded together, particularly in the upper delta
region where cotton plantations were abundant, in order to flex their muscles to make sure their
investments would not be subject to the Corps new approach to managing water (Reonas 2009).
Engaging in these “floodway fights,” many planters rebuffed construction of
spillways/floodways as “engineering experiments pure and simple” (Reonas 169, 2009), and did
what they could inside and outside of courts to keep their agricultural lands from becoming
spillways. Many of the wealthier, white landowners were successful at abating large floodway
projects (Reonas 2009). Other communities that lacked the political connections to fight the
Corps' plans to build spillways through their properties were left having to relocate homes,
churches, and businesses that were in the way of new plans for managing the lower river.
While old headstones would have long subsided into the coastal marshlands within the
Bohemia Spillway, its creation established a pattern of sacrificing racially and geographically
marginalized lands and people to accommodate the river and engineering science. As will
be discussed later in this dissertation, the Bohemia Spillway is one of several engineering
projects that extend the interconnections between racial and economic inequalities of the past in
the parish into the science of river management of the present. Furthermore, the Bohemia
Spillway stands as a defining moment in the history of many African Americans in Plaquemines
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Parish, particularly those who currently live in the predominately black towns located just above
where the spillway was located. It set the tone in collective memory for understanding
themselves as sacrificial laboratories for coastal engineering and science. Moreover, the winners
and losers of floodway fights were not only about lowering river water levels or wise
engineering science: they indexed experiences of material displacement and political
disenfranchisement which continues to frame contemporary debates about the meanings of land,
water, engineering, and racial pasts in the region.
It is important to remember that engineers had long understood that outlets would be
necessary despite the fact that in popular history the Mississippi River engineers of the
nineteenth century are often pitted against one another for conflicting understandings of river
hydrology and geomorphology, hubris, and larger than life political egos (Barry 1997). Yet, as is
still the case today, engineers had to compete with the demands of landowners, who might not
favor plans that were hydrologically best for the river. “In such cases,” historians remind us,
“economics and ideology eventually influenced the discussion [of river management] as much as
or more than engineering judgement” (Reuss 1995, 73). Within the context of a separate but
equal Jim Crow social and political landscape, spillways went from an idea to something that
garnered the political and engineering support to become a new standard for river management in
the lower delta region.

Restoration
Man-made modifications in Louisiana wetlands are changing the conditions of existence from its
very foundations [and] are the result of flood protection, deforestation, deepening channels […]
and the cutting of navigation and drainage canals.
- Geologist (Viosca 1925)
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While the political controversies surrounding the creation of Bohemia and other
spillways did not come to light until the heirs to spillway property went to court in the 1980s, its
construction set the tone for an increasingly adversarial set of relationships between politically
disenfranchised communities and an emerging institutionalization of river and wetlands science
and management. Moreover, the 1927 flood magnified the political dimensions of river
engineering and management, establishing what communities are saved, who does the labor of
repairing the levee system, and what communities become spillway sacrifice zones. In the
decades following the flood, the Corps took on the challenge of attempting to accommodate and
control the river through the strategic construction of spillways and their most elaborate river
control infrastructure to date, Old River Control Structure: a series of locks and dams built above
Baton Rouge designed to keep the Mississippi River on its current course past New Orleans and
prevent the river from changing course to the west and into the Atchafalaya River.19
As planning and engineering became more elaborate, concerns among engineers and
scientists about the impacts of levees and development in the coastal wetlands, particularly for
the exploration and extraction of oil and gas, transformed the hydrology and geomorphology of
the lower river system. The combined impacts of over a century of ad-hoc and increasingly
centralized attempts to management the river for navigation and flood control and unregulated
degradation of coastal wetlands to find oil and gas - the rampant cutting of canals through
healthy marsh that eroded the marsh and exposed freshwater marsh to saltwater intrusion became particularly alarming to a group of wetlands scientists and geologists who, in the decades
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The Old River Control Structure follows a federally mandated regulation of water flow on the lower Mississippi
River that diverts 30% of the Mississippi's flow into the Atchafalaya River, which was threatening to capture the
entire river by the mid-twentieth century. The massive structures were finished in seven years and began operation
in 1955 and operate to this day. See Reuss (1995) for a comprehensive history and McPhee (1989) for an
ethnographic snapshot of the engineers that work to keep the structure in operation.
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following the 1927 flood, began to notice that coastal areas were changing in unexpected,
unnatural ways.

Envisioning a receding coastline
Regional ecologists and geologists who focused less on infrastructure and more on the
ecological life of Louisiana's coastal wetlands were beginning to notice what appeared to be
rapidly receding coastline. As early as 1925, coastal scientists took note of the ways humanmade modifications of the river and its wetlands were accelerating coastal erosion and
subsidence processes. “Man-made modifications in Louisiana wetlands,” Tulane biologist Percy
Viosca wrote in 1925, "are changing the conditions of existence from its very foundations [and]
are the result of flood protection, deforestation, deepening channels […] and the cutting of
navigation and drainage canals” (Viosca 1925, quoted in Houck 2014). While Viosca’s work was
prescient, it wouldn’t be until the 1940s and 1950s that regional research institutions and
scientists began formally examining the river’s geomorphology and it transformation in the wake
of over a century of engineering the river to support plantation economies and urban settlements.
The establishment of the Coastal Studies Institute at LSU in the early 1950s was one of
the first collaborations between ecologists, geologists, and geographers aimed at understanding
the coast’s changing wetlands and estuaries. They built off the work of Viosca and Harold Fisk, a
geologist who worked with the U.S. Geological Survey and later for Humble Oil, who generated
the first compressive geologic study of the lower Mississippi River Valley (Fisk 1944, Robinson
1995). His elaborate hand drawn maps of the river’s various channels throughout geologic time
served, and continue to serve, as a scientific and conceptual flashpoint for grasping the
dynamism of the river as an engine of land transformation (see Image 1 in the introduction). Up
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until this point, scientific understandings of the formation of the lower deltaic plain and its
geophysical process was nascent, or "pathetic" as Sherwood Gagliano, one of the early students
in Coastal Studies Institute recalls (Theriot 2014, 106).
Commissioned by the Corps who recognized the need to expand their understanding of
the river beyond flood control and navigation, research by the Coastal Studies Institute was
largely lead by Gagliano, a local geologist who found his interest in geomorphological processes
via a childhood curiosity about the archeological artifacts he dug up in his aunt's backyard as a
boy. One of the first questions Gagliano and his colleagues' work focused on was whether or not,
and to what extent, the coast was retreating. Up until this point, there was no clear scientific
consensus as to whether or not coastal erosion in some areas of the coast was offset by accretion
(land building) processes in other parts of the coast. Although research on the unnatural rate of
subsidence and erosion of deltaic lands was investigated in the 1950s (Morgan and Larimore
1957, Gagliano and Van Beek, 1970) a comprehensive investigation had yet to be completed by
any academic, state, or federal institution.
Confronting this data gap, Gagliano's team started mapping the Louisiana shoreline
beginning in 1812, which was no small task: neither local scientists nor the Corps had
systemically mapped the Louisiana coastline at this time. As such, researchers at the Coastal
Studies Institute were tasked with making the first map of Louisiana's changing coastline. They
did this through compiling a diverse collection of older maps created for navigation, surveys and
maps generated by U.S. Topographic and Geologic Survey, the Corps, and other state agencies.
They also relied heavily on U.S. Geologic Survey maps created by aerial photomosaics and
topographic surveys ("quads") that had been taken periodically since the 1930s to piece together
transformations in land to water ratios across the coast (Gagliano et al 1973: 76, Gagliano 1981,
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see also Morgan and Larimore 1957 for an earlier description of this process).
The aggregation of images were used to determine land loss and land gain over time
across the coast and develop a formula for predicting future land loss. Methodologically,
researchers mapped a grid onto these aerial photographs with points for several biophysical
factors such as fresh water, saltwater, swamp, and canals in order to develop a systematic
approach to pinpointing, as close as possible, transformations between land and water over time.
They coded the points and entered them onto computer cards, and wrote a program to delineate
land areas and water bodies, calculate ranges of change historically, and used these rates to
predict future land change up to the year 2000.
The maps revealed a fairly bleak scenario: over the past four decades, only a handful of
areas along the coast was showing any land gain: "The net loss figures are most impressive. For
the coastal Louisiana wetlands the land loss amounts to approximately 16 1/2 square miles per
year. This is an average for the last 25 to 30 years" (Gagliano et al., 1970: 1773).

Image 9: Projection of the inward movement of the coastline in Plaquemines Parish (Gagliano et al. 1981).
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Although rates of coastal retreat varied across the coast, overall the maps painted a stark picture
for the future of the coastal environment. Their studies predicted that Plaquemines Parish, for
example would be gone by 2020. “No one wanted to believe it,” Gagliano recounted,
reminiscing about the early studies during an interview in the early 2000s (Theriot 2014, 107).
Gagliano and his colleagues’ findings transformed how scientists and engineers
envisioned the coast. Results confirmed that the coast was subsiding and eroding at a rate
outpacing its capacity to accrete new land. While loss rates varied around the coast, with some
areas still connected to deltaic rivers like the Atchafalaya River to the west making new land,
Louisiana was losing more than it was building. Furthermore, reports indicated that the leveeing
and channeling of the Mississippi River in the interest of navigation and flood control were key
actors accelerating the subsidence of coastal lands. To be sure, hurricanes, particularly Betsy in
1965 and Camille in 1969 were also significant accelerants of land loss as they can tear-up
hundreds of acres of wetlands in one storm. Oil and gas extraction and canal dredging, which
"account[ed] for a significant amount of land loss” were also key accelerators for coastal
wetlands loss (Gaglinao 1973, 84). Making access canals, laying pipeline, and other tactics,
including dynamite, used by oil companies for accessing wells and facilitating the flow of oil
were significantly responsible for breaking apart the marsh and accelerating coastal erosion.
The work of the LSU group established that human intervention on the river and the coast
was having dramatic geomorphological impacts on the lower deltaic environment, and it pointed
a clear finger at the activities of the Corps. And much of their research was commissioned by the
Corps, who were beginning to understand that their activities were having unanticipated impacts
on coastal wetlands.
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The river for restoration
Scientists and engineers were not the only ones who took notice of changes to coastal
environments. Commercial fishermen who depended on the productive estuaries of the coast
with its range of salinities and commercial species to fish were concerned about changes in the
estuaries, particularly to salinity levels. As early as the 1920s, oystermen noticed the impacts of
levees cutting the river off from surrounding marshes and estuaries. Because their oyster grounds
were becoming too salty, they wanted to have a strategic introduction freshwater from the river
in adjacent marshes to keep salinity levels at the ideal mixture of fresh and saltwater for their
oyster beds to thrive (McGuire 2006). As a sedentary species, oysters cannot move when the
water around them changes in temperature or salinity as other commercial organisms like shrimp
can. On top of this, oysters grow at a very particular mix, fifteen parts per thousand, of salt to
freshwater. Too much saltwater or freshwater swiftly kills oyster beds (ibid. 698). In response to
changes they were seeing in the estuary, oyster growers and their associates began actively
lobbying the state in the 1930s and 1940s for more consistent freshwater inputs to the estuaries.
Oystering was a big business, especially in Plaquemines Parish, where the bayou was a
source of work and subsistence for residents, especially people of color and poorer communities.
Under Perez's rule of political and economic segregation, the descendants of formerly enslaved
African Americans as well as Creole, indigenous, immigrant, and other mixed-race groups were
confronted with conforming themselves to the unique tri-part segregation - black, white, and
Native American - that shaped all aspects of everyday life. Perez and his family ran the parish
like a small fiefdom, manipulating local laws and geography to keep Civil Rights activists and
federal oversight out of the parish and extract as much wealth as he could from above and below
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Plaquemines' deltaic lands. As journalist Walter Isaacson described of Perez in 1978: "Leander
Perez, cigar-chomping, white-suited boss of the parish for almost half a century. He ruled like an
arrogant and protective plantation owner, although he preferred sowing oil leases to crops. He
fought federal intervention with Faulknerian tenacity, a battle that began over control of oil
reserves and evolved into a crusade against "forced integration," which he saw as the plot of an
international Communist conspiracy" (Isaacson 1978).
To be sure, no matter what race residents identified with or as, the river and the natural
resources beget by the delta continued to be the lifeblood of the parish, providing jobs and
livelihoods to all residents. Many African American residents continued to live in segregated
villages on former plantation properties - many even retaining the plantation appellation, such as
Magnolia Plantation. They worked in the agricultural sector that replaced many of the former
sugar cane fields as well as in a thriving commercial seafood industry, including oyster canning
and seafood processing plants. Many older residents today recall waking up early to catch the
bus down to oyster canning plants with their mothers before school to get in a few hours of work.
Men would also work on agricultural properties or on the boats as hired hands for local oyster
dealers. The oyster industry was dominated by the descendants of Croatian immigrants and
closely mirrored the racial and economic relations of the nineteenth century plantation in
twentieth century waters (see chapter two).
Beyond working class jobs, the bayou continued to supplement the incomes and provide
food for many of the communities of color and poorer communities in the parish that lived in
proximity to, and even elevated above, coastal waters. The natural resources of the area abundant hunting and trapping in the coastal marshes and woods, oystering and shrimping in
coastal waters - kept many families, black and white, fed and also enabled them to generate extra
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income for their families (Cazabat 2012). Residents shrimped or oystered with family and
collected figs, oranges, pecans, or other items grown in their backyards. Some communities, like
the Grand Bayou Native American community lived out in the marsh and almost entirely off of
the bayou. Accessible only by boat, even today, children in the community were taken by school
boat to an all Indian school established by the catholic church, reflecting the region's distinct
segregation practices (Bethel 2010).
As many of my older participants noted to me, Perez prided himself on the riches of the
parish and the fact that anyone who did not challenge his political rule, black or white, would
have a job, even if the pay or access to resources was unequal and split along racial lines. In this
way, Perez aimed to keep political unrest to a minimum. When those tactics did not work, he
threatened to put agitators into a "snake infested" old fort downriver, only accessible by boat
(Jeansonne 1977).
Despite his political rule, many black residents challenged his economically greedy and
racist political rule. Churches served as locus for political organizing, particularly around the
right to vote in an effort to push back against Perez's political vision. Many leaders from both
sides of the river held meetings to educate residents on how to pass literary tests to get voter
registration cards, using churches and the cover of night to teach and train each other (Edwards
2017). Prominent members of black communities made repeated efforts to register to vote and
even went so far as to file federal suit against the parish for discrimination (Jeansonne 1977).
While these tactics worked to a certain extent, with federal courts ruling in favor of black
citizens and demanding the parish give them full access to their voting rights,20 federal
enforcement of civil rights legislation was minimal in the remote parish. A culture of political
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intimidation, coupled with threats of violence kept robust political organizing among
communities of color and white communities who supported integration limited. Even in the late
1970s, the parish had segregated waiting rooms in hospitals, two hurricane evacuation shelters
(one white, one black), black towns without running water, segregated pools and youth
recreational programs, and even two book mobiles to serve residents of different races (Isaacson
1978).
Unfolding against this social and political backdrop the Corps recommended the
construction of river diversions to introduce freshwater into coastal marshes below New Orleans
to help sustain the parish's seafood economy (US Fish and Wildlife Service 1964, Gagliano et al.
1973). The project called for the creation of four salinity control structures to be used to
introduce freshwater into the lower delta region and push back saltwater intrusion from the Gulf
of Mexico (USACE 1984, 6). It was subsequently authorized to be constructed by the Flood
Control Act of 1965 and introduced the idea of environmental restoration as an aspect of flood
control and navigation on the river (See also McGuire 2006, 699).
Upon the diversion's approval, the Corps commissioned Gagliano and his team at LSU to
conduct a series of studies on the impacts of controlled river diversions. Their findings reflected
that diverting the river at specific points could be used to maintain the salinities that fishermen
were interested in and potentially begin to stem the bleeding of coastal lands through the creation
of new sub-deltas that would deposit sediment, along with freshwater, into estuaries to stabilize
salinity regimes and facilitate land building processes. "At 70 percent efficiency," coastal
scientists reported, "the 300 million tons of sediment carried by the lower Mississippi in an
average year, if diverted to the seven sites in proportion, would develop 12.3 square miles of new
land through deltaic accretion. This is about 75 percent of the current net annual loss of 16.5
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square miles per year” (Gaglinao 1973, 37). In addition to building land, the report noted,
diversions also provide a "valuable buffer zone for reducing hurricane generated storm surges,
which have plagued lower delta communities in recent years” (Gagliano 1973, 98).
Gagliano's and LSU’s work also reflected an expansion of the knowledge base consulted
to manage the relationship between people and water in the region. Up until the 1950s, decisions
about river management had largely been emanated from engineers who did not necessarily have
training or interest in coastal ecological systems. Their expertise was in physics and hydrology.
Beyond this, river engineering was largely bureaucratic and highly political. As historian John
Barry writes, entities like the Mississippi River Commission and their engineers “never became
scientific experts,” but were rather a bureaucracy that, unlike science, would compromise on
ideas, even those of the scientists and engineers it hired (Barry 1997, 90). The work of the
Coastal Studies Institute paved the way for engineers to begin working more closely with natural
scientists interested in the impacts of riverine engineering on local ecosystems and biophysical
processes. Conclusions from these reports expanded a techno-scientific vision of the river from a
flood threat to a vital resource for environmental restoration and conservation. These reports
were the first of their kind to suggest that letting the river go, albeit in a strategic and controlled
manner, could help sustain coastal economies dependent on the fishing industry and, moreover,
perhaps ensure the future of a sinking coastline.
At the time, however, land loss and environmental restoration was not as pressing as
protection from the river and, perhaps because the 1970s were a rather quiet decade for
hurricanes, river diversions and environmental restoration were not funding priorities for the
Corps. Part of this reflected Louisiana's economic constraints because they could not come up
with their cost share for building the first of the approved river diversions from the Flood Control

89

Act of 1965 until 1987 (McGuire 2006). But it also reflected the fact that land loss and
environmental restoration was yet to be an issue of national concern. Compared to confronting
the immediacy of riverine flooding in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
connection between coastal land loss and risks from hurricane storm surge and land loss was yet
to be fully articulated. Yet as environmental reforms took shape at the national level in the
1980s, increasing concerns for the environmental impacts of oil and gas exploration, on shore
and offshore, as well as the impacts of hydrologic modifications to the river, became increasing
pressing questions for state and local environmental interest groups in Louisiana (Theriot 2015,
143-147).
In 1989, a group of coastal scientists, lawyers, environmentalists, and citizens from an
organization called the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana took the lead on raising public
awareness about coastal land loss. That year they published their founding document, Here
today, gone tomorrow? A citizen's program for saving the Mississippi River Delta Region, to
protect its heritage, economy, and environment. The report situated coastal land loss as an
environmental problem, a hurricane protection problem, and an economic and cultural problem
that squarely connected all human activities that altered the coastal environmental, from oil and
gas exploration to flood control and navigation projects (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana
1989, 16). It encompassed mounting debates among wetlands scientists who, although torn on
exactly how much damage was caused by which particular practices, agencies, and companies,
agreed that the land loss problem was much worse than anticipated and that immediate state and
federal action would be necessary to begin repairing the damage done to the coast.
The document forcefully advocated for a suite of restoration tactics to be undertaken
immediately, to reverse the "slow and untimely loss of coastal wetlands" (CRCL 1989: 19). As
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the report went on to describe, "ultimately, some very sophisticated engineering works must be
designed and constructed to separate the flow of the Mississippi River south of New Orleans for
delta building" (CRCL 1989: 26). Their goal was to have a sediment diversion in place within
decade. While this was not achieved, the report compelled state leaders to develop
comprehensive, science-led coastal planning efforts at the state level.

Restoration as a public good
In 1991 the Corps finally began construction of the freshwater diversion/salinity control
project proposed in 1965. Not explicitly billed as a restoration project, the Caernarvon
Freshwater Diversion was built on the east bank of the Mississippi River in Plaquemines Parish
and flowed into estuaries of Breton Sound. According to a feasibility study from 1984, the
diversion was capable of diverting up to 6,600 cubic feet per second of the river with the
intention of enhancing oyster production in the region. Secondary benefits included the
possibility that the diversion could also potentially slow localized rates of land loss by
"combating natural forces of subsidence, compaction, and erosion" (USACE 1984, 12).
In the process of scoping multiple sites along the lower Mississippi River below New
Orleans, the Corps report noted several negative impacts that might accompany operating the
diversion. At the top of the list was a widely shared concern among residents that the diversion
would cause widespread oyster mortality in the areas most proximate to the outfall of the
structure, overwhelming oysterbeds with freshwater and smothering them sediment (ibid.).
Acknowledging that numerous oyster leases would be taken out of production, the Corps framed
the project as a series of tradeoffs which, in the long run, would ultimately improve oyster
production (ibid., 63-64). Other impacts included enhanced risks of flooding, loss of agricultural
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lands, and impacts to local businesses.
These concerns were particularly pressing for black communities and oystermen who
lived next to Breton Sound and relied on the local oyster beds for subsistence and economic
independence from large, white-owned oyster companies in the parish. Despite the fact that the
Corps anticipated significant critique and push back from these groups, they managed to build
the project and work with state officials from the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources,
Wildlife and Fisheries, and an advisory board of Louisiana oysterman to operate the diversion in
a way that could strike a delicate balanced between adding just enough but not too much
freshwater to the estuary to re-establish historic salinity patterns (USACE, 1999). When the
diversion was opened in 1991, it ended up impacting a significant portion of the 8,200 oyster
leases held in Louisiana at the time (Caffey and Schexnayder 2002, 222). Through 1992, the
flow rate from the river into the surrounding estuaries was around 2,000cfs. When flow was
subsequently increased to 7,000cfs in early 1994, however, it caused widespread oyster mortality
as fishermen feared (ibid., 233). "They just threw operations out the window," Ricky, a
prominent black oysterman from the east bank of the river noted to me as we discussed the
history.
The structure continued to pour 7,000cfs of the Mississippi River into the estuary for
years until oystermen filed court cases against the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources in
1996 (McGuire 2006, 700). While it was expected that the diversion would cause a certain
amount of oyster mortality, many local oystermen felt that the unanticipated scale of destruction
constituted an illegal "taking" of personal property in the form of water bottoms they leased. At
first, the lower courts agreed with the oystermen, noting the unique state of long term leased
water bottoms as "quasi-private" land. They granted oystermen almost $2 billion in damages.

92

Upon appeal, though, the Louisiana supreme court struck down the lower court's decision, and
many of the oystermen were left with little compensation for their losses.21
At the time the cases were heard, pressure from environmental groups aimed at saving
Louisiana’s coastal wetlands had begun to shape public opinion about the political and
ecological benefit of coastal restoration projects. The court's ruling against the pleas of the
fishermen established that the use of the diversion for marsh restoration purposes reflected not an
illegal taking of private property, which oystermen claimed, but rather an action oriented towards
supporting the “greater good” - or "trade-offs" - of protecting coastal Louisiana, albeit at the
expense of numerous oystermen (McGuire 2006, 701).
Many of the large oyster dealers that held thousands of acres were not too economically
bruised by the court's decision, however the ruling created significant hardships for smaller scale
oystering outfits, particularly black fishermen who lost the only oyster leases they had.
Compared to white oystermen of Croatian descent who could afford private oyster leases around
the coast, less wealthy black residents were more dependent on the public oyster beds in Breton
Sound where Caernarvon was built. So while other oystermen could fish their private leases,
many of the black oystermen lost all of the productive leases they owned (Ware 2014, see
chapter two). To make matters worse, in the interim a second freshwater diversion, Davis Pond,
was opened on the west side of the Mississippi River in 2001. The Corps and the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources, heeding its experiences with Caernarvon, offered oystermen
in that basin an opportunity to participate in a $7.5 million oyster relocation program (Caffey and
Schexnayder 2002, 224), which fostered further resentment between the fishing industry and the
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See McGuire (2006) for an extensive anthropological take of court battles between oystermen and coastal
restoration advocates. Extensive coverage of the oyster lawsuits is archived in the Times-Picayune series "Shell
Games" from 2003: http://topics.nola.com/tag/shell%20game/
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efforts of costal restoration.
Overall, Caernarvon set an unsavory precedent for the Louisiana's first foray into coastal
restoration by attaching restoration to an unjustified taking of land (oyster beds) and livelihoods
from working class and minority fishermen.22 This left many coastal residents, particularly
fishermen in Plaquemines Parish, with the impression that large restoration projects generate
forms of loss on par with and perhaps even worse than damages from hurricanes, land
expropriation, and racism. Associations with restoration as a means of "stealing" land for some
residents harkened back to 1927 when the levees were blown at Caernarvon and when the
Orleans Levee Board turned their ancestors' land into an experimental spillway. For black
oystermen from the lower east bank, the Caernarvon lawsuits also seemed to set back the
progress they made fighting racial and economic discrimination as it manifested through the
manipulation and management of deltaic lands and waters (see chapter two).

Footprint communities: Restoration as protection
Though a setback for fishermen and coastal residents, the Carnarvon case was a victory
for coastal restoration. It solidified the environmental and political integrity of restoration and its
role as the next socio-technical and scientific regimes for managing the lower Mississippi River
Delta.
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It is important to note that the class status of fishermen in coastal Louisiana can be a bit murky. Many of the
fishermen who work for themselves and employ only a handful of other fishermen have the majority of their wealth
tied up in the equipment they need to fish. Boats and supplies for oystering are their biggest assets, making them
somewhat the equivalent of being "land rich but cash poor," a status held by many African Americans in the U.S.,
especially the U.S. South. While public depictions of the oystermen during the lawsuits characterized them as
"greedy oystermen," as one black fishermen noted to me during my fieldwork, many of the oystermen working on
the east bank of the river aligned themselves more squarely with what is typically understood as working or middle
class. Part of the reason why is because the bayou is seen as an asset that ensures they never live in poverty even if
their incomes do not reflect this wealth. "As long as we have the bayou" to paraphrase a saying I often heard during
my fieldwork, "we'll never be poor."
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Despite concern from coastal residents about diversions specifically, land loss was an
issue that scientists, fishermen, coastal communities, and engineers were increasingly concerned
about. By the late 1990s and early 2000s the Corps had waded into the waters of coastal
restoration, figuring out ways to negotiate partnerships with state and local agencies to rebuild
marsh and manage projects like the Caernarvon Diversion. The passage of the Coastal Wetlands
Protection Planning and Restoration Act (CWPPRA), or the Breaux Act as it is also called, was
the first major federal investment in funding restoration research and projects. It committed
federal dollars to restoration efforts in Louisiana for twenty years. CWPPRA signified federal
recognition of Louisiana’s coastal land loss problem and ensured a pot of generated from oil and
gas revenues, to be earmarked for coastal restoration research, planning, and project
implementation. Funds have ranged from $30 to $80 million since 1990.
In the decades after the passing of CWPPRA, scientists began spearheading more explicit
research efforts coordinated between regional universities, state agencies, and federally
supported wetlands preservation programs, particularly the Barataria Terrebonne National
Estuary Program (BTNEP). Convening the first of numerous management conferences that
brought together scientists and other stakeholders to determine the scope of the land loss
problem, necessary research and data collection still needed (data gaps), and recommendations
for restoration projects, BTNEP set the stage for what would become a culture of collaboration
for coastal planning based on the integration of ecological, technical and social sciences. Coast
2050 was another multi-stakeholder, science led planning effort that attempted to move coastal
planning efforts from a list of projects to a more fundamental conceptual shift to plan at a
regional scale to “reestablish natural processes” in order for the deltaic system to be able to
sustain itself (Reed and Wilson 2004, 13). This reflected a change in efforts to understand coastal
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land loss and restoration planning as a much wider attempt to shift the culture of planning for
living on the coast towards ecosystem needs that, in turn, were assumed to inflect with social and
cultural needs (Hemmerling et al, 2019).
To be sure, many scientists and coastal restoration advocates also recognized that land
loss in the coastal area was not only a threat to sport and commercial fishing industries and the
deltaic ecosystem: it also provided valuable protection for coastal communities. It was not,
however, until the hurricane season of 2005, which brought Katrina and Rita, that wetlands
restoration became fully framed in scientific and public discourse as a measure of protection for
coastal residents. That is, the connection between human vulnerability and land loss came most
forcefully to fruition. In an article authored by sixteen prominent wetlands scientists in 2007
after the storm, scientists made began to spell out the explicit relationship between the ongoing
degradation of the coast and the production of vulnerability. Taking an opportunity when all eyes
were on the coast, the article emphasized the necessity of reestablishing the deltaic ecosystem
through ambitious coastal restoration projects as a matter of storm protection planning and
damage reduction efforts in addition to ecological restoration (Day et al 2007). The article
reflects a palpable, post-Katrina transition in the scientific discourse of wetlands science towards
situating their research, and coastal land loss, as a political question. Saving the coast was not
only about ecosystems anymore; it was about saving people's lives.
In addition to exposing the extent of Louisiana’s coastal land loss crisis, Hurricane
Katrina violently laid bare the ongoing crisis of racial and economic inequalities in the region
and their intimate entanglement with practices of environmental management and science. Failed
engineering, in addition to water and land loss, emerged as a key player in the production and
maintenance of systemic inequalities that contributed to the now famous characterization of
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Katrina as a human made, not natural, disaster (Smith 2006). Science and engineering certainly
played their roles in the drowning of the region, however it would be short sighted to only point
to levee failures. It was levees eroded by lackadaisical regulation and a long history of
attempting to transform the region into one with clear boundaries between land and water
maintained by and maintaining of racial, economic, and political hierarchies.
In the wake of Katrina, the state centralized coastal protection efforts alongside
restoration planning. Up until this point, determining exactly which federal and state agency was
responsible for coastal protection and restoration was still ambiguous. With mounting
responsibilities and limited funding, the state reorganized several positions within their agencies
and in 2007 established the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) with the
charge to centralize planning efforts across the coast. Their primary work encompassed making a
Coastal Master Plan every five years - a "wish list" of projects, as CPRA officials often say - that
is used as a tool for soliciting funding under a comprehensive vision of a restored coast.
Katrina introduced new coastal bureaucracies and paved the way for more ambitious
restoration ideas to move forward, and large river sediment diversions occupied the center of
planners' ambitions. Many environmentalists and scientists who worked on coastal restoration
efforts over the past three decades praised the CPRA's unprecedented aggressive approach to
using river diversions. For these groups, the scale of a project for restoration had to match the
scale of the land loss problem, and river sediment diversions delivered on this desire. To be sure,
though, there was not consensus on this approach within the scientific and engineering
community from a geomorphological standpoint or a political one. Nevertheless, feeling pressure
to take the lead in national environmental planning efforts - and encouraged by the windfall of
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funds coming to the state in the form of criminal fines from the BP oil spill in 201023 - the CPRA
and its supporters designed the 2012 Master Plan to achieve no net loss by 2060, and sediment
diversions were a key part of achieving this goal.
The proposed sediment diversions aspired to divert up to 250,000 cubic feet per second,
about one fourth of the Mississippi, through several sites along the lower river in Plaquemines
Parish. And while the projects and project sites were not necessarily new, the scale of water
shocked many residents, particularly those in the commercial fishing industry and a good number
of coastal scientists who saw the proposed projects as essentially drowning the estuary and
coastal communities along with it. Despite the fact that the 2012 Master Plan passed the state
legislature in a unanimous vote (Peyronnin et al., 2013) there was anything but consensus about
what these new projects would mean for coastal communities.
While most groups agreed that something needed to be done fast about repairing the
coast, opinions clashed about approach, especially when it comes to the river. In technical terms,
the sediment diversions proposed in the 2012 Master Plan were different than the freshwater
diversions built in the early 1990s and 2000s, which were in turn also distinct from the spillways
and crevasses constructed for flood protection in the early twentieth century. To be sure, though,
all of these are projects for reintroducing large quantities of water into areas and communities
that live a delicate balance with water as a resource and a threat. The feeling of being sacrificed
for the greater good of the coast permeates many of the experiences residents associated with
diversions and spillways like Bohemia and Caernarvon, which have their affective roots in
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In 2013, settlements for the criminal fines associated with the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill off
southeastern coast of Plaquemines Parish granted $2.5 billion dollars to impacts Gulf Coast States. These funds were
earmarked to fund coastal restoration efforts including over $1 billion to Louisiana. See:
https://www.nfwf.org/whoweare/mediacenter/pr/Pages/gebf-la_16-1115.aspx
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multigenerational histories of displacement and dispossession in the name of using the river to
benefit urban centers and economic development.
Because a sediment diversion has never been built before, older crevasses, spillways, and
diversions are used as scientific analogs for examining the potential impacts of sediment
diversions on land, water, and communities. These connections mark a clear intimacy in the
scientific and technical literatures between the past and future manipulation of the river. It is an
intimacy that many residents who have lived in the pathways of these experiments in river
management have often felt. While fervent supporters of the Master Plan debate which analogs
are the correct ones, at the end of the day it’s clear that despite the technical differences in the
design of this new diversion structure and how it might be managed, its core design - a large cut
in the levee to move water and sediment - appears to mimic not only natural processes but
political histories for coastal communities who have been experiments for the alternating desires
of engineers and scientists to control or accommodate the Mississippi River.
These connections come most palpably to the forefront in the predominately AfricanAmerican footprint communities where the diversions are slated to be built. Many residents
challenge the techno-scientific logic of building the diversions on the grounds of social and racial
justice. At meetings with CPRA officials, residents from footprint communities fold questions of
racial inequality and environmental injustice into public dialogue about the project in a way that
state officials are largely unprepared to address (chapter four). Pushing the connection between
racial histories and managing the river reflects the longer connection of water and land
management and change to the production and maintenance of racial hierarchies. Many
community leaders probe the extent to which nature or politics dictates the construction and
location of the sediment diversions. Bolstered by decades of experience fighting for economic
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independence and political power, black leaders in the parish frequently remind state planners
and scientists that they cannot not come into their community to build a $50 billion restoration
project without considering how that fits into their recent and long term histories.
Conflicts around the construction of the diversions - slated to be completed by the mid
2020s24 - sends a clear message to coastal restoration advocates and scientists who work with
them that science's aspirations to do what nature “wants" to do cannot stand outside the wider
historical contexts "natural processes" unfold within. This means not only grappling with the
more recent history of the fallout from the oyster lawsuits with the Caernarvon Diversion, but
also understanding how choices about managing the river have shaped the landscape and
contours of political and racial belonging.
Heading popular resistance, the CPRA asked the Water Institute of the Gulf to convene a
scientific review panel, an Expert Panel, to help quell anxieties and potentially convert
restoration agnostics into believers.

Conclusion
If the plantation, at least in part, ushered in how and where we live now, and thus contributes to
the racial contours of uneven geographies, how might we give it a different future?
- Geographer (McKittrick 2013: 4)
Give us science with integrity.
-Plaquemines parish resident
Since its colonization by European settlers, the lower Mississippi River region has been
treated as a laboratory for capitalist development and extraction - a clean slate sanitized of
histories of encounter, change, or conflict - wherein elaborate social and environmental
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Federal permitting processes have sped-up time to anticipated completion for the first river sediment diversion:
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/environment/article_1ebf4cce-36aa-11e8-888d-63f1bef6e429.html
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experiments have unfolded in order to extract wealth from land, water, and bodies, with little
attention paid to the construction or afterlife of the technologies put into use by colonizing
forces. Yet histories of the evolution of the plantation and regional race relations are rarely
brought into dialogue with the political and technical histories of river science and engineering.
Rather, they are often read side by side but rarely entwined25 telling two seemingly separate
stories: one of the evolution of meanings of racial difference and economies in the south, and one
of the history of science and engineering. Within each, though, the environment and geophysical
process played a key role, as did the power of science and engineering, to shape the fate and
course of social life and racial difference in the lower river region.
Connections between discrimination, environmental change, and river science are
clarified when contemporary struggles about coastal restoration projects are situated within the
histories residents and scientists carry to understand the stakes on current river engineering
projects. The stories and experiences they carry - with plantation histories, spillways, or early
restoration projects - contextualize their understanding of projects like river sediment diversions
as alternatively detrimental or life saving for coastal Louisiana.
For residents and scientists who continue live and work in the footprints of former
plantation land that has been transformed into sites for environmental restoration, the
relationships between people, science, plantations, and the now subsiding delta landscape are
diverse and often divergent, but rarely disconnected from each other. The planation, in this
regard, is not circumscribed by time, place, or ecology. Rather, the plantation is a technology
critical to the production of racialized class and political systems that persists to this day as much
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See Barry (1997) and Johnson (2012) as notable exceptions that integrate critical attention to racial inequalities
and racism alongside environmental and engineering histories of the Mississippi River Delta.
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as it is a technology of moving and refashioning the earth for capitalist extraction. In other
words, the plantation is a distinct laboratory for social, scientific, and environmental creations
that is a central technology that connects race and power to the transformation of land and water.
And it has set in motion a history of environmental change in the region that is inextricably
linked to struggles for wealth accumulation, environmental control, and political resistance, past
and present.
As land loss continues to dictate the direction of coastal restoration projects and research,
communities of color and other politically and economically disempowered communities find
themselves once again in the pathway of, and integral to, the techno-science of realigning the
lower Mississippi River Delta. Standing on the grounds of the former sugar plantation in front of
the Expert Panel on Sediment Diversion, members of these communities remind scientists of the
deeper histories of racism and use of science for environmental good and economic development
that resonate through conversations about environmental restoration.
Mr. Percy arrived the Expert Panel meeting at Woodland Plantation just as it was coming
to a close. Taking the three minutes allotted to members of the public to say something to the
Expert Panel, he came up to the mic.
“Welcome to Plaquemines Parish,” he said to panel of out-of-towners.
“I’m 63 years old and I work with a lot of the fishermen and young people in this parish.
You know,” he said with fatigue in her voice, “these meetings have become toxic to me. I'm
frightened. We need more integrity in science. We need honesty. People are losing their lives” he
said, introducing sharp language and looking over the crowd of scientists, planners, and
environmentalists.
"We need to see the politics,” he emphasized, "as much as the science."
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"Don't sell yourselves out to these people," he said to the crowd of scientists, forwarding
a word of caution about their collaborations with policy makers.
"Don't let them turn you into academician prostitutes," he said as he walked out. His
closing sentence reminded those in attendance that they do not work in a sanitized laboratory, but
a messy, unpredictable environment as much shaped by the movement of sediment and
subsidence of land as histories of political corruption and racial sacrifice.
Those histories are built into the soil, levees, homes, memories, and futures of black
communities in ways that are profoundly different than the unassuming external review panel
that see plans for restoration solely through the lens of delta geomorphology and practices of
peer review in the natural sciences. Coastal restoration, for better or worse, as this chapter
argues, is embedded within, although certainly not wholly defined by, the social ecological
lineage of the plantation.
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2. Excavating the racial geographies of land, loss, and political belonging
"All they want is a check”
It’s an early spring afternoon and I am sitting with Mary Ann at a small picnic table as kids from
the Davant community run around playing basketball and adults serve nachos and hamburgers to the
crowd. We just finished a fundraising walk to raise money for the local Baptist church. As we eat lunch
in the shade, Mary Ann and I discuss recent meetings that the state’s Coastal Restoration and Protection
Authority (CPRA) held in the parish about their proposal to build several large river sediment diversions
near her community - one on the east bank of the lower Mississippi River and the other across the river,
on the west bank, next to Ironton. Davant, like Ironton, is one of several black/African American/mixedrace communities in the rural, southern and eastern ends of the parish. The river diversions are intended
to help sustain subsiding and eroding marsh through the strategic placement of sediment-laden river
water in marshes adjacent to these communities. Ironton will be the first site for this unprecedented
environmental restoration project, with Mary Ann's community following soon after. Mary Ann feels it's
her responsibility to follow what is happening and keep her friends and neighbors informed of CPRA's
plans for her community.
The kids are yelling at each other as they aggressively pass and shoot the basketball around.
Mary Ann’s middle daughter, about ten years old, comes up to her to complain that she got her finger
jammed when one of the other kids passed her the ball. “Stop crying!” Mary Ann yelled, in a tone that
she often uses to diffuse what could be an outburst by unhappy children. “Go back over there and keep
playing. Can’t you see I’m talking with Monica?” Her daughter returned to the basketball court.
She was updating me on her latest conversation with CPRA officials. They recently held a
meeting across the river in Ironton with residents who are living next to where the first sediment
diversions are slated to be built. “I wasn’t there,” Mary Ann told me, but what CPRA official told her

104

about the meeting shocked her. "They told me that folks there were asking for a check!” she recounted,
raising her voice. I looked at her puzzled. “I was at that meeting,” I told her, “and I can assure you no
one was asking for a check."
"I cannot believe," she went on to say, "that they would think our people just want hand-outs." I
was as shocked as Mary Ann when she told me the story. Mary Ann’s distaste for this characterization
of the Ironton community as "asking for hand-outs" reflected what she was afraid of: That state and
other environmental groups advocating for the construction of the diversions would treat the people
living in these small, rural communities as "handicapped," or incapable of advocating for themselves
and understanding the changes that are intended for the waters surrounding their homes. Many of the
residents that live in the footprint of where diversions are anticipated to be built are elderly people of
color in addition to a handful of Native American communities and low-income individuals living on
family land and fixed resources.
The notion of asking for charity was deeply disrespectful to Mary Ann and others from minority
communities living in the rural parts of Plaquemines Parish. Many of the black residents living along the
lower reaches of Plaquemines Parish were fiercely proud of the self-sufficiency and autonomy they
cultivated over generations in the face of entrenched political and geographic racial inequities. To ask
for a check was the equivalent to asking for food or housing assistance which many folks, Mary Ann
included, often frowned upon. This was not necessarily because of the social stigma of dependency but
because many folks “down the road” - the colloquial term for southern and east bank Plaquemines
residents - prided themselves on the fact that they did not need support from the local or state
government since they had the bayous and land to hunt, fish, and grow their own food. While it's
certainly true that some families accept forms of food and housing assistance, to characterize an entire
community of black residents as “asking for a check” was an overtly racialized misrepresentation of the
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Ironton community in Mary Ann and others' interpretation. Without comprehending what their
description of Ironton residents implied, in a few short words CPRA disrespected the history and culture
of Ironton and other people of color in the parish who fought hard to sustain themselves in the face of
hurricanes, virulent racism, and economic downturns that have nurtured the sense of pride and
independence many people of color in the parish hold. To Mary Ann, reducing Ironton residents and, by
association, other black communities to "looking for a check" made a clear statement about how the
state and advocates for ambitious and experimental environmental restoration projects felt and
understood “what these communities are about,” as Mary Ann put it. Furthermore, CPRA's lack of
cultural sensibility sent a message that CPRA's responsibility to Ironton and other communities was
merely to mitigate or pay for anticipated damages as opposed to meaningfully engaging residents and
their values in the planning process.
As the prospect of getting river diversions built became more feasible, Mary Ann became
increasingly involved in conversations between CPRA and communities of color in Plaquemines to
make sure their experiences and expectations were correctly represented to environmentalists, scientists,
and the state. “It’s like they think we cannot take care of ourselves,” she said, reflecting on an
increasingly routine set of conversations she had with different diversion advocates. One central aspect
of respecting her community and other communities of color and frontline coastal communities in
Plaquemines meant understanding the deeper history and culture of people and their small towns,
particularly as they have become intimately entangled with coastal lands and waters. Fighting to be
understood on their own terms, to be seen and not overlooked by environmental restoration practices or
other projects that moved into their communities was a central organizing call for Mary Ann.
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“The man apologized profusely when I called him on it,” she said as we were sitting there,
discussing the phantom request for a check and watching the kids play. "They don’t know enough about
our community," she went on. “To think they just see us as people who want a check...”

Searching for the invisible people
Mary Ann’s story kept rolling over in my mind as I drove home. I attended the entire
meeting in Ironton the month before and never heard anyone ask for a check or buyout. Why,
then, would CPRA officials interpret what happened at the church that evening through this lens?
And, more importantly, what did Mary Ann mean when she pointed out that CPRA officials and
others frequently misunderstand the culture of her and other communities in the parish,
especially when it comes to their relationship to the water and the land?
For black residents in Plaquemines Parish, experiences with political disenfranchisement
and geographic marginalization are intimately forged through the management and manipulation
of land and water. Access to, ownership, and protection of black-owned land and waters
throughout the twentieth century is the literal grounds upon which the in/visibility and sense of
political belonging for black communities in Plaquemines has been, and continues to be, forged
and contested. Embedded within this history are diverse understandings of what loss and
protection mean, key terms the state and residents from coastal communities navigate as they
confront the future of a quickly disappearing Plaquemines Parish.
This chapter examines the ways racial histories and understandings of political rights and
loss have coalesced around land and water for people of color in the southern and eastern ends of
Plaquemines Parish. It highlights these connections as they emerged through specific practices
and policies managing the deltaic environment for environmental conservation, flood control and
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protection, and access to and ownership of land and water. I argue that ambivalent and frustrated
reactions to expensive and large-scale restoration projects among residents from black
communities in south Plaquemines Parish are entangled with the longer history of racial
segregation and inequality. These have taken shape through struggles for access to land and
water, which has resulted in contested meanings of loss and protection in the subsiding coastal
landscape. In order to excavate these relationships, this chapter draws from oral history and
ethnographic interviews with residents and community leaders from black and mixed-race
communities in south Plaquemines Parish. These conversations concerned the history of race
relations in the parish, expropriation and loss of inherited family land in the black community,
and the emergence of civil rights and community organizing around the work and demands of
black fishermen in the parish. Each of these sections focuses on the ways land and water are tied
to political questions for residents concerning racial justice and economic equity.
Diving into the multiple meanings of land loss residents carry that extend beyond coastal
subsidence and erosion, this chapter suggests that the relationship between communities of color
and environmental change are not circumscribed by geophysical processes of land subsiding or
disappearing, as popular narratives of coastal land loss in Louisiana typically convey.26 Rather, it
is through a longer history of racialized relationships to the coastal landscape that these
communities come to understand the political and racial stakes of environmental change.
Interpreted through the experiences of black residents, subsidence, restoration, and loss are as
much about restoring black voices and visibility in parish histories and politics as they are about
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See, for example: Anderson (2014) "Louisiana loses its boot": https://medium.com/matter/louisiana-loses-its-bootb55b3bd52d1e; Marshall (2014) "Losing ground": https://medium.com/matter/louisiana-loses-its-bootb55b3bd52d1e
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replenishing and restoring sediment starved marshlands that can protect and ensure the future
viability of Mary Ann and other people of color's homes.
Expanding the framework for interpreting land loss within and beyond physical
transformations to sediment, water, and marsh, this chapter contextualizes residents' multifaceted
experiences of land loss within struggles to attain political rights and recognition that are
entangled with the contemporary practices of protection and environmental restoration that
undergird the Louisiana's efforts to restore sinking and eroding coastal marshes.

Invisible geographies
"So you're interested in the forgotten communities," Ms. Anne said to me after I climbed
the 14-foot-tall stairway to her kitchen table one morning. Her home had recently been elevated
and there were several Latino workers, and their buzzing saws, putting together the deck at the
top of her new stairway that day. "We were always invisible," she continued, "hidden by the
trees on the road. The signs they have now [on the main highway] are an upgrade from what they
used to have." I drove past Ironton at least twice before I slowed down enough to see the small
collection of houses in the distance and make the turn.
Ms. Anne was not the first person I met from Plaquemines Parish to describe her
predominately African American community as forgotten. Geography is always the first thing
that comes to mind when folks describe their down the road homes and communities. Ironton,
like many other communities strung-out down the single highways that follow each side of the
river south until marsh and open water take over, is set back off the road, tucked-up close to the
23-foot-high Mississippi River levee. The town is four blocks long with St. Paul's Baptist Church
at the center. Originally built in 1887, the church serves as the central place for worship and
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community gatherings. The church is a two-minute walk from Ms. Anne’s house. No physical
markers remain of the plantation that once occupied the land where the town is now established
except for a few small cemeteries. One is next to her house and the other is in a small
outcropping of forest behind the town. During one of our visits she showed me a picture of the
plantation house where she used to play as a child. "We were always told it was haunted," she
said laughing, "but it was our family house." She had the picture in a small frame in a guest
bedroom where it was waiting to be unpacked with other family mementos in the midst of her
home elevation and move. The old house was a modest size, most likely the overseer’s cabin.
Her family hailed from both the enslaved workers who cultivated sugar cane on this and other
area plantations, and the plantation owners who oversaw the operations. "You can't see it on me,
but they are our family too," she said, tilting her head towards the nineteenth century portrait of
the white landowner. "We just recently found our white relatives. They attended the last family
reunion." Folks were worried at first, she described, that their presence would be awkward. Ms.
Anne hosts the bi-annual reunion on the family property, which includes where her house is now,
the cemetery, and the empty lot where the overseer’s house used to be. "But they came and it
was a great experience. We had our ceremonies out here with candles honoring our ancestors and
had a great time. It was very moving."
She held the portrait as she finished her story. "This man used to be on the mantle in our
fireplace in my home when we were growing up. And for the longest time I did not know why
we had a picture of a white man up in our home. Then, one day, my auntie told me that we were
kin to that man. I knew we came from the plantations but I had no idea at that point that we were
related to the owners. Guess he took-up with one of his workers, you know how that is..."
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After the plantation house was destroyed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, all that was
left of the physical imprint of this history is the cemetery and the stories Ms. Anne and others
from the town remember and choose to share. Artifacts of the region's plantation and slave
history are hard to find. Wiped-out by hurricanes and the gradual encroachment of water over
land, many complex histories forged by racism and exploitation of land, people, and natural
resources live largely in the memories of people like Ms. Anne. These histories shape the way
she looks at and navigates the world of present-day Plaquemines, whether it is talking with
curious, non-black anthropologists like myself or representatives from CPRA who ask to hold
meetings in her church to have a "community conversation"27 about the need to build a river
sediment diversion through Ironton to protect the people of coastal Louisiana.
The history of Ironton and Ms. Anne’s family is not easy to pick up on due to her darker
complexion or the landscape of small homes, levees, and gravel roads of the community. Later
on during our visit we would discuss the arbitrariness of black/white and, to a certain extent,
Native American racial and ethnic distinctions in the parish as well as throughout the wider
region surrounding New Orleans. With its African, French, Spanish, western European,
Caribbean, and eastern European admixture of migrants, south Louisiana evades easy
black/white racial significations. At least until the Jim Crow era, which introduced a tri-part
racial segregation and mentality that continues to linger in self-ascribed and imposed racial
distinctions across the region to this day (Hirsch and Logsdon 1992, Kupra 2010, Ware 2014).

"Community Conversations" was the name of a series of open house style events CPRA hosted between 2016-2017 in
small coastal communities across Louisiana. These were small meetings, hosted in churches like the one in Ironton, bait
shops, and other community gathering spaces. CPRA hosted these meetings to create small, informal opportunities for
residents to speak directly with CPRA officials.
27
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Despite her mixed background, Ms. Anne identifies as black or African American, terms
that residents frequently invoke interchangeably if they describe themselves in terms of racial
distinctions. She also identifies strongly with place, evidenced by the fact that she is quick to
remind many visitors to Ironton like me that it is a historic African American town and a
Freedmen's community. As a public figure prominently associated with fighting for the rights
and well-being of the black community in the parish, she frequently qualifies her description of
Ironton as a Freedmen's community, emphasizing the importance of race-centered histories that
shape contemporary issues impacting her community. "I come from a family of fighters," she
said as we discussed her role as a community leader. She hails from a family of longshoremen
and civil rights activists who instilled in her from a young age the importance of challenging Jim
Crow racism and developing independence from the largely corrupt political bosses who
descended from "Judge" Leander Perez, the politician who controlled Plaquemines Parish for the
majority of the twentieth century.
Perez and his family established a fiercely state's rights framework for political rule
undergirded by a defense of racial segregation that imposed Jim Crow black/white distinctions
upon a population of mixed-race, African American, Creole, Native, and white ethnic residents.
They funded their racist cultural and political agenda by siphoning millions of dollars in revenue
generated from oil and gas resources in Plaquemines' wetlands into parish coffers and their
private bank accounts and flexed their unchallenged political rule through intimidation and
sometimes violent tactics against any resident or politician that publicly challenged the terms of
their rule (Jeansonne 1977). "My family wasn't intimidated by Perez like others were," Ms. Anne
noted, cutting through the long deceased man's infamous legacy with little more than a bat of the
eye. While Perez certainly espoused a virulent biological and social defense for racial
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segregation, he also managed to retain political power in a parish almost thirty percent black in
the mid-twentieth century by providing jobs and some measure of resources for everyone, black
and white. It was his way of attempting to combat political unrest from developing in the parish,
and prevent outside agitators from bringing disenfranchised communities of color into national
movements for Civil Rights.28 She explained that her family went to Orleans Parish to work on
the docks in order to avoid being subject to his tyrannical rule. And that the women in her
family, particularly her mother, actively fought against his government to bring political power
and resources to underserved black communities in the parish. One of the most significant
victories her family won was a decade-long fight to get the parish to spend the $200,000 needed
to install the infrastructure to bring running water to the 200 residents of Ironton (Jeansonne
1977, 394-398; Isaacson 1978). Until the pipes were installed in the early 1980s, residents relied
on cisterns for catching rain and weekly deliveries by truck of water to use for washing, cooking,
and consumption (see also Edwards 2017). Ms. Anne's mother was worked with other organizers
in the parish - including the Fishermen and Concerned Citizen's Organization discussed later in
this chapter - to pressure the parish to allocate the funds for the water infrastructure. "I went to
all the meetings with her and saw it first hand," Ms. Anne recounted. The fight for running water
set in motion a strong push among black communities in the parish to begin directly challenging
the racist culture and political organization of the parish.

Leander Perez predominately relied on fear and intimidation as a means of keeping internal and external civil rights
groups from challenging Perez's political order in Plaquemines. One of the most widely remembered tactics was Perez's
threat to put outside civil rights agitators in a sunken military fort on the lower east bank of the river - a place only
accessible by boat. Though this never happened, many residents often tell the story when asked about Perez's racism.
Despite such threats many black residents worked to organize and challenge illegal voter restriction laws, school
segregation, and other violations of civil rights legislation in federal court throughout the 1960s and 1970s. See
Jeansonne (1977) and Edwards (2017) for detailed historical accounts of these activities.
28
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Race, land, and water
To this day, the fight for water and land is frequently invoked by residents to underscore
the severe costs of being invisible in the parish and the political importance of visibility for black
residents in light of Plaquemines' segregationist past. "We're still the stepchild of the parish" Ms.
Anne told me. She noted how Ironton and other black communities are still the last to receive
resources or projects - like playgrounds, paved roads, and levees - compared to whiter and
wealthier towns in Plaquemines. The cost of not knowing this history, which many local (white)
historians either omit from their histories or simply claim ignorance about, continues to be a
source of frustration and motivation for black community leaders in the parish to challenge the
dominate Mayberry29 narrative of the parish's history that largely concealed any presence of
black residents and racism. As other scholars working in the region have noted, the erasure of
black history from the broader cultural imaginary of the Louisiana coast reflects and reinforces a
culture of forgetting on the part of white majorities who do not share similar histories of racial
discrimination or the fight for political power, land, and water with people of color in the region.
As anthropologist Katherine Browne points out in her ethnography of a black family from
eastern St. Bernard Parish (adjacent to the east bank of Plaquemines Parish) recovering from
Hurricane Katrina between 2005 and 2010, the "whitewashing" of history is common for postslave holding areas, like the circum-Caribbean region that encompasses Louisiana and the
coastal US South (Browne 2015, 173; see also Trouillot 1995). The framing of coastal heritage
in Louisiana from the imagined halcyon vantage of regional histories romanticizes coastal
culture and history as a "working coast" of bayou people (predominately white Cajun groups

Mayberry is the fictitious white, small-town community depicted on the popular Andy Griffith show airing in the US
during the 1960s. This is a term many white residents used over the course of my research to describe growing-up in
Plaquemines Parish in the mid-twentieth century.
29
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descendant from French settlers) in a way that erases histories of slavery, plantation economies,
racism, and land dispossession that exist alongside the formation of the region's natural resourcebased economies and the various white immigrant groups who came to work the bayous. In the
broader imaginaries of securing this seemingly universal coastal heritage that frame policy and
public discourse about coastal land loss, much of the cultural diversity of Native American,
Cajun, Croatian, Vietnamese, Isleno (descendants of migrants from the Spanish Canary Islands),
African and Creole people are ignored. Under the framework of coastal restoration cultural and
historical differences are transformed in a shared heritage that highlights the dependency of
groups on coastal industries - such as oil and seafood - but fails to dive deeper into the many
political struggles groups have confronted in order to maintain their homes and communities.
When histories of black communities are accounted for, they are often the footnote to more indepth explorations of political leaders like Leaner Perez. Native American groups are sometimes
and to a certain extent an exception to this. They often become tokenized in their role as
hallmarks of cultural authenticity, enshrined by archeological sites and tribal traditions.
Meanwhile, however, the brutalization and theft of Native American land by oil and gas
exploration companies is ignored as are the challenges they face with gaining state and federal
recognition precisely because they have lost so much land (Maldonado 2014, Klopotek 2011).
The association of land with recognition and rights extends to the experiences of many black and
mixed-race communities across the coast. While historical memories of Cajun people being
persecuted by the French and seeking refuge in Louisiana runs deep in historical understandings
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of losing coastal Louisiana, histories of enslavement, dispossession of land, and contemporary
racial inequalities and racialized geographies are largely absent.30
When these omissions are coupled with the geographic isolation of black communities, as
Ms. Anne and other community members emphasized to me, it can become a challenge to make
sure that the parish government or CPRA recognizes the presence of people of color and their
particular situatedness in the context of projects for changing the land and water surrounding
black communities. "They don't understand what land means to us," Ms. Anne emphasized as we
spoke about the concerns she has for her community when facing predictions of land loss and
imminent coastal restoration projects. Because CPRA officials and others from outside the black
community don't have those same histories connected to the land and water, Ms. Anne and I
went on to discuss, they do not understand why Ms. Anne and others, like Mary Ann, find
CPRA's approach to environmental restoration at times disrespectful and problematic for black
communities. But visibility is not only a matter of respect. It is also a matter of survival for
Ironton and other marginalized communities who also rely on ownership and access to land and
water as a means of cultural and economic survival, yet are exposed to some of the highest levels
of flood risk and in the pathway of experiments to rebuild the coast.

30

Coastal histories such as Laska et al (2005) and (2010), Davis (2010), and Brasseaux and Davis (2017) tend to
emphasize the culture of the "working coast" in their characterizations of the cultural importance of the coastal area.
Yet while these works often highlight the histories of white ethnic and Native American groups, they offer little
mention of plantation histories and the descendants of formerly enslaved African-Americans who continue to living
in coastal areas. An exception to this is the recent establishment of the Whitney Plantation, which operates as a
museum documenting the histories of formerly enslaved African Americans and work on environmental justice
issues in the Baton Rouge to New Orleans corridor (i.e. Allen 2003). Yet these works offer little insight into black
coastal communities specifically and/or the history of civil rights organizing in these communities. It is also
important to note here that Native American histories in the region are equally marginalized and sometimes
conflated with the generalized cultural significance of the coastal area. When picked-up by popular press, the socalled "refugee status" of Native American groups is emphasized over their longer battles for civil and political
rights over the course of the Twentieth Century as well as the historic and cultural diversity among groups.
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Water
When most people talk about land loss in Louisiana, they often think of the coast and the
well-circulated phrase "losing a football field an hour." The term comes from a 2012 US
Geological Survey study that found a football field to be perhaps the most apropos referent for
Louisianans to understand the spatial-temporal scale of coastal land loss since the 1930s
(Couvillion et al. 2012).
Circumscribing land loss to geomorphological processes, however, overshadows some of
the fundamental ways land, water, and environmental projects are experienced by coastal
residents - especially fishermen. It misses the ways land and water have been historically
entangled in battles for political rights and racial justice for marginalized communities of color
like those in Plaquemines. To better understand how black residents might feel uneasy about
CPRA's interpretation of land loss and what tactics to use for land restoration, I spent time
among residents collecting oral histories about civil and environmental rights organizing in the
parish and how black fishermen in particular have interacted with science and scientists
managing coastal areas.

Sharecropping on the water: The racial politics of oystering
Dale and Gary were the first community leaders I was directed to when I began asking
about the history of the black fishing community around Pointe à la Hache, on the east bank of
the Mississippi River. Both men grew-up fishing for oysters during the days of Leander Perez
but, like Ms. Anne, never quite relinquished total power to Perez's tactics. "Perez?" Dale said to
me with a note of inflection in his voice when I asked about growing-up in Perez's Plaquemines
Parish. "Nobody scared of Perez. Perez preached that shit [racism] to keep people out of here so
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he could keep his millions [from oil and gas subleasing]. I saw my mamma curse out Perez from
one end to the other […] ain't nobody talk about that." He took a drag of his cigarette and
continued. "My daddy more white than Perez," brushing off the larger-than-life persona and
scale of Perez's racism and political power.
The more we talked about race and racism in the parish it became clear to me that Dale
understood from a young age that race and racial distinctions were arbitrary and entirely about
power. It seemed as though racism was hardly something that put a dent in his sense of selfworth or confidence despite growing-up in a segregated world. "Segregation was just ridiculous,"
Dale explained me as we were driving around the local boat dock, "they would even make you
sit on different parts of the ferry...I mean, my god!" We were talking about growing-up under the
rule of Leander Perez and how that impacted his life working in the bayou. One of the main
problems of racism at that time according to Dale was that the parish "always wanted to keep
you with a secondary education to provide the labor for the factories...and one of them even said
it over here...well, we gotta keep these jobs for the white boys and these black boys can come
work in my oyster steam factory." Race maintained class structures in the parish as did
systemically barring black residents from voting and holding elected office through widely
practiced literacy tests and other Jim Crow discriminatory tactics. Dale, however, did not intend
to step into politics the way Ms. Anne and her family did at that time. Instead, he avoided
working in the steam canning factories in favor of working in the bayou, where the racial
division of labor played itself out on the water.
Gary, a close friend of Dale's and fellow oysterman worked on the oyster boats run by the
wealthier, white Croatian oystermen in the area, getting paid by the sack for how much he could
collect in a day. He likened the proliferation of large oystering outfits he worked for to
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"industrializing mother nature" that turned the bayous into "plantations," complete with the
racialized labor relations of the plantation. "You [black and poor folk]," Dale explained,
"couldn’t own large oyster boats because Perez set them up in business, so it was white boat
owners and mostly Croatians and Yugoslavians... and what happened was you worked their
boats." They would get paid by the sack for their work with boat owners taking a cut of the
profits. The system, essentially sharecropping on the water, put many of the black workers at the
mercy of the owners. Gary explained the history one morning: "you see, they had more control
of everything you see. Because if you didn’t work for them [...]you had to work for one of them
or you didn’t work. That’s for sure [laughs]. But you wasn’t getting paid your right amount of
money."31
Relegated to being underpaid laborers, many black oystermen started trying to figure out
ways to start their own oystering businesses to become independent of the oyster dealers. While
they understood and experienced racial discrimination, the desire to change the oystering system
was about economic autonomy for Gary, Dale and others. This challenged the trenchant racial
hierarchies in the parish. At the time, in the late 1970s, black fishermen in the Pointe à la Hache
community didn't have the resources to buy and operate big boats like their white counterparts.
Instead, they had their own little skiffs, small wooden boats designed to move through shallow
water, that they would use to try and make extra money selling oysters they caught. Catching
oysters on these smaller boats meant "cooning for oysters," as Dale, Gary, and other black

31

For more on the history of Croatian oystermen and the racial struggles between black and Croatian fishermen in
the region see: Ware, C. (1996). Croatians in southeast Louisiana: An overview. Louisiana Folklore Miscellany, 11,
67-85 and Ware, C. (2014). Offshore Oil and Deepwater Horizon Pointe à la Hache. U.S. Dept. of the Interior,
Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region.
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fishermen I spoke with often said. This meant literally getting out the boat, going overboard, and
diving for oysters to pick from the reef. As many of these men worked the reefs on a regular
basis for their employers, they often knew where to find the best oysters, however they did not
have the same kind of equipment their bosses had, making it difficult to make a living
independently. Frustrated with the leaky wooden hull boats he used to fish oysters for himself,
Gary went down to a company that made aluminum hulls and asked if he could get some ribbed
aluminums hulls made - a less expensive alternative to getting an industrial-sized skiff. At the
time, Gary also had a friend who came up with the idea to use a smaller oyster dredge - a tool for
gathering oysters from the reefs that made the processes a lot quicker than going by hand.
As Gary described, the combination of outfitting the small boats and the new hand dredge
enabled him and others to get off the big dealer’s boats. Working independently, they were able
to make more money and have more flexibility with when and how they worked, as long as they
were willing to work hard. After that, the big oyster outfits couldn't get anyone to work on their
boats. Dale shared the same story with me, noting how the combination their "little boats" and
the hand dredges enabled them to become independent from the oyster dealers, much to the
frustration of the large outfits that lost a significant portion of their cheap labor force. To quote
Gary, "we come out with our invention with the aluminum hulls and the hand dredge [and] we
could make three times the money we was making on these boats and not have to work as hard."
When the oystermen went about trying to start their independent businesses in the late
1970s, however, they ran into several legal obstacles. The first was the creation of a law in 1978
that outlawed the use of the hand dredge because it allegedly destroyed the oyster reefs despite
the fact that it was much smaller than the dredges used by companies owned by white oystermen.
Dale, Gary, and other black oystermen were shocked when they went out on the first day of the
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season on the public oystering grounds and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
(LDWF) told them they could not use the dredge because it supposedly destroyed the oysters.
"We couldn’t earn a living because they passed that law on us" Gary explained, noting how it
was no coincidence that the law was passed once he and other black fishermen "got to be
independent." Compared to the size of the much larger dredges used by their white counterparts,
the hand dredges caused minimal damage, something that seemed quite obvious to the
oystermen. Nevertheless, LDWF continued to enforce the law under the auspices of
environmental conservation.
The regulations spurred the oystermen into action. They began meeting regularly at the
Fishermen and Concerned Citizens Organization (FCCO) in attempt to strategize how to fight
the new regulations. After reaching out to veteran civil rights organizers and lawyers in New
Orleans, Gary and the fishermen challenged the new law in federal court. Upon taking their case
to court, with the help of several civil rights lawyers from New Orleans, the judge came to the
same conclusion as the oystermen (Webre 1980). Gary recalled the day in court: "We had them
[the hand dredge and the large dredge] in the back of the pickup truck at the courthouse in New
Orleans. We had them side by side. The newspaper was out there taking pictures.... the judge
say, ain't no way, this here gonna do more damage than that there!"
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Image 10: Plaquemines oystermen after court hearing (Times-Picayune, April 15, 1980).

The FCCO's lawyers also pointed out that it was discriminating against black fishermen,
violating equal protection and due process rights protected by the 14th Amendment to the US
Constitution (ibid.) because at the time, as Gary recounted, almost all the fishermen on the east
side of the river were black. After hearing the oystermen's testimonies, the courts ruled in their
favor and overturned the law.
Despite being able to get back on the water, the fishermen ran into trouble as they attempted to
lease oyster grounds from LDWF. In Louisiana, state waters up to nine-miles out are regulated by
LDWF for leasing public and private oyster bottoms. The system for oyster leasing is organized entirely
by LDWF in a "quasi-private" way: Anyone can lease, not own, state water bottoms for oystering for 15
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year terms which can be fished year-round and are easily renewable or transferrable (McGuire 2006,
693-694). Private leases can be purchased anywhere in state waters except on the public seed ground.
The state managed oyster bedding grounds and the wild reefs in Breton Sound, which is directly
adjacent to the black fishing communities where Gary and Dale live on the lower east bank of
Plaquemines Parish. The public grounds are the seed grounds for all the oysters in Louisiana and, as
such, can only be fished during certain times of the year. Because all the oyster spat, or seeds, come
from these wild reefs, almost all oystermen lease some portion of the public grounds, take the seeds
from there, and bed them on their private leases where oysters can mature and be harvested year-round.

Image 11: Areas outlined in purple and cross-hatched are the public, wild oyster reefs. Pointe à la Hache is in the upper lefthand portion of the map (Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries 2018).

When Gary and his friends would find a particularly good spot and attempt to lease the
area at the LDWF offices in New Orleans they were frequently ignored by staff. When someone finally
did help them, the bottoms they wanted to lease were already taken. Public leases can be held by
individuals for up to 15 years before they are released back to the state, but they are frequently renewed
and kept in families. This makes it difficult for new people to get in. As a result, residents from Gary
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and Dale's villages had few, if any leases in neighboring Breton Sound. Beyond this, however, LDWF
was reluctant to lease grounds to them or even explain to them how the process worked, which put
further obstacles between them and the possibility of acquiring oyster leases. Perplexed by the responses
he was getting from LDWF when he tried to lease oyster bottoms, Gary recounted: "We was out there
[at the LDWF offices], me and my brother-in-law, we saying, you know one thing? If this land is leased
already, they gotta have a map with all the leases on it. So I went in there and said, 'do you have a map
with all the leases on it?' They [LDWF] say, 'yeah.' I say, could we get one? [LDWF says] 'What you
want to do with it?' I said, ' are they available?' He say, 'yeah, it cost you ten dollars.' I say, 'gimme two
of them.' [...] I said okay, I guess these are the leases, huh? Well okay, then I want here then. You can’t
tell me they got this because it ain’t marked up on the map! So that is how we started leasing ground."
Because they would often be given the run-around at the LDWF offices, Gary and his brothers had to
use the maps in order to demand that LDWF lease them the lands that were available. It seemed to Gary
that when black oystermen would put in a request for a lease that LDWF would call oyster dealers to
lease it before offering it to a black oysterman. As he described, "I don’t know if [LDWF] was working
with them or what, or they’s getting money under the table or what ... they just didn’t want to see no
blacks with no bedding grounds... because they be too independent."
As with the fight for using hand dredges, acquiring the means to be self-employed infused the
oyster-rich waters of Breton Sound with a new meaning of economic independence from life under the
thumb of oyster dealers as low-wage, sharecropping laborers. Compared to their white counterparts,
access to these waters was a means towards undoing aspects of the racial and economic inequalities that
defined relations to natural resources in the parish.
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From oysters to the first free elections
The FFCO's legal battles did more than enable fishermen to have the freedom to work
independently off the waters next to their communities. It also laid the groundwork for the most
persistent anti-racist organizing in Plaquemines Parish. After linking-up with civil rights groups and
lawyers in New Orleans and successfully overturning the oyster hand dredge legislation, many of the
fishermen felt emboldened to keep pressing many of the issues around inequality and racial
discrimination in the parish that had long languished under Leander Perez and his sons. The civil rights
lawyers, fired from their original jobs for working with the fishermen, decided to go into private practice
and continue working with the fishermen for free. "They were teaching us a whole bunch of civil rights
stuff," Gary recounted, and the lawyers "didn't want to stop."
As the FCCO and their lawyers continued to meet, other folks in the Parish began to
approach the fishermen with problems that needed to be addressed, and membership grew on
both sides of the river. I asked Gary how the organization grew from its origins with fisheries.
"As persons joined," he said, "they had ideas about what was going [...] on in the parish and we
got school problems, we got all kind of problems, we got water problems, we got this problem,
we got work problems, and we just got together and just wrote them down and said we were
going to deal with all of them, you know?" The FCCO was not solely about fishing anymore, but
political power.
When Gary and other members of the organization first reached out to residents in
Ironton about their lack of running water in the early 1980s, residents were not confident the
FCCO's intervention would make much of a difference. "It was an all-black town with no
running water," Gary explained. "And I thought Ironton had water!" On the days when the water
truck didn't come, they had a large tank with extra water tucked back behind the river levee.
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Many residents took to hauling water from the river to wash clothes and perform other chores.
"This was in the 1980s!" Gary exclaimed. Residents petitioned the parish government for years
to route water lines through their town but had little success. Upon handing out flyers to start a
meeting in the town one women said to him, "son, we been trying to get water in Ironton for
forever. For last 20 years, you know?" To which Gary replied, "But how did ya’ll try? Ya’ll tried
by yourself. I say, how’s about trying with the whole Plaquemines Parish? She said, I don’t think
that will ever happen.” By this point, the organization’s number and chapters were growing and
the FCCO was getting a reputation for making change happen. They began packing council
meetings, demanding the parish council pass a resolution to pay for water. Several members
were thrown in jail. When FCCO organizers planned to have residents bring in their literal dirty
laundry to a council meeting, and the council got wind of it, the council finally broke down and
passed a resolution to bring running water to the small town.
The FCCO similarly organized for the heirs of the Bohemia Spillway, a portion of land
expropriated from predominantly black and white ethnic residents on the lower east end of the
river in the 1920s to create a floodway for New Orleans. As of the mid-1980s, the spillway was
deemed out of operation but the Orleans Levee Board, the governing body that owned the
property, continued to maintain the area, along with lucrative mineral leasing rights. With their
lawyers on hand, the FCCO organized living heirs to the legally and illegally expropriated land
to file a class-action suit to have the land, and mineral royalties, reverted back to the descendants
of the original landowners. After several rounds in court and an amendment to the state
constitution, the FCCO made a pathway for several residents, black and white, to get their land
back - land which continues to bring oil and gas revenues to "spillway families" all over the
eastern and southern ends of the parish (Marcus 1986, see chapter one).
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With significant legal support and sophisticated organizing leadership, the FCCO made
parish leaders nervous. When Gary invited Leander Perez's son, council president Chalin Perez
to one of the FCCO's meetings he refused, saying he "doesn't go to gang meetings." Such a
comment reveals the deep nature of not only racism, but resentment on the part of longentrenched parish officials whose political power rested on racial hierarchies that was now
challenged by the direct action of the fishermen and their allies. Indeed, for the FCCO,
transforming the structure of parish governance and ousting the Perez family from power was
crucial. Working with other black leaders in the parish who had filed federal suits against the
parish for illegally denying black communities’ political representation on the parish council, the
FCCO pushed to get the parish council to comply with federal law and switch from at-large to
geographically discrete council elections. They also organized to put Chalin Perez out of office,
which required a majority vote of the parish council.
Recalling the day of the vote, Gary noted how the group once again packed the parish
courthouse, chanting and encouraging other councilmembers to cast a vote to get Perez out of
office. "They held the meeting about 5 o’clock one evening in the courthouse. And we packed
the courthouse, we packed it. We had people all down the road and outside, you couldn’t get
people in the courthouse [...] everyone was cutting up and chatting and shit because first
[councilman] voted against [keeping Perez in office], then another [councilman] voted against,
then another [councilman] voted for him, then one vote that was councilman Beshel. And boy he
was up there, boy he was, ohhh he was shaking. And boy we was hollering, we was hollerin’, we
kept cheering him on boy. So he got up, boy he was sweating, boy he was sweating boy,
everyone was talking and laughing and stumping, vote, vote, vote No, vote No, vote NO vote
NO vote NO. And boy when Beshel pushed that button for no... [laughs] everything go quiet.
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Ain't nobody say a word boy. So his father in-law got up and hollered, you nigger lover!" It was
a clear indication that while many residents in the parish were invested in long-entrenched racial
hierarchies, the FCCO confronted and transformed a culture of politics based on racial
discrimination and disempowerment of poor and working class residents in the parish.
As he told the story, Gary laughed. "Beshel was so scared he said, lord, lord, lord, what I
did, what I did? So we all said, you did the right thing, you know? You did the right thing. You
know, the man had all the power and control." To be sure, Gary and Dale were quick to note that
even though they found the larger-than-life persona of the Perezs laughable, racism in the parish
was fierce and real. "The most racist parish" is a phrase Gary and other members of the FCCO
frequently used when I spoke with them about their political organizing in the parish.

Racializing water and land
The work and legal victories of the FCCO in the 1970s and 1980s took tremendous steps
towards undoing almost a century of Jim Crow policies on land and water. Challenging state
regulations of oyster harvesting practices opened the door for communities of color to develop
organizing tactics, legal resources, and confidence to begin systemically challenging a culture of
racism that, from the plantation era onwards, used the environment to "beat up" - as one leader
put to me - the black community in the parish. The fishermen's work, however, challenged this
framework through mobilizing the environment and its economic and politically emancipatory
capacities to challenge prevailing mechanisms for controlling water and, through that, race
relations.
The relationship between the water, economic autonomy, and racial equity for fishermen
in Plaquemines Parish reflects the ways forms of property and the natural resources they can
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provide to sustain a family - such as oysters, shrimp, food, oil and gas royalties - are connected
to combating deeply entrenched racism. These relationships are particularly poignant because
natural resources have historically been used to oppress and disempower people of color. Land
and water, in other words, occupy an ambiguous space in Plaquemines Parish as the terms and
grounds of oppression and freedom.
Land, in particular, is connected to a deep sense of belonging and multigenerational
histories that are deeply embedded, as I would come to find out, in the land itself that powerfully
shapes how black residents understand the meaning and political significance of land loss as they
confront Louisiana's plans to rebuild sinking coastal lands around their homes.

Land
Battles to overturn overtly discriminatory fishing policies, to secure running water, and
even overturn state law to return illegally expropriated properties to residents, reflect the broader
ways that fights for political belonging are cut-through with racial politics as much as the politics
of environmental management and flood control. With the victories of the FCCO in the 1980s
and the ousting of the Perez family from political power in the parish, the days of overt racial
inequity in Plaquemines Parish seemed to be on the decline. Yet as I dove further into
conversations with black residents about meanings of land and water and forms of land loss,
many pointed out that though they are concerned with the "coastal erosion crisis," which has
become a prominent public issue in the parish, they are equally if not more concerned with the
ongoing property succession crisis associated with a litany of storms that have hit the region in
the past decade and its impacts on the black community.
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Going up
When I first met Ms. Paula in late August 2015, she was sitting behind the front desk at
the local parish government. A friend had suggested I talk with her to learn more about the
Ironton community. We covered many subjects over that first conversation, one of which was the
fact that she was in the midst of scheduling meetings with several contractors to elevate her
home. Her home was rebuilt after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to seven feet above the ground and
was subsequently being raised up to twelve and a half feet because of water damage the house
sustained from Hurricane Isaac in 2012. This was necessary despite the fact that her house rests
on some of the highest land in Ironton.

Image 12: A home on cradles in the midst of being elevated (photo by author).

Ms. Paula's home was the first elevation project the contractor she hired had done in the
parish and he was having some trouble getting his numbers right. Flood levels and ground
surface elevation have changed at least twice in the past ten years, making it perhaps confusing
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to the contractors. Ms. Paula hired them with a $150,000 grant she received from the US
Department of Housing and Urban Development to elevate her home. In order to qualify for
reduced flood insurance rates, homes must be elevated at least a foot above the most recent flood
levels, and this must be confirmed by a surveyor from the parish who comes out after the
elevation is done to make sure it is to the correct height. "If the house isn't high enough," Ms.
Paula described, "then my insurance rates go through the roof!" But when the parish evaluated
her house, they determined it was not high enough, just short a few inches. This put Ms. Paula in
an ongoing battle with her contractor to re-elevate the extra foot and a half, and pay for the costs.
Because of disagreements between the grant program managers, contractors, and the parish, she
had to get her home raised three times. "Nobody can determine what the base flood elevation is
and at what point between the ground and the very bottom sill of the house the house needs to be
elevated to...they couldn't agree on it."

Image 13: A completed home elevation (photo by author).
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The elevation started in June 2016. Paula and her family had to be out of the house for a
month and half. During that summer her daughter and her daughter's two young children came to
stay with them. Her daughter was in the midst of a divorce. With her husband and two adult
sons, one who is wheelchair-bound, that put the house population at seven - seven people who
had to find somewhere else to stay for a month and a half. Ms. Paula and her husband stayed
with her sister-in-law, her daughter stayed with her soon to be ex-in-laws and children across the
river. The family was split up all over. "I had this persistent feeling of uncertainty," she told me.
"When will the inspector come out? When will it be done? " When her home was finally up to
the necessary height and the project seemed to come to an end, all other kinds of structural
troubles arose from lifting her 80-ton (or 160,000 lbs.) house. When the elevation was finally
completed, cracked tiles in the kitchen, uneven floors in the hallway, doors that could no longer
fit into their doorframes, and the possibility of termite damage under the house were new stresses
that emerged. When I visited her home a month before Thanksgiving she was painting her dining
room walls. As we walked into the living room she asked me to excuse the mess and then
proceeded to show me all the damage the multiple elevations had done to her home. She looked
exhausted. She had been going back and forth with the contractor to pay for the flooring damage.
Ms. Paula had hoped to host her extended family for Thanksgiving that year, but decided that
Christmas might be a feasible option, giving her time to work through fixing at least some of the
damages.
Despite how taxing the process of elevation can be, in some ways Ms. Paula felt
fortunate. During my visit with her that autumn afternoon, I asked if it was awkward to have her
home up so high above her neighbors. Even at the time of writing this in 2019, only four homes
are elevated in Ironton. She explained that yes, it was at times awkward to be one of the only
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families elevated. She felt bad for most of her neighbors because one of the primary barriers to
being eligible to apply for a federal grant was proving outright ownership of your house and the
property it rests on. For many black families in Plaquemines Parish as well as across the US
South, the homes they live in are situated on larger family plots of land, owned by multiple
members and generations of a family. That is, their homes are on land that they do not outright
own - or at least of which they are not the sole owner. In these situations, their homes are built on
what is classified as "heir's property": land passed down from generation to generation without a
clearly defined title that is legally owned by all the heirs of a family. Over generations this can
lead to a property legally belonging to hundreds of heirs in the absence of any clear division, or
succession, of the property (Mitchell et al 2009, Douglas 2017).
Ms. Anne, who lives a few blocks over from Ms. Paula, made it clear that the succession
problem was a legal and racial problem for residents who were trying to take proactive steps
towards protecting their homes in the wider environmental context of losing coastal land. But
one land loss seemed to beget another land loss, particularly for black residents in the parish.
"There are so many ways this land loss thing has been particularly hard on our community, the
black community," Ms. Anne said to me as we discussed Ms. Paula's home elevation as well as
her own. "Take for instance this elevation," she said, gesturing towards the house. "They force us
to go through a succession of family property to get the elevation grants, but many families don't
want to do that with family property." Her characterization of family land echoed the tradition
among many black families in the parish of land as a shared family entity; something that
connects generations and is always there for folks to come home to.
Legally, however, properties owned by families as opposed to one or two single owners
(again, what is labeled “heir’s property”) can create a legal nightmare when families find
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themselves in situations, like Ms. Paula, where they have to do a succession or division or
property shares in order to qualify for things like federal elevation grants. "Inherited land," as
Ms. Anne explained to me, "even if it is a very small piece [...] just the fact that it was passed
down through generations, it means so [much] more to an African American person than it
would to a general person on the street." Ms. Anne was referencing her family's particular ties to
properties in Ironton that emit a sense of belonging and historic connection across time and space
for her family. For some families, Ms. Anne explained, to subject the land to a succession can
disrupt a vital connection to family as the land comes out of collective familial ownership and
into the title of one family member. In an ideal world, residents would have access to flood
mitigation measures without needing to alter their relationship to their family land.

Clouded property and land loss
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which revealed the extent of the coastal land
loss crisis, the concentration of heir's property among black communities in Plaquemines Parish
created what some residents referred to as a succession crisis: many families felt pressured or
forced into a succession of their property to become eligible for federal funds to rebuild and
elevate their homes. "You have to show immovable property," Ms. Paula described to me, which
means that you need to demonstrate that you are the outright owner of the land and the house that
is being elevated, not just the house. "They [homeowners] would have to resolve any land
through succession [but many] people can’t afford to do that, to hire an attorney…with the block
grants you had to be the owner of the land, particularly the land, because it has something to do
with immovable property…so both the land and the house have to be owned by the people
applying for the grant."
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Opening up succession of property is a mixed-bag for many families for economic and
personal reasons. "I see it as a racial thing," Ms. Anne said to me. To her, the stipulation of
immovable property was having a disproportionate negative impact on people of color in the
parish, disqualifying and denying them access to federal and state funds. This would make many
residents who did not want to do a succession on their property for financial or personal reasons
feel forced to go through a succession for fear that if they did not, they could very well lose
everything again and have no social safety net to help them rebuild. For some residents, Ms.
Anne and Ms. Paula similarly explained to me, if family land was divided it was no longer "in
the family" and could draw families into messy legal battles among themselves as well as any
third parties that heirs to the property might sell their inherited share to. Such legal battles could
also result in families losing their pieces of their family property or the entire property altogether
if they cannot agree on a way to settle and courts force them to sell the property at auction
(Mitchell et al. 2009). In addition to emotional stress, succession creates economic vulnerability
for families whose economic and personal resources are entwined with family properties.
Indeed, their fears are not unsubstantiated. In historic and legal scholarship, the
relationship between heirs' property, or tenancy in common formations of property ownership,
which are more common for minority families in the US, has led to loss of ownership of black
properties throughout the country, particularly in the US South. Heirs' property, or tenancy in
common property, refers to a property ownership situation where multiple tenants - usually
multiple generations of the same family - own portions of a property, sometimes equal in size,
sometimes not, with each tenant also having the right to use and occupy all of the property. This
form of shared property rights is common among African Americans who acquired land after the
Civil War, and low to middle class landowners in the southern US for whom lack of legal wills
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dictating the ownership of property or exchange of titles and deeds to land resulted in land
becoming equally owned by all descendants of the original property owners. As a result, the title
of the property is what is referred to as "clouded," wherein there is no clear legal line of
ownership to a property. To undergo a succession or partition of property means to legally divide
the physical property or the rights to a property into parcels. While owning a share of a tenancy
in common or heirs' property is legal, it can become compromised when developers or
environmental conservation and protection groups with interest in the property acquire a share in
the tenancy in common and attempt to bring the property into a forced succession to establish
individual landowners. Such activities compromise the rights of heirs' property owners,
particularly in desirable areas for coastal development and protection such as the coastal
Carolinas and Georgia in the southeast US and along the Gulf Coast from Texas to Florida
(Flemming et al. 2016, Rivers 2007, Kahrl 2012, Grabbatin 2016).
Forced sales and loss of family land in Plaquemines, as many of the residents I spoke
with noted, could come in the form of family members selling-off their shares of a property to
settle a debt or take-out new debt (putting a lien on the property) and could also come in the form
of paying off debts to the parish, sometimes even to bail a family member out of jail. While some
of these practices are no longer used in the parish, specifically putting up money to post bail,
several individuals noted how the use of inherited property as collateral to a lender could often
result in the loss of the entire family property, not just the individual's share. To be sure, there is
a shared sense and experience among many of the residents I worked with that there are several
quasi-legal forces at work to make them and their family property vulnerable to being stolen or
lost. As legal scholars have recently pointed-out in cases from the US South, black families who
disproportionately own a higher percentage of tenancy in common properties in rural areas -
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upwards of twenty-five percent of black rural landowners in the south (Mitchell 2005, 583 citing
The Emergency Land Fund, Inc. 1980, 62-63) - often lack the financial and legal resources to
fight forced property partition (succession) cases when they are brought to court when
developers are able to acquire a share of the property. Because there can be hundreds of heirs
with legal rights to a property, developers can often approach out-of-state or distant heirs who
have less personal connection to the property, make an offer for their share and, once acquired,
can use their status as one of the tenants to force a partition and sale of the property against the
will of heirs who occupy or have emotional and economic ties to the actual property (i.e. they
have homes and live on the property).
Ms. Jenny, an eighty-five-year-old African American woman from an area about ten
miles down the road from the Woodland Plantation, helped me understand the extent of the
financial, emotional, and familial burdens predatory land acquisition practices and forced
succession can leverage on black families. From behind a pile of succession paperwork and
transcript records of court hearings from three decades of attempting to resolve her family's
property succession, Ms. Jenny looked exhausted. Since 1984 she has fought the parish and local
real estate developers who have collaborated to acquire pieces of her family's property in south
Plaquemines. Cavanaugh Realty (hereafter Cavanaugh) came to acquire a portion of the interest
in her family's property when one heir sold their interest (a portion of the share of the property)
to a real estate developer. Ms. Jenny does not exactly know how that happened, but that transfer
of interest in the property gave Cavanaugh a way to acquire the most valuable piece of the
property: the waterfront.32 In 1999, Ms. Jenny lost waterfront property but continues to take the
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Ms. Jenny's case is, unfortunately, not unique. As Mitchell et al. 2009 notes in their extensive legal study of the
relationship between racial discrimination and force partition sales in the US South: "The media, including the
Associated Press, has uncovered many shocking instances in which real estate speculators utilizing very sharp
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real estate developers who took her land back to court. As she explains her case to me, her niece
and nephew fill in some of the details. Together, they continue to her appeal the case in the
parish. As we sit and go through the paperwork at her dining room table, two grandchildren are
playing in the living room of her double-wide trailer and her daughter is getting ready for her
shift as an emergency dispatcher for the parish.
Ms. Jenny has challenged Cavanaugh for over two decades since the parish courts
awarded the local real estate developer the water/marsh front portions of her family property. As
she patiently explains to me, Cavanaugh originally got hold of the property through an
agreement with an out-of-state heir and used it, along with their political connections in the
parish, to acquire the waterfront property for a fraction of its real value. When members of the
family could not reach an agreement with Cavanaugh as to the best way to subdivide the
property, the parish courts forced the family into a full succession. When the case was brought
back to court in 1999, Cavanaugh made a move to take less land than he could legally fight for
with the caveat that it would be the land in the back of the property on the marsh side; land that,
as Ms. Jenny argued at the time, Cavanaugh was after because he wanted to turn that waterfront
property into fishing camps33 that would sell for several times more than the value of the entire
family property.

practices purchased very small interests in black-owned tenancy in common properties [heir’s property] located in
states throughout the South, properties that in many instances had been owned by certain African-American families
for generations, and then were able to convince various state courts to order the property sold under a partition sale
(618)."
33
Fish camps are second homes that people from the region use for weekend fishing trips out into the coastal
marshes. Though the appellation camp might sound primitive, these second homes are fairly expensive, especially
when the cost of flood insurance is factored in. They often have small boat docks with direct access to the water. In
the wake of devastating hurricanes and unending coastal land loss in the region over the last few decades, wealthier
out-of-town individuals have bought waterfront properties and retrofitted them as fish camps. Many locals, on the
other hand, cannot afford to maintain most of these homes, and end up selling them, creating a phenomenon that is
called by local scholars as "bayou gentrification."
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The geography of the property division is important to understand in Ms. Jenny's case.
Despite the fact that Cavanaugh was technically receiving less than one-sixth of the physical land
in the offer they proposed, Ms. Jenny and her lawyer both pointed out that the land Cavanaugh
was proposing to take was not of equal value to the other parts of the family property, and could
easily be worth upwards of $300,000 because it was prime real estate for fishing camps. As I
read through the transcript from the hearing, I noted the hostile tone of the exchanges between
Ms. Jenny and the judge as she pointed out the economic motivations of Cavanaugh compared to
the personal interest of her family in the property. The Judge, not interested in this argument,
snapped back at Ms. Jenny and her lawyer, stating: “I am very familiar with the area, I was born
and raised there and I can tell you, it’s not worth $300,000.” At this point Ms. Jenny cuts in to
make her case that Cavanaugh's motivation to acquire this portion of the property is rooted in the
fact that it is several times more valuable than all the other portions of the property Cavanaugh
has an undivided share in. "He [Cavanaugh] wants to develop it into campsites to make hundreds
of thousands of dollars." But the Judge, curtly responds, “that was an expectation, but if it does
not come through it does not come through. The values of the property have to be determined as
of the date of trial, you know, they could discover oil or discover gold on it and the value would
go up tomorrow, next year, next week or whatever. But based on — the decision has to be made
as of the moment of the trial” (Court transcript 4/1/1999).
Refusing to agree to the arrangement because she felt that the courts had inaccurately
determined the amount of property Cavanaugh was entitled to and the fact that Cavanaugh
clearly intended to use the property as a financial investment, Ms. Jenny refused to agree to hand
over the waterfront strip of property. When Ms. Jenny's lawyer attempted to get her on record as
having no objection to selling the property at auction she replies, “we have objection, but it don’t
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make a difference, would it? But it’s been in [our] family over a hundred years, you think I want
it..." Her lawyer interrupts her, emphasizing, “this is the only option available to you right now.
You will not compromise [with Cavanaugh]." Ms. Jenny replies, “if [settling] means giving him
my five-sixths share for his one-sixth share, no” (ibid). The lawyer goes on to say that since Ms.
Jenny cannot resolve her disagreement with Cavanaugh through transferring property or money
the only solution is to have it sold at public auction (Court transcript 4/1/1999). The Plaquemines
Parish courts, frustrated by her unwillingness to compromise on the land sale, forced her to put
the property up for auction at a forced partition sale.
Cavanaugh acquired the property after it went up for auction in 1999 and owns it to this
day. Ms. Jenny, who was unable to outbid Cavanaugh,34 continues to appeal the case even
though Cavanaugh has established several sub-divided properties on her family's land. As of
summer 2017, there are at least 40 lots available for purchase to "build your dream fishing camp"
upon on the land that formerly belonged to Ms. Jenny's family. Each lot is listed at
approximately $70,000. Together, Cavanaugh is looking to make at least $2.8 million off of the
property if all the lots ever sell. The sign announcing "Waterfront Lots for Sale" sits in front of
Ms. Jenny's home.
Compared to wealthier upper and middle-class landowners, the economic impacts of a
forced partition sale on low to moderate income groups, especially minorities, often results in the
property owner receiving below market value for their property. Journalists and scholars
examining this phenomenon in the US South point to the proliferation of forced partition sales as
some of the primary drivers of black land loss, reproducing a racial wealth gap between minority

34

Again, in situations where black owned heirs' property is put into a forced partition sale, family members are not
often able to bid as competitively as white property owners (Mitchell et al. 2009, 619).
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and poorer white communities and middle to upper class white people through discrimination in
real estate markets (Mitchell et al. 2009, 646-657; Oliver and Shapiro 2013). This is tied to the
increasing disparities between market value and real land values that persistently undervalue
black properties, as well as discriminatory lending practices that have reduced black
landownership in the US (Mitchell et al. 2000). Legal scholars examining the relationship
between heir’s property and forced partition sales note that this practice disproportionately
negatively impacts the wealth generation of poorer and middle class folks, especially people of
color in rural areas, calling it a "double discount" that devalues property based on race and/or
ethnicity of the property owner in addition to the devaluation of property that accompanies
forced property partition sales (Mitchell et al. 2009, 657). Examples of black property loss such
as through legal transactions and the forced sale and partition of property points to the cultural
and emotional significance of losing land as well as the ways land loss sustains the racial wealth
gap in the US (ibid., Oliver and Shapiro 2013).
As I visited Ms. Jenny and members of her family over the course of several months, they
pointed out to me how similar legal tactics were often used by wealthy landowners in the parish
to acquire the most valuable land in the parish, which, for example, could be made into luxury
fishing camps or, of course, have oil underneath it. Ms. Jenny's parents had also lost their land
across the river in the early 20th century when the Orleans Levee Board decided to expropriate
the area where they lived for the Bohemia Spillway project. She remembered them telling her
stories about having to move everything they had, including her, across the river to where she is
now, in order to establish a new home. Ms. Jenny's experiences with Cavanaugh and the parish
government felt like an extension of the same illegal and racist land theft practices from
Bohemia.

141

Upon the pile of papers that Ms. Jenny carries with her to her various court dates to
appeal the 1999 decision is a letter, only addressed "to whom it may concern," without a date. It
is attached to the court transcript. In the letter, Ms. Jenny summarizes her struggles to keep her
family property as a case of blatant favoritism and abuse of the legal system by the wealthy
(Cavanaugh) to steal from the poor. As she writes, "I [Ms. Jenny] have lost a case because of
dishonest, fraudulent and deceitful conduct [...] I as a poor person came up against a millionaire
who wanted my land to make millions for himself and his family while leaving me and my
descendants to struggle ... I believe there are many more cases like this in Plaquemines Parish
which has a history of blatant corruption, favoritism, and nepotism."35
Ms. Jenny's letter and fight points out the unique vulnerability created by non-formalized
forms of land ownership in many black rural communities. Though it is technically legal to have
tenancy in common properties, many aspects of property law are designed for individual
property owners and actively promotes, to a certain extent, the loss of family land.

Fostering resilience in racialized landscapes
As coastal land loss raises the risks of living in Plaquemines Parish, measures for
rebuilding and protection, particularly access to home elevation grants, were added to the list of
forces that seemed to conspire against many black families in the parish who either did not want
or could not afford to complete a succession on their family property. Ms. Jenny's struggle with
developers with interest in developing coastal property for tourism and valuable fish camps
details the extent of legal, emotional, and financial struggles that heirs' property poses to black

35

This is a personal correspondence Ms. Jenny shared with me in 2016.
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families.
In an effort to ethnographically situate how residents from a historic black community in
the lower ninth ward of New Orleans interpreted this double-displacement - first through
eminent domain and second through Hurricane Katrina - anthropologist Joyce Marie Jackson
suggests that many residents associate the loss of their homes and communities with a larger
"conspiracy" on the part of white politicians to disenfranchise black communities from land and
political rights (Jackson 2006, 769-770). Historian Andrew Kahrl's work on black-owned coastal
properties in the Gulf south extends this argument through examining the legal mechanisms by
which black land was taken in a series of transformations in coastal planning policies (zoning
and building codes) that made black land vulnerable to predatory real estate developers. This was
especially true in the wake of storms and hurricanes that provided an opportunity to revisit the
laws and policies on land use and development practices. The twin rise of "coastal capitalism"
and unsustainable environmental policies that leaned heavily on the capacities of capitalist real
estate development and coastal engineering to turn remote coastal areas into resort towns are one
of the primary mechanisms that shape the "spatiality and political economy of race in twentiethcentury America” (Kahrl 12, 2012; see also Hardy et al. 2017).
To be sure, hurricanes and their attendant disaster mitigation programs, such as the home
elevation grants through HUD, as well as an increasingly powerful shift towards managing the
lower river environment for coastal restoration (see chapters one and four), contributes to once
again re-arranging racialized property relations, often to the detriment of communities of color
and poorer coastal residents. because clouded property titles have made black families ineligible
for federal disaster mitigation grants. As Ms. Anne frustratingly pointed out to me one day
regarding the allocation of home elevation grants: "When I lost my home in a hurricane I’m not
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asking you to replace my land, I’m asking you to replace the home that was on the land." Despite
her resistance, Ms. Anne, like Ms. Paula, did a succession on her family land and was able to
have her home elevated. For her, a significant part of that motivation was to secure the land for
the family by making sure that her home and the family land it is poised upon, is at least owned
by someone in the family who values the property as a shared family property with an intangible
value that ties her sprawling family together. Ms. Anne went through succession to protect her
family despite the fact that she finds the process problematic and discriminatory against black
residents in the parish. In other words, to protect family land, the land needs to legally not be
family land anymore.
Many of the struggles black residents face in Plaquemines Parish rest at the awkward
intersection between legal challenges of owning heirs' property and a system of adapting to
environmental risk, in the form of disaster mitigation grants, that is designed for individual
property owners. Heirs' property, in this regard, is a direct obstacle to cultivating strategies for
adaptation and resilience in coastal communities (Flemming et al. 2016). Coastal planning efforts
focused on creating more resilient communities often have little frame of reference for
understanding the distinct challenge occupying heirs' property poses to people of color and lowincome communities in Plaquemines and throughout the rural coastal south. For scientists,
environmentalists, and planners invested in making coastal communities more resilient, heirs'
property "increases human vulnerability in a way that echoes America's racial past" (ibid.), yet
what they fail to understand is that it reflects the present racialized state of property relations that
continues to put the onus of protecting family land on black families as opposed to asking how
environmental adaptation and protection programs can augment their policies to accommodate
these entirely legal forms of property ownership.
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To insist that it is a matter of educating landowners and providing legal and financial
assistance for changing a clouded title - or family land - to a clear title, and individual property
owner,36 misses the point, as Ms. Anne might say. "What they...Caucasian people...seem to miss,
in that whole conversation is…inherited land, even if it is a very small piece, but just the fact that
it was passed down through generations, it means so much more to an African American person
than it would to a general person on the street." Despite the fact the succession enabled Ms. Anne
to make her house safer by providing her with access to the funds to elevate, she, like others in
the parish, also saw succession as producing a certain kind of vulnerability for black families.
Practices and policies for protecting vulnerable communities from the environmental risks of
coastal land loss are thus overlooking racialized experiences of land loss that are interwoven into
colloquial understandings of land and water in addition to more mainstream understandings of
flood risk. The changing coastline is not only moving land and water itself, but threatens to
undermine the cultural, economic, and material relationship of black communities to the land and
water.

Conclusion
When land loss is fixated on only sediment and land, as the dominate conversation in the
state is, we lose its connection to the histories and the multiple meanings this loss carries for
different groups. The phantom memory of Ironton residents "asking for a check" is an illustrative
example of the ways race and racialized meanings of land and water infiltrate and shape
contemporary conversations about environmental protection and restoration. It reflects a deep
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There are several NGO legal groups making increased efforts to offer services to low-income communities of
color to help them complete a succession of property to in order to become eligible for federal hazard mitigation
assistance in coastal Louisiana.
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and perhaps willful ignorance on the part of state officials of the difference that race makes when
they approach figuring out protection and mitigation plans for coastal communities. For state
officials, flood risk and protection of land has no color. But for residents who have fought to
identify and remediate racism as it manifests in their relationships to land and water, addressing
the potential impacts of building a river sediment diversion is as much about race as it is about
protecting land and a way of life that they have fought hard for. Whether or not those histories
and people are visible to coastal planners and environmentalists, racial histories are infused in
contemporary efforts on the part of residents and planners to ensure the safety and future of
coastal communities.
Racialized property relations, such as those outlined above, are suffused within black
residents' engagement with and understandings of environmental restoration policies and projects
that stand to dramatically reconfigure the social and material landscape of the lower river region.
As much as the geophysical processes of erosion and subsidence constitute land loss in one form,
political struggles to acquire access to and maintain black-owned lands and waters constitute the
interpretive framework that many black communities in Plaquemines Parish use to interpret
coastal restoration. Many of the stories about the meaning of ownership and access to land and
water for black residents of the parish reflect what numerous scholars of the US south describe as
the “pivotal role and ownership and development [plays] in shaping and giving spatial definition
to African American’s experiences of class, pursuit of pleasure, and the struggle for economic
empowerment” (Kahrl 5, 2012). As Gary and Dale point to, access to the public leasing grounds
in Breton Sound was not only about the accumulation of wealth but the broader struggle for
freedom from the racist political and economic organization of the parish. To make a livelihood
and home in defiance of the deep political and cultural entrenchment of racism was a hallmark of

146

independence and source of pride and freedom for black families.
The connection of land ownership to the sense and actualization of political, economic,
and social independence and freedom in black communities, particularly in the US South, is
underscored by residents’ articulation of the meaning of black land and their history of fighting
for access to and protection of land and water. More than just a space away from virulent racism,
the fight for black Americans to acquire and maintain land has long been associated with
struggles for economic and political equality. As historians of the Reconstruction Era and black
communities in the South have pointed out, emancipation land ownership, especially in the
south, was one of the central ways that black communities aspired to dismantle the cultural and
economic hegemony of the plantation regime (in addition to envisioning new forms of collective
governance) (Woods, 1998; WEB DuBois 1935, 580-636).
Acquiring some form of financial independence under the institutionalized and cultural
racism and economic inequality of Plaquemine Parish's history was a significant achievement for
black residents even if it was only in small enclaves on land and on water. Access to land and
water built financial independence and a sense of community among residents that fortifies their
persistent desire to live in this increasingly vulnerable and sediment-starved environment. As the
experience and work of many black leaders makes clear, struggles for land and water are infused
with struggles for racial equality and, as such, the meaning and re-definition of racial identity
and political belonging in the parish are deeply tied to decisions about the management and
control of land and water.
To a certain extent, the mentality of "why would I live anywhere else?" (c.f. Simms
2016) is shared among groups across the coast regardless of racial or economic background.
People of all ages in many of the black communities I worked with in Plaquemines Parish talked
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about how much they love knowing everyone, how safe it is, and how close they are to family.
Socializing freely, mostly among other black residents, at church or in front yards is a part of
what makes these predominately all-black communities so special to residents. Yet, I would
argue that among communities of color as well as other minority communities, part of the
meaning infused into the landscape is the struggle to make it their own in the first place.
Residents from the east bank make this clear when they describe the months after Hurricane
Katrina when the parish government did not want them to rebuild and "come home." These
qualities reflect the special social relations that are embedded in the black geographies of the
parish and, specifically, black-owned land and (practically) all-black communities that persisted
despite and in defiance of the social-spatial and economic violence of the color line and
contemporary legal impediments to protecting their land and adapting to coastal land loss.
In short, battles for land ownership and access to water is part of what enables black
residents to acquire and maintain social and political freedom and is what roots their desire to
stay despite increasing vulnerability to storms and coastal flooding. As a result, many
community leaders take it upon themselves to be vigilant in protecting these spaces against
newer forces, such as industrialization and restoration, that threaten to perpetuate a history of
displacing their homes and communities. Environmental restoration, as a discourse and practice
of science-led policy making, cannot exist separate from these racialized understandings of land,
loss, and protection. As recent critical work by geographers has pointed out, environmental
mitigation and adaptation plans that overlook or dismiss racism and racial inequalities run the
risk of reproducing them (Hardy et al. 2017).
In a post-Katrina and BP oil spill moment when decisions about investments in
environmental restoration and protection have been proven to exacerbate existing social
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inequalities in south Louisiana (Adams 2012, Browne 2015), it is worth asking to what extent
coastal restoration has inherited an ideological framework under the guises of environmental
sustainability and serving public good that attempts to separate environmental restoration from
relations of power and inequality that are thoroughly racialized.
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III. Inundation
Inundation is the process by which a river or other body of water overflows its banks,
submerging areas outside of its established topographical footprint. This can be intentional or a
result of natural processes. In the Mississippi River Delta, seasonal inundation of sediment-laden
water from the Mississippi River every spring deposited a wealth of sediments and nutrients to
adjacent lands, making it some of the most fertile agricultural land in the US. Regular floods on
the river not only generated nutrient rich land but shored-up natural levees along the river, where
the largest sediment deposits quickly fall out of the water column building up natural levees.
Inundation in the lower Mississippi River Delta also helps to build up land along the river's main
channel. This serves to offset rates of subsidence by ensuring the periodic replenishment of
sediment rich waters. Once the river was leveed-in, or channelized, much of this sediment ends
up passing by the sediment starved wetlands, and being dumped off the continental shelf beyond
the Birdsfoot Delta.

Image 14: Sediment wasted (Restore the Mississippi Delta Campaign, n.d.).
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Inundation is also associated with the intentional flooding of lands. Since the
establishment of the Mississippi River Commission by the US Army Corps of Engineers in the
late Nineteenth Century, intentional breaching of levees to relieve water pressure has been used
to avoid catastrophic floods. In its mimicking of natural, river flooding processes, it is used as a
river management tool on the Mississippi River in order to shape the impact of the river's
movements and impacts on the lower delta landscape.
Tapping into the land sustaining and building capacities of the alluvial Mississippi River
has become a central tactic for scientists and environmental planners wrestling with possibilities
for large-scale land replenishment in coastal Louisiana over the past thirty years. Yet the use of
the river introduces elements of uncertainty. Despite the best intentions of scientists, many
residents fear that using the Mississippi River for rebuilding land will increase flood risk to
coastal communities living nearby the project site. And the introduction of large amounts of
freshwater into the estuary means that commercial and subsistence fishing patterns will change
once the diversion is turned on. Preliminary predictive models and scientific studies indicate that
these uncertainties are potential outcomes. Yet scientists are hesitant to assert what the exact
outcomes of the diversions might be. The only way to ground truth the models, as engineers and
scientists note, will be to build and operate the diversion. The capacity to access "good sediment"
thus entails reckoning with the world-making practices and uncertainties of scientists and
scientific models. Beyond this, the possibilities of using lower Plaquemines Parish as a site for
experimenting with inundation based land restoration extends a history of subjecting people and
landscapes in the lower region to extensive environmental experimentation for the benefit of
groups living on higher ground.
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The use of the river for coastal restoration thus introduces a complex set of entanglements
between water, sediment, scientific models, and social justice that people who work and live in
the region face as they navigate a means of trying to sustain a disappearing coast.
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3. Contesting the rule of models: Sediment, science, and the politics of predictive models
Voodoo science
It's December 2015 and the state's Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA)
is making the rounds of public meetings delivering their "fall river sediment diversion decision
point" presentation. One of its last stops is at the end of the road on the east side of the
Mississippi River, in the small hamlet of Pointe à la Hache. The decision that Steve, the oftdisgruntled and defensive Executive Director of the CPRA, had to deliver was that, after years of
modeling the impacts of six large river sediment diversions in Plaquemines Parish in the hopes
of restoring sinking land, the state decided to build only two diversions. Models showed that rerouting large sections of sediment-laden water into sediment starved marshes helped to maintain
land, but ultimately did not build as much land as scientists and policymakers had hoped. It was
the first concession CPRA made since they put river sediment diversions at the center of their
plan to rebuild and sustain the coast in 2012.
Steve had a reputation of not having the most finesse with the public. In fact, many times
he was outright hostile in public meetings, which was often provoked by hostile questioning and
insults thrown at him and his colleagues by residents. They understood CPRA's plans to use river
sediment diversions as a means of rebuilding disappearing coastal land as ignorant at best, and an
outright attempt to destroy their way of life at worst. Nevertheless, Steve persisted in these
spaces. He made his presentations, took questions, and promptly left.
This particular presentation was given at one of the bi-weekly meetings of the
Plaquemines Parish (county) council, a nine-member elected body that oversees the governing of
the parish. Every other Thursday the council meeting is held in Pointe à la Hache, Louisiana,
about forty-five miles south of New Orleans on the east bank of the Mississippi River. Pointe à la
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Hache is a rural, predominately African American and Creole (or as many residents refer to
themselves, black) community that is about two-miles long by about a quarter mile wide. It sits
between the Mississippi River to the west and Breton Sound to the east. A fifteen-foot levee
surrounds Pointe à la Hache on all sides, which is high enough to make you forget you are
surrounded by water. Unlike towns on the west bank of Plaquemines Parish, Pointe à la Hache
and the lower east bank is more sparsely populated, less developed, and geographically isolated.
The road that follows the river down to Pointe à la Hache is winding and dotted with trailers, a
handful of churches, small cemeteries, three bars, a coal storage facility, several raised creolestyle plantation houses now sitting abandoned, and cattle that graze among stately oak trees with
wisps of Spanish moss dangling from their branches.

Image 15: St. Thomas Catholic Church, Pointe à la Hache, Louisiana (photo by author).
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As of 2010, Pointe à la Hache had a population of just shy of 200 residents. Along the road, a
large high-school also sits 18 feet in the air. Phoenix High School was rebuilt after Hurricane
Katrina, as was a large prison and the Percy Griffin Community Center, which also sits 18 feet in
the air. Residents rely on a small ferry that can carry at most 30 cars, and is often out of service.
If the ferry is operating, it costs $1 per ride to get them to the more developed, west bank of the
river where they can “make” groceries, get gas, catch a movie, and go out to eat. Amenities in
Pointe à la Hache include a small marina that use to be the epicenter of the black fishing
community until the combination of botched restoration projects, hurricanes, and the BP oil spill
destroyed most of the areas wild oyster reefs (see chapter two). Next to the ferry dock is a
convenience store that sells soda, chips, ice, and microwaved pizzas.
This parish council meeting was held just fifteen or so miles south of where one of the
river sediment diversions is anticipated to be built. I noticed Steve standing in the back of the
room when I arrived. I also noticed that he was on the ninth page of agenda items for the council
meeting. Because the meetings usually run for at least four hours, the council often allows
visitors making presentations to present earlier than listed on the agenda as a courtesy. But as the
meeting went on - motions about zoning permits, insurance for civil service workers, levees for
communities on the east bank, etc. - it was increasingly clear that the council had no intention of
being generous to Steve. I also knew that Steve was facing a two-and-a-half-hour drive back to
Baton Rouge from remote Pointe à la Hache. He paced in the back of the room, waiting to be
invited up.
Once Steve was finally called forward, he began his presentation by pulling up graphics
of all the instances when CPRA "picked up the tab" for projects in Plaquemines over the past
few years, tenuously making his way into his announcement. He reminded the audience the
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Coastal Master Plan in 2012 was unanimously approved by the Louisiana legislature. "River
sediment diversions," he said, "are some of the more aggressive projects in the Master Plan."
But, he reminded the crowd, diversions have been used for years in Plaquemines, albeit at a
much smaller scale. The river diversions that the state modeled are designed to replicate historic
patterns of the river overflowing into the wetlands and depositing sediment to sustain and build
new land, he explained.
"And sediment diversions are not the only projects we have for the parish," he
emphasized. "I have signed more dredging contracts than anyone else in the US," he stated.
He said this because he knows the critique well by now: Those opposed to constructing
river sediment diversions have many reasons to doubt their efficacy for rebuilding lost land,
including the fact that dredging and pumping sediment from the river is a quicker way to build
land than using the river. The state, however, does not see dredging as cost-effective in the long
run compared to building sediment diversions, which are framed as a sustainable and long-term
investment in nourishing and sustaining fragile coastal lands. Diversions will create more
permanent, and cheaper, land than dredging in the opinion of CPRA.
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Image 16: Plaquemines Parish Council Meeting, December 2015 (photo by author).

Steve tells the audience that the state decided, via the scientific models they developed
with engineers and natural scientists, that they will build two diversions instead of six in
Plaquemines Parish: One on each side of the river. And these will be run at a greatly reduced
flow rate - maximum 75,000 cfs (cubic feet per second) and 35,000 cfs. These flow rates were
down from the anticipated 250,000 cfs rate proposed by CPRA in 2012. As he went on, whispers
from the back became more audible to me.
"Does Steve live on Mars?" one man said to another sitting next to him. Muffled laughter
followed.
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"These are models," Steve went on to say, reminding the audience that the models are
predictions. "So we don't know exactly what will happen when they are turned-on. But we do
have data."
Once he finished the questions began.
"Did you look at oysters?" one audience member asks.
"He's saying there will be no change," another audience member replied, referring to
Steve, with an air of annoyance and disbelief.
"We won't have a total collapse of oyster production" Steve responded, knowing very
well that many in the room did not believe him. Another audience member asks about an existing
freshwater diversion about twenty-miles north of where were sitting, the Caernarvon Diversion,
which many residents associate with destroying the once thriving oyster reefs in the area (see
chapter one). The audience member pointed-out that this river diversion has not built any land in
decades and has only succeeded as killing the fisheries.
"We haven't gained enough land there to make up for what we lost," he noted, referring to
marsh loss after Hurricane Katrina.37 He then went on to say what many of the most outspoken
critics of river diversions frequently repeat: "Freshwater does not build land."
"That is simply not true!" Steve retorted.
"I've seen your so-called land created by the diversion," one of the council members
chimed in. "I know what I saw...I touched it. That's not real land."
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Many residents and scientists often point-out that freshwater marshes, due to their shallow root structure, are
prone to being rolled-up, displaced, and destroyed when tropical storms move through the region. Saltwater marsh,
on the other hand, has deeper root structures and the capacity to withstand and bounce-back from the disruption
tropical storms place on the coastal environment. Coastal ecologists working in the region have similar findings in
their work, see Howes et al. 2010.
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"Look," Steve said, putting on a matter-of-fact tone, "are we going to do this [restoration]
right or are we going to keep putting band-aides on it? Erosion is real...the best science says that
we need to build these diversions."
"Your diversions come at the expense of us," another council member reminded Steve.
"Oh really?" Steve responded, getting visibly frustrated. "Well why do I spend all this
money on Plaquemines Parish?" He then proceeded to list-off all the money he could save if
CPRA stopped doing work in Plaquemines Parish, speaking over several of the council members
to who tried to respond to him. "Well I could just cut this project, and that one...hell, I could save
a lot of money...."
As tensions increased, so did questions about the role science and the predictive models
utilized to make decisions about the diversions.
"Your models show forty to fifty years," one audience member stated, "but we don't have
forty years...we'll be gone. We needed something yesterday." Others insinuated that Plaquemines
Parish was being sacrificed to protect New Orleans, an argument often repeated at public
meetings about coastal restoration.
"Don't attack me," Steve responded in a hostile tone pointing up at his PowerPoint screen.
"Attack the science!"
"If someone sees it with their own eyes," another audience member replied, "maybe
science needs to go look."
"And how much of the land built is theoretical?" an older gentlemen said, standing up
from his chair. "It's all theoretical land."
"Nothing on this planet has been built like this," Steve replied, "but we have the data. It's
good science."

159

"How will the parish stop this [the diversions]?" the older gentlemen responded, turning
to the rest of the audience. "You need to do something now. Call your legislators...All that data
he showed...he must live on Mars!"
Steve started to turn red.
"The fishermen are the best scientists, Mr. Steve," one council member threw out,
egging-on the audience.
The final set of comments came from Mr. Percy, a key representative of the black
community in the parish. He reminded the audience and the council that it was positive that
CPRA came to the parish with their plan, encouraging the council to meet with them in a real
way to discuss their differences and concerns.
"They are the only game in town," he reminded everyone in the room. And, to be sure,
there is a big difference between "stuff in an office on a computer and something on the ground."
Despite these differences though, he said calmly, the conversation did not need to become
antagonistic.
Before Steve managed to leave, one last audience member got out a final critique : "I do
not believe that there is enough science to do what these people say they are going to do [...] if
you ask me, it's all voodoo science."
After the meeting adjourned, Steve quickly left the council chambers, not waiting around
to be cornered further by the riled-up crowd.

Contesting the rule of models
Science, and the scientific model in particular, is a strange and powerful actor in the
conversations around sediment diversions and coastal restoration. The critiques leveraged at
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Steve, river diversions, and scientific models that afternoon reverberated with other heated
encounters between coastal policy makers, scientists, and residents from several of the remote
coastal areas where sediment diversions will be built. In the 2012 Master Plan, significant
emphasis was placed on the projects using the "best science out there," as Steve echoed that
afternoon in Pointe à la Hache. This narrative framing certainly aims to derive its authority from
the role that science plays in our society as it is perceived as an apolitical, neutral voice amongst
a panoply of corrupt politicians, special interests, and a diverse public. But it was not until that
moment that I fully saw how predictive models, and scientists to a certain extent, were used as
shields to protect policymakers from the questions of coastal residents and other critics.
In his work on techno-politics and modernity in colonial Egypt, historian Timothy
Mitchell (2002) suggests that infrastructures and the engineering that enables them are circuits
through which experts and expertise participate in the production of political rule. But the
encounters I witnessed in Plaquemines Parish demonstrated time and time again, how the “rule
of experts" is contested on the grounds of contrasting knowledge about the natural world and the
tools used to interpret the future of the changing coast: Specifically predictive computational
models through which experiments with environmental futures are produced and contested.
Over the course of my research on the debates surrounding sediment diversions - from
meetings on plantations to over air conditioned hotel conference rooms to informal chatter at
local bars and boat marinas - it was clear that the decision to build large river diversion
infrastructures in hopes of sustaining a drowning coast generated an uneasy alchemy of doubt
about the integrity and mobilization of techno-scientific fixes for saving the coast. The majority
of the doubt and critique around diversions stemmed as much from diverse material encounters
with the coastal environment as it did from the questionable scientific integrity, as residents
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sometimes put it, of the scientists and their science. But the most palpable concerns shared by
both residents and scientists often centered around the role and reliability of predictive,
computational models that CPRA uses to evaluate the land building capacity and environmental
impacts of large river sediment diversions.
This chapter examines encounters between scientists and coastal publics as they engage
with the use of predictive hydrodynamic models that are at the center of the state's most
ambitious land restoration project: the construction of large-scale river sediment diversions. To
date, a river sediment diversion has never been built anywhere in the world. There are no
examples, only close analogs that can be used as a means of understanding how projects might
alter the biophysical and social terrains of southeast Louisiana. The most politically powerful
analog has been the creation of series of predictive models that integrate historic and
contemporary data taken from the river and adjacent wetlands to simulate various kinds of
sediment diversion scenarios. While the state of Louisiana sees these diversions and, moreover,
predictive models, as the necessary tools to naturally restore the coast by reconnecting the river
to its adjacent wetlands, attempts to generate so-called nature-based responses to coastal land
loss are often critiqued in public and scientific spaces. These critiques are grounded in intractable
differences between the virtual nature of predictive numerical (computer) modeling and the
observable, material qualities of sediment, water, and coastal ecosystems whose actions and
histories do not always appear to reflect their virtual others.
Based on participant observation of public meetings and scientific conferences, as well as
interviews with coastal scientists and residents, this chapter examines the ways these different
groups confront the possibilities and limitations of predictive models and river sediment
diversions within contrasting frameworks: as pioneering ideas and risky experiments for saving
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coastal Louisiana. And, furthermore, how disagreements about sediment diversions and
predictive models reflect conflicts over the nature of knowledge itself and the politics of
expertise. To do this, I analyze diversion debates – like the one featured in the opening of this
chapter - as a kind of knowledge controversy (c.f. Whatmore 2009) that emerges from the virtual
spaces of models and the speculative futures they produce.
The first section follows how large-scale sediment diversions and models became central
pieces of the state’s plan for restoring Louisiana’s disintegrating coast, how scientists perceived
the role of models, and how models transformed the scale and ambition of coastal restoration.
The second section introduces the modelers and field scientists that work on Louisiana’s
sediment diversion research program and the ways they navigate the terrain of materiality and
prediction, certainty and uncertainty, in their work on computer models and in the field. This
section in particular highlights scientists’ attempts to make models more realistic. The chapter
ends by examining the political dynamics of the models as they morphed into pro and antidiversion camps within coastal and scientific communities and how these opposing camps view
the political stakes of the diversion modeling program.
Within the broader context of the unprecedented biophysical and political changes
associated with the Anthropocene, this chapter argues that debates about the nature and politics
of predictive modeling demonstrate how ongoing and attendant transformations of the earth also
transform the political nature of techno-scientific knowledge and reveal the complex
subjectivities of scientists enrolled in the practice of making coastal futures.
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Launching the diversion plane
Science sometimes sees itself as impersonal, as “pure thought,” independent of its historical and
human origins […] But science is a human enterprise through and through. An organic, evolving,
human growth with sudden spurts and arrests, and strange deviations, too.
- Neurologist and historian (Sacks 1995).
Sediment diversions emerged as a matter of more prominent public controversy in south
Louisiana when they were introduced at the centerpiece of the state's Master Plan for Coastal
Restoration and Protection in 2012 (CPRA, 2012). The coastal Master Plan is developed every
five years by the state Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA), an agency under
the office of the Louisiana governor. CPRA emerged in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in
order to centralize coastal planning at the state level. CPRA released their first five-year Master
Plan in 2007, but it was not until 2012 that CPRA was able to fully develop the suite of projects
and overarching framework for coastal restoration. The 2012 Master Plan, unlike previous
iterations of restoration planning efforts, took up a place of major prominence in the science and
policy community and was touted by many as the cutting-edge of climate change planning
(Peyronnin et al. 2013).
While the plan included many projects—from barrier island restoration to marsh creation
to the construction of flood walls and levees—sitting in the middle of the document was an
ambitious plan to cut several river diversions into the existing Mississippi River levees south of
New Orleans. The biggest of these diversion structures was planned to divert 250,000 cubic feet
per second (cfs) of the river—one-quarter of the average one million cfs that flows past New
Orleans—into adjacent, sediment-starved marshes.
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Early attempts to launch the diversion plane
Although the size of the diversions were almost unprecedented save for floodways and
river outlets designed to quickly relieve pressure on river levees in the event of a flood on the
Mississippi River,38 using the river as a way to rebuild coastal land was not a particularly new
idea. In the 1960s, the US Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter "the Corps") and coastal
geologists began systemically studying the extent of loss and coastal retreat since the late 1800s,
and developing initial strategies for projects that could slow and potentially reverse a trend of
accelerating land loss (Gagliano 1970; see also chapter one). The use of river diversions was
conceived of at this point primarily to control salinity in the estuaries surrounding the Mississippi
River, reflecting the requests of commercial fishermen in the region who had long asked for the
strategic input of freshwater to sustain the ideal environment for their fisheries (McGuire 2006).
Alongside inquiry into the evolution of land loss along the coast, this early research also
established that sub-delta formations along the lower coast move through rapid cycles of growth
and deterioration within cycles of 50 to 100 years and that this process could easily be
manipulated with "controlled diversions" that could replenish subsiding land (Gagliano et. al.
1970). This and other research conducted throughout the 1970s and 1980s by coastal geology
teams introduced the use of controlled sediment diversions as a potential tactic, among many
others, to offset accelerating rates of land loss.
As scientists and environmentalists became increasingly alarmed by the extent of coastal
land loss, they began advocating for the state to take a more aggressive stance towards
confronting sustaining land. In the 1990s, building on a growing body of research on the causes
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The Bonnet Carre Spillway above New Orleans is designed to release 250,000cfs of the Mississippi River into
Lake Pontchartrain in the event of a flood on the Mississippi River. The spillway is not, however, a controlled river
diversion structure and is not used for land building or marsh restoration purposes.
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of land loss and the evolving geomorphology of the coastline, community groups and scientists
pushed for the public and politicians to take note of the state’s slow burning land loss crisis and
make a plan to confront it. Early recommendations from coastal scientists argued to use river
diversions to restore land, not only to maintain salinity levels, but in a way that could "restore
delta building on a massive scale" to replenish sediment to the coastal area and sustain its
ecological health and function (CRCL 1989; see also chapter one). Capturing the attention of
elected leaders, the state secured federal funding under the Coastal Wetlands Protection
Preservation and Restoration Act in the early 1990s to begin the first of several comprehensive
plans generated and vetted by scientists to study coastal land loss and develop restoration tactics.
Sediment diversions occupied a persistent yet nebulous space in these early plans. Up
until this point, most scientists working on the state’s coastal restoration plan were wetlands
biologists, ecologists, and geologists. Few, if any, engineers or hydrologists were at the table. At
this time, computational modeling was not regularly applied to complex ecological and
hydrological problems like those posed by Louisiana’s land loss crisis. As one of the engineers,
Eric, who worked on early diversion modeling efforts noted to me, computer models were used
in aeronautical engineering but not so much to look at the interactions between water,
geomorphology, and ecological systems. This began to shift, however, towards the late 1990s
when integrating engineering with the biological and physical sciences was becoming
increasingly “hot” as Eric described. Collaborations across the engineering and natural sciences
fields began to develop cross-disciplinary approaches to confronting complex environmental
problems around the world, many of which were created by engineering projects in the early and
mid-twentieth century.
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After finishing his doctorate in the mid-1990s, Eric worked with fisheries scientists in the
Pacific Northwest using computational model to understand the impacts of dams on fish
migration and navigation on some of the area's largest rivers. He was looking at the ways river
control structures, particularly hydroelectric dams, were interrupting the life cycles of salmon. It
was the first time he ever worked with fish biologists and ecologists and attempted to integrate
biological and biophysical data into singular computer models. James, a geologist who would
eventually become a close colleague of Eric’s in coastal Louisiana, was also working with
interdisciplinary teams which took him all over the world to work with biologists and engineers
to study the impacts of land use decisions, such as deforestation and damming, on changes to
sediment loads in large river delta systems.
Wider disciplinary advances in environmental restoration research and practices like
those Eric and James were involved with were intriguing to the groups working in Louisiana.
Kelly, one of several wetlands biologists working on coastal planning, discussed this history with
me. He noted how several of his fellow scientists in Louisiana advocated to invest federal dollars
to develop computer models to test and predict the physical and ecological impacts of ambitious
restoration projects. As a home-grown scientist who grew up in the marshes of coastal Louisiana,
however, Kelly was suspicious that such investments would be wise. In part, this reflected the
nascent use of computer models in coastal research. But it also reflected Kelly’s sense that the
quality of data and predictions that models could produce were questionable. Models are
“garbage in, gospel out,” he told me as we discussed early debates he had with other scientists
whom he felt were overly enamored with the possibilities of what models could contribute to the
study of coastal land loss.
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Part of his hesitation came from the emerging dominance of environmental groups
(regional non-governmental organizations) within the world of coastal land loss research.
Compared to the limited funding the federal government gave to Louisiana to support research
on coastal land loss these groups, many connected to powerful environmental lobbying groups in
Washington, D.C., had access to more funds than state universities and federally-funded
estuaries programs.39
Environmental groups, on the other hand, had more resources and were invested in
solutions on a scale much larger than what the state could fund or what some local scientists
were comfortable with endorsing. Other scientists, however, saw the interest of national
environmental groups as a boon to coastal restoration: They would be vital partners whose
support could advance a vision for bigger and better restoration. And coastal Louisiana did not
have a minute to lose. Investing in computational models that could provide a more temporally
and geographically expansive scope of the impacts of coastal restoration projects and their land
building capacities could, some scientists believed, be the best way to convince federal and other
funders to provide Louisiana the money it needed to pursue building large-scale projects like
sediment diversions. For Kelly and others with similar skepticism towards models, the capacity
to “run models until they [scientists] got the results they wanted” was an ill-advised fiscal and
scientific endeavor. From his years working in the marsh, Kelly understood that even though the
concept of deltaic rivers building land made geophysical sense, cutting large-scale river
diversions in the coast’s contemporary landscape of industrial development and human
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As Kelly pointed out, federal funds gave researchers just enough money to conduct their work and make coastal
restoration plans, but not enough to fund their construction (a problem the state continues to face to this day).
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settlement could cause “complete biological and cultural genocide,” he told me without batting
an eye. He argued they would drown the estuary and coastal communities along with it.
Luckily for Kelly, though, early investments in building hydrological and ecological
models that could justify building projects like large river diversions turned up few results as
researchers struggled to get ecological and hydrological models to “talk” to each other. In other
words, the modeling programs did not combine smoothly. Beyond this, within the wetlands
science community, land loss was still considered a geomorphological and ecological problem,
not an engineering problem or pressing matter concerning the protection of coastal communities.
This kept predictive modeling and ambitious restoration projects marginal to coastal planning
until the mid-2000s.

The fortune teller and the field guy
When Eric first started working in Louisiana in the late 1990s, his modeling skills were
not readily sought after by teams of scientists studying the coastal land loss and restoration
problem. He found it difficult to break into established networks of researchers working on the
issue and, instead, found himself at a regional university teaching and picking up small contracts
from the state. His early work modeling salinity levels in a local port for the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources (LDNR) quickly taught him the political stakes of his models.
Describing a tense meeting between port officials, the state of Louisiana, and the Corps, he noted
the ways various groups leveraged engineers against one other to further their personal political
battles with each other. The meeting, he recalled, "started off positive, but quickly turned bad."
What Eric's supervisors at LDNR did not tell him was that they set him up to be their fall guy,
bragging about how their modeler was going to disprove the Corps' studies. "Eric is going to

169

prove you all wrong!" he told me, somewhat laughing as he reminisced about the experience. "So
I went in there, excited to present the results of my work, and these guys [the Corps] are angry
and they just start tearing my presentation apart because my model said the exact opposite of
what the Corps' model said! I wish they would have told me that before I walked in," he
lamented. "They knew they were setting me up, but they didn't give me any warning. I was
young and didn't know the politics. I got jammed.”
He made it through, though, and as he continued his work he built a reputation for
himself as an adept riverine modeler who produced work that local and state officials could use
to confront complex environmental problems such as saltwater intrusion, which requires
extensive knowledge of how water moves through swamps, marshes, coastal plains and inland
water systems. When the governor wanted to know what would happen if there were oil spills on
the lower Mississippi River, Eric was finally pulled over to the eastern side of the state and
began building a model for the Mississippi River.
At this point, in the early 2000s, the kinds of three-dimensional models of the river Eric
specialized in building did not exist for the lower river area. With a blank slate in front of him,
Eric started building a team of researchers and models to set up the drivers and inputs for his
river model. When his work caught the attention of LDNR, the main state entity working with
the Corps on their emerging coastal restoration program at the time (then called the Louisiana
Coastal Area (LCA)), they realized that Eric’s river models could be useful for coastal
restoration planning. Several of the scientists involved in coastal planning efforts from the 1990s
were part of the LCA and, after they saw Eric’s models, they focused once again on the river as
an untapped resource for aggressive coastal restoration tactics.
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The LCA team was just getting their first reports out when Hurricane Katrina hit the gulf
coast in 2005. In the wake of the storm’s revelation that coastal land restoration was a matter of
protecting coastal populations and resources as much as ecological restoration (see Day et al.
2007, see chapter one), the LCA returned in 2007 with a renewed commitment to finding a
pathway towards ambitious restoration projects. And Eric’s river models would lead the way
toward realizing these aspirations.
As questions of long-term viability of coastal lands and livelihoods became a more
pressing concern that predictive models could potentially answer, the Corps and the state of
Louisiana authorized the Mississippi’s River Hydrodynamic and Delta Management Study (Miss
Hydro Study) in 2007. The Miss Hydro Study was charged with making a hydrodynamic model a model that can integrate water, morphology, and ecology - that could be used to predict and run
simulations of possible restoration projects on the lower Mississippi River. Around 2008 the
Governor's office put Eric in touch with several geologists, including James, a self-described
“dyed in the wool observationist,” to lead the Miss Hydro Study. The project was unique among
coastal research programs for several reasons: First, to date, there were no hydrologic models of
the lower river system, which made it difficult for the Corps to assess the impacts that various
restoration techniques, from sediment diversions to barrier island creation, would have on the
physical processes in the lower delta. "It was about looking [at] how the river works," James
explained. "That was the missing piece in conversations about coastal processes and restoration.
"No one understood how water and sediment moved through the [lower river] system.”40
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For more details on the Mississippi River Hydrodynamic and Delta Management Study see:
https://www.lca.gov/Projects/22/

171

Before diversions could be tested for land building capacity in the model, James and Eric
needed to begin collecting data about exactly how much land, or sediment, was in the river along
its lower reaches. "The river isn't a pipe anymore," James noted to me. "It loses a lot of the
sediment it has behind damns, locks, and other structures as it makes its way from Minnesota to
the Gulf of Mexico." In order to model forecasts of land loss as well as how different projects
might impact the future coastline and the river, the Corps needed to know how much sediment
was in the lower reaches of the river. James and his team began building monitoring stations
below New Orleans in Belle Chasse, a town in Plaquemines Parish. Up to this point, monitoring
and regular data collection of flow, turbidity, and sediment load in the river stopped just above
Baton Rouge, over 200 miles upriver of the lower delta where new diversions were anticipated.
After installing the monitoring equipment at Belle Chasse and receiving regular profiles of the
water running from New Orleans to the Gulf, James and Eric worked together to build a model
that could examine the biophysical and hydrologic contours of the river at different times of the
year and under different water regime scenarios (high and low river). Ultimately, they were
trying to forecast how the river would react as they pulled sediment out of it. James measured the
bedload and did the field measurements which fed Eric's models. Both men worked on the
project as much as they could between their regular teaching jobs across multiple states.
Diversions were not the first things the models were used for. One of the first projects the
model looked at were impacts to hydrology and sedimentation in the riverbed if large amounts of
sediment from sand bars in the river were extracted to use for building barrier islands.
Researchers needed to know how this might impact flow on the river, how long it would take the
river to replenish borrowed-out sand, and if changes upriver might unexpectedly create
shoaling—sediment filling in—farther downriver. In short, the model helped Eric, James, and
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their colleagues to have a better understanding of the biophysical and hydrologic processes at
work in the lower river. Once the model turned towards looking at diversions, it tested more
modest uses of the river for land building, such as infrequent pulsing where a diversion would
only be opened up at particular points in time during the year to maximize sediment capture
without letting too much water into the surrounding basins. They knew, as did their skeptics, that
diverting too much freshwater, as Kelly said, could drown the estuaries and communities
surrounding the lower river delta.
The hydrodynamic model that Eric and James were building appealed to many of the
coastal scientists and policy makers who felt an increasing sense of urgency to get bigger
restoration projects on the ground and faster. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, land loss
and flood protection become the primary focus of coastal planning and the hydrodynamic model
was a means towards evaluating options for restoration projects. As the new gospel of coastal
restoration, Eric's model expanded the imaginaries of what coastal restoration could look like. As
the project's demands grew, Eric took a sabbatical from his teaching to work on the model full
time. After a certain amount of time, it was clear that the Miss Hydro Study was a career and he
would not return to teaching. While Eric enjoyed teaching, the choice to work full-time on the
project was a "no brainer" for him. He felt that he could be more helpful in his role leading the
science teams on this ambitious project for the state. "That's when I started bringing science to
decision making."

Scaling-up diversions
Compared to predictions of land loss and the impacts of sediment diversions in reports
from the 1960s, which encompassed a synthesis of topographical data and aerial images data to
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reconstruct the history of land loss and estimate future rates of loss, the hydrodynamic models
that Eric and James built could process large amounts of data and several layers of model types hydrologic, ecological, topographic - all at once. With these models, not only were time scales
greatly extended - from 50 to 100 year outlooks - but the possibilities of what a sediment
diversion could be, or rather how big it could be, were less constrained. The transition to the
virtual world of computer models was a window onto the possibilities of what the physical world
could become. The only limits were the data inputs from fieldwork and the imagination of the
modelers. Freedom to experiment in the model seduced many of the state's more powerful
policymakers and environmental groups into the belief that sediment diversions could deliver the
land building that the state desperately needed. They could run the model, in theory, until rates of
land gain outpaced land loss. And though predictive models can only at best attempt to validate
the likelihood of a future outcome or environment based on calculations of existing
environmental data (Edwards 1999), the possibility that there could be the likelihood of restoring
parts of the lower delta based on historic patterns was enough to encourage many
environmentalists to push the agenda of sediment diversions forward.
As a tool, the model provided a safe space to experiment with a variety of scenarios that
could help policymakers evaluate the range of possibilities they could pursue for coastal
restoration that were not possible without the model. "[The state] wanted us to work with no
constraints," Eric explained, "so we tested the model with a diversion that was 5,000cfs and
gradually increased...10,000, 20,000, 50,000...all the way up to 300,000cfs. Basically we asked:
How much water can we pull from the river without disturbing navigation?”
Egged-on by the state as well as a growing number of environmental groups pushing for
funding large sediment diversions, Eric was asked to model up to a 450,000cfs river diversion.
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Engineers and scientists were given creative freedom, to a certain extent, to use the model to
imagine what the real diversion could be. Eric and other scientists were reluctant, though, feeling
that the request was ambitious and a rather unrealistic scenario. "You need to start medium," he
told me, referring to his initial reaction. He tried to explain this to the groups. Even though Eric
worked in the virtual world, he had a sense of the ways his models might look out in the physical
world. He also knew the modeling programs and combinations of scenarios for testing a
diversion intricately. After all, Eric and his team wrote the programs. Environmentalists without
this depth of knowledge about the model or delta geomorphology asked Eric why, he recounted
later, he was "intimidated" by the size of bigger diversion. And they cajoled him: when did he
"become a politician?" Their questions implied that somehow Eric was not responding to their
requests the way a scientist should, as an experiment without boundaries.
"I told them no, I did not become a politician,” Eric explained, "I became a realist […]
You don't know what a diversion will do. How many cubic feet per second we run it at is not just
small details. We need to start with something we can build.” To be sure, Eric hesitated at some
of the suggestions for running a bigger diversion yet also recognized that, if the goal was to build
land, he would have to be ambitious with his models. “A little diversion,” he noted, “won’t cut
it.”
For scientists like Kevin, an ecologist and biologist involved with the LCA program and
later the 2012 Coastal Master Plan, the models were an opportunity to test new ideas, something
they described as "fun." While he knew that biological and social constraints such as impacts to
fisheries or flooding in coastal communities would eventually have to be confronted, the notion
of running the model "unencumbered by the politics" was what needed to happen, in his
perspective, to push the discussion of restoration forward. Kevin's perspective is representative
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of many scientists who spent years in the trenches fighting for coastal restoration resources in a
regional and federal climate that refused to invest in their science and saving coastal Louisiana.41
Their work, it often felt, was "thank-less science."
With the models, though, there were new tools to fight for scarce resources. Not only
that, the model essentially became the "decision-making framework" on coastal projects for the
state (USACE 2013): when the model showed the results planners and scientists desired, that
was the project they chose to put their scientific and political support behind. In 2012, CPRA
proposed six river sediment diversions in Plaquemines Parish below New Orleans: two
250,000cfs diversions, two 50,000cfs diversions, and two 5,000cfs diversions. With the six
diversions in place, planners and scientists thought they could achieve what seemed an
impossible goal: no net land loss and the possibility of land gain in sinking coastal Louisiana
(CPRA 2012).
As a tool, the models unlocked the possibilities of what a diversion could do for land
building. The size of the diversions, though, made many groups nervous, including the Corps,
who have priorities of navigation, flood control, and environmental problems to consider with
any alteration of the river. Fisheries groups were nervous as well when they looked at the size of
the diversions and saw the collapse of their businesses with the transformation of the coastal
estuaries. Individuals who had worked on coastal planning projects since the 1990s were mostly
in support of the idea of diversions, however the predictive modeling approach to decision
making about diversions put them off as much as the size of the diversions did. Up until this
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Many environmental and restoration scientists I encountered in my fieldwork often critically pointed to the fact
that Louisiana received hardly any federal funds for coastal restoration. By comparison, in 2000 US Congress
approved the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, which eventually earmarked over $270 million towards
ecological restoration of degraded wetlands (see Ogden 2008).
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point, the biggest river diversions the state had built were 10,000cfs and 7,000cfs, respectively,
and their operation was met with much public and legal controversy (see chapter one for more
detail).

Image 17: CPRA 2012 Coastal Master Plan for the Southeast Coast. Note the six proposed diversions south (below)
New Orleans in Plaquemines Parish (CPRA 2012).

The “run the diversion ‘til we build land approach,” for natural and social scientists
working in coastal Louisiana smacked of techno-scientific hubris, Kevin noted. The state, he
went on to explain, was so consumed by the biophysical aspects of diversions - obsessed with
land building - that there was hardly any room to consider the social and economic aspects of
such a large project. "The folks in charge think they can just tack the social stuff on to the end,”
Kevin said, shaking his head, "but what they don't realize is that the public can easily derail the
entire thing once it is built.” He explained that even if they built a diversion that big it would
never operate at full capacity because the public would raise a ruckus and lawsuits would be
flying in. This would mean that billions of dollars would be spent on a project that would never
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be able to operate as modeled or intended. Echoing these concerns, other wetlands scientists felt
that the science used to populate the model was weak because it had become a “Frankenstein
model”: a collection of multiple models of ecology, hydrology, and geomorphology with the
outputs of one model feeding directly into the next with the possibility for the accumulation of
error growing with each new piece that fit onto the master model. "This is not good science,”
Kevin said, reflecting on this new approach to coastal planning. "Their [the state and its
scientists’] hearts are in the right place, but the conclusions they are drawing are maybe not
correct.” Kelly perhaps put it best, noting how this epistemological shift in research and planning
"turned science into a giant fuzzy black box called models."
For many natural and social scientists on the periphery of modeling efforts, and even
some embedded within research for the state, predictive models enabled diversions to take on a
new and questionable role as a scientific and political machine. The model, in essence, became
the new politics of coastal restoration that centered on land building. Beyond this, predictive
models were tools that, while intended to aid in guiding coastal policy and projects, introduced a
project that was at best a pioneering idea for environmental restoration, and at worst a reckless
demonstration of scientific hubris. The model became, in other words, a politics machine.

Models don’t speak for themselves: Navigating the material and virtual worlds of sediment,
models, and science
That sediment is going to be our salvation.
-Rep. Graves, LA -US Congress
Only God knows how much sediment will be in the river in fifty years.
-Greg, Plaquemines Parish resident
The only accurate model will be the diversion itself.
-Bradley, US Army Corps of Engineers
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Many scientists and residents echoed the trepidation that Kelly and others expressed as
models moved into the terrain of “gospel,” as he called it, for making coastal policy and projects.
In large part concerns from all sides rested with the fundamental differences between predictions
and materiality, hypothetical and concrete realities, that models and the scientists who make
them, struggle to navigate. With this in mind, one of the biggest challenges for policy going
forward from the 2012 Master Plan was convincing fellow scientists and a skeptical, frightened
public that models were realistic and the correct frameworks through which to make decisions
about coastal restoration and protection. Environmental groups had the added incentive at this
time to push modeling and diversions forward because unfolding fiscal settlements from the
2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill held the promise of providing the funds for the $50 billion
price tag that came along with the 2012 Master Plan.42 It was a serendipitous moment for
restoration advocates wherein science and funding were finally coming together.
Some scientists and residents, however, were not so quick to celebrate the achievements
of the 2012 Master Plan. Conversations about the diversions at public meetings and other
gatherings in small coastal towns where the diversions will be built brought out frustration from
residents about how diversions, or "letting the river go," would destroy precious coastal
ecosystems that support local commercial fishermen and flood many of the communities that live
on the thin edge between land and water. Widespread public disagreement about the diversion hit
a fever pitch in the years following the release of the 2012 Master Plan. The diversions turned
into a political debate when a group of fishermen from St. Bernard Parish organized residents
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In 2013, settlements for the criminal fines associated with the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill off
southeastern coast of Plaquemines Parish granted $2.5 billion dollars to impacts Gulf Coast States. These funds were
earmarked to fund coastal restoration efforts including over $1 billion to Louisiana. See:
https://www.nfwf.org/whoweare/mediacenter/pr/Pages/gebf-la_16-1115.aspx
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and fishermen living in the outfall areas of the proposed diversions to voice their anti-diversion
stance. Their activities turned diversions and models into a full-on political debate across the
region, solidifying the “pro” and “anti” diversions camps that frequently drew swords at public
meetings, in local newspapers, and at scientific conferences in the region.

The bloodletting
“You’ve heard about the bloodletting, right?” A fisheries biologist and I
were discussing the arc of the political battles between scientists and residents over the
anticipated impact of sediment diversions and the integrity of the science that substrates their
construction. The bloodletting happened in June 2012 in St. Bernard Parish, just east of New
Orleans. A local documentary filmmaker had the meeting on video and let me watch it one
afternoon during my fieldwork in order to understand what happened in the infamous
showdown. It must have been hot because many in the audience were fanning themselves with
cardboard and popsicle-stick fans in the shape of a stop sign that said "stop diversions" on one
side and "save fishermen" on the other. They were sitting in stadium-style seats facing a table of
scientists, elected officials, levee board members, representatives from local environmental
groups, and officials from CPRA who were there to hold an open conversation about the
diversions.
The meeting was moderated by a professor who specializes in environmental education
and communication, but his attempts to finesse conversation in the crowd did not reduce the
level of frustration in the air. “There is a lot of passion in this room,” one member of the local
coastal zone management board noted, encouraging audience members to be cordial in
their engagements with the panel of experts who were there to listen. One after another, though,
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residents and fishermen got up to the microphone and described their concerns with the
uncertainties of how the project would impact their homes, communities, and livelihoods.
“Everyone is scared of the unknowns," he went on to say. "So we need to work through those
unknowns.”
One local oyster dealer was particularly successful at raising the tension in the room,
pointing to the widely-shared suspicion that political re-alignments at the state level had been
largely responsible for the unexpected emergence of sediment diversions at the center of the
state’s coastal restoration and protection plan. "How many y’all, on the panel, making money?"
Mr. Roubideaux began. “You got a raise for this new job? You got a raise, huh? To destroy all
these people?” He said, gesturing to the audience. "You ought to be ashamed of
yourself!” He yelled, alternating between addressing the panel and turning back to the audience:
"Y’all need some sun...windows to look out on the real world [because] y’all living in fantasy
land […] your job is to protect everyone in Louisiana, not throw away 20%! That’s not your job!
Y’all live inside the levee, I’ve never lived inside the levee, I don’t need a levee,” he continued,
egged-on by the crowd. “Your plan is to reconnect the river to the marsh, well who disconnected
[it]? Was it the residents?” he asked, pointing to the audience. “Or was it people like y’all?!" The
audience broke into applause. “Why we not in the master plan? Y’all going to hell,” he
concluded, sitting down and eliciting more applause from the audience.
“Hear me out,” one local congressman who was on the panel at the front of the room
said, putting his hands up. “We have to agree that coastal Louisiana is in big trouble right
now...no one here [on the panel] created this crisis. None of them are paid to do this."
Attempting to offset critique from the Master Plan panel to the activities of the Corps, he pointed
a finger towards flood protection measures that starved the wetlands of sediment. "That sediment
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is going to be our salvation.” Attempting to find firmer footing he leaned on scientific expertise
to make clear that the planning process was free of politics. "I want to make clear that no
politician said this but it was the scientists. Their models told us that if we use the river we can
save hundreds of acres of land.” Others on the panel were quiet. Backing down a bit, he tried to
level with the audience, “I don’t have any desire to wipe out anybody’s livelihood...I love you, I
love this place. I don’t want to destroy it. But if we want to do something we gotta be able to
talk…not dropping f-bombs, not making ethical threats. We’ve gotta have a dialogue and we are
going to be doing extensive modeling to try to figure out how to do this. The computer calculates
the impacts [of the diversions] to test the project on oysters and flooding” he said as he took his
seat, trying to reassure the audience that they should trust the work of the scientists.
The heavy silence in the room after his comment, however, reflected the fact that many
were not comforted by appeals to good, apolitical science and models. Beginning with the
dynamiting of levees in St. Bernard Parish in 1927 to the construction of the Mississippi River
Gulf Outlet in 1965 and Caernarvon Diversion in 1991, these residents lived the economic and
personal consequences that accompanied coastal protection projects. The prospect of yet another
massive transformation of the lower river environment at the behest of local scientists and
engineers was met with grave suspicion (Lewis and Ernstson 2017).43 Both colloquial
and scientific knowledge affirms the connections between these projects and the acceleration of
coastal subsidence, erosion, and biological changes to local estuaries. As such, environmental
infrastructure projects are powerful frameworks through which those inclined towards an anti-
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Lewis & Ernstson (2017) provide an in-depth socio-ecological history of some of these projects, particularly as
they evolved for residents in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. Austin (2006) and McGuire (2006) also provide vital
cultural and historical context for the emergence of mistrust between scientists, engineers, and coastal residents,
particularly commercial fishermen.
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diversion stance engage in political and scientific debates about the use of predictive models
and sediment diversions for developing coastal restoration and protection policy.

Making models realistic
James and his field teams work on the muddier side of the virtuality-materiality problem
debated among angry residents and exasperated scientist and public officials at the bloodletting.
As a self-ascribed “field guy,” he is quick to distinguish himself and his work from Eric’s. One
of the most persistent critiques of the models is their questionable relationship to the water,
marsh, and sediments moving through the lower coastal area and the kinds of data used as the
inputs to the model. Compared to the engineers who spend their days working in computer
programs, the field geology teams that James works with has much more in common with coastal
residents who work on the water. Many days are out in small boats, navigating mechanical
quirks, trying to set-up and troubleshoot equipment as they prepare to gather data. A typical day
with a field team starts early, often meeting at the warehouse that stores the boats and technical
equipment, which each field team hooks up and drops into the river. On one such morning, I
arrived before dawn and started hauling what seemed like an endless pile of equipment and
supplies onto the survey boat and into the trucks hauling the boat down to the day’s field site:
extra batteries (car battery size), 20-gallon-sized plastic bins filled with cables, zip ties, and
screws, tool boxes, drills, power cords, hard drives, computers, and coolers full of water,
Gatorade (sometimes sparkling water), and at least 10 bags of groceries (chips, cookies,
sandwiches, vegetables, milk and cereal), and other materials were all arranged and re-arranged
between cars and boats that were making the trek 80 miles down the road to the boat launch
where the crew would set up for the week to do surveys on the river. We started packing at 6am,
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hoping to get on the water by 2pm. “The days we pack and set-up the boat are the longest while
we're not on the water,” Darin, the team leader, noted to me. At this point, working in the field
seemed more like going out fishing or shrimping.
Once we were at the team’s base camp and had the boat set-up, we were out on the river
by 9am taking transects across the water with very sensitive (and expensive) survey instruments
that measured for water depth, turbidity, salinity, and sediment load in the river. It would usually
take an hour or so of idling on the river before getting the instruments calibrated and speaking to
each other. In other words, they made sure the instruments were accurately measuring variables
and synching up with the onboard computers.

Image 18: Onboard computer setup for fieldwork (photo by author).

After the apparatus was set-up, they were "mowing the grass," as one of the team members
creatively described the process. That is, they slowly drove the boat back and forth and stared at
the computer screens on board as a picture of the underwater river bed gradually emerged.
Music, cool drinks, sandwiches, and cookies kept us company until about 6pm each day. Then
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we'd go back to the dock, take the boat back to base camp, and the team would proceed to
download all the data collected from the day and look at emerging images.
While this particular week of fieldwork was on the river, other days of fieldwork in the
marsh were not too dissimilar. The primary difference was that we might be trudging through
knee- or waist-deep water, or cutting through marsh to physically take sediment cores. As an
extra hand and curious anthropologist along for the ride, nothing about what we were doing felt
“hypothetical,” as some of the more vocal critiques of sediment diversion models often
proclaimed. In fact, it felt very physical and material. While the field team does not necessarily
build the numeric models, the data they collect in the field and their experiences in the physical
nature of the lower delta play a significant role in how the models are shaped.
"I make observations of processes out in the field, but I'm not predictive like those
models,” Darin told me as he was steering the boat across the river. “We go back and forth with
the modeling team,” James explained, "to help them design a model of the system.” This
includes measurements of the biophysical processes circulating within and through the lower
river region. "But I’m not predictive," he was quick to say. “I can do hindcasting but not the
future.” Nevertheless, he felt that the models are “physically realistic.” His field team designed
their fieldwork on what modelers need to set-up in the model and how accurately certain things
need to be, such as the bathymetry, the depth of the water relative to sea level or submarine
topography, in the marsh and river where intake and outfall for the diversion will be located.
Sometimes the geology and ecology teams advised the modelers to use older datasets to test the
model for accuracy against past events in order to calibrate and validate its algorithms. This
reflected scientists’ assumptions that if the model is correct in its representation of the past, its
predictions about the future will be more reliable. The field teams also helped the modeling team
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identify what aspects of their models were most unreliable, particularly in areas where historic
data did not produce accurate simulations of the most recent changes to the coastal environment,
such as newly constructed barrier islands and restored marshes.
"It's a give and take between the observations and the models," James explained. The
process calibrating the models—setting them up with initial datasets and subsequently validating
those calibrations by taking a second dataset from a different time period under different
conditions, such as low and high river discharge cycles on the river—helps to build confidence
[for scientists] in the correlations between the physical and virtual environments. Comparative
scenarios, in this regard, enabled the modelers and the field geologists to see how well the model
performs and correlates reality. "It’s about trying to distinguish how much error there still is in
the model," James went on to say, "because that is what the policy makers are always asking
you. How much can I rely on this model? Is this really realistic?” Since the model is never a
perfect one-to-one correlation of a snapshot of the environment's past and future, the goal is to
get as close to reflecting the datasets as possible, reducing the margin of error.
"You have to creep into it crawfish-wise," James noted, testing out how well the model
reflects the physical processes and making adjustments. The extent to which it can be perfected
is limited mostly by the amount of money available to pay for time in the field to collect more
data and time at the office to run the models.
The geologists and ecologists James works with have a keen sense of the differences
between the virtual world of sediment and water and the behaviors and habits of those materials
as they exist in the physical world. They know what realistic representations the models do well,
and those that the models do not. “The model does really well with water,” Darin noted. “But it’s
the interactions between different materials, marshes, water velocities, erosional processes,
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suspended sediments, and other things that become a challenge for the models to delineate.” As
much as the models try, they are still simulations and cannot move and respond to changes as the
environment does.
Having colleagues in the physical sciences like James review the accuracy of the
algorithms and predictions forged from field data helps modelers like Eric to ascribe accuracy to
his diversion models. Yet scientists can hardly evade the “known unknowns,” as James put it.
This is not only about the accuracy of the data that populates the model, but the other landscape
change factors, such as sea-level rise, that need to be programmed into the predictive capacities
of the model. “What measurements do you use when you are running a model fifty years into the
future?” he posed as we talked. “How can you account for possible changes as a result of human
activities or biophysical changes? And subsidence,” he went on to emphasize, “is spatially
variable as hell [along the Louisiana coast].” In short, what James and his physical scientist
colleagues understand well is that modeling efforts, at best, can aspire to “eliminate wrong
answers,” to borrow his language, but cannot necessarily guarantee that the results models
produce will correlate with biophysical changes to the coast as sediment diversions are built.

The Expert Panel on Sediment Diversions
These are models, so we don't know exactly what will happen when they are turned on. But we
do have data.
-Executive Director, Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority
Society works by consensus. It is political and economic […] A political approach to restoration
won’t work. Nature doesn’t care about human consensus […] Science is competition for ideas
[…] some ideas catch on and influence management.
-Louisiana coastal ecologist (Streever 2001, 43)
Uncertainty is endemic to science.
-Anthropologist (Button 2010, 186)
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In response to widespread hesitation and critique among scientists and residents that the
bloodletting unveiled, the state established an external scientific review group to evaluate
evolving research and policy decisions associated with constructing the sediment diversions. The
Expert Panel on Sediment Diversion Planning and Implementation (hereafter referred to as the
"Expert Panel") was a group of 12 out-of-state scientists tasked with independently providing
"expert advice and guidance on key issues that pertain to river diversions, recognizing that
diversions are an essential restoration tool in coastal Louisiana" (Expert Panel on Diversion
Planning and Implementation, Report #1, February 2014). The panel, assembled and convened
by the Water Institute of the Gulf,44 brought together scientists from a variety of backgrounds,
predominately in the natural sciences, with experience working on similar large-scale restoration
projects across the US and internationally. The Expert Panel was an attempt to make the science
and scientific peer-review process more transparent to officials and the wider coastal public.
Strictly advisory in nature, the panel met a total of seven times between February 2014 and
September 2016 to review research and plans for diversions and provide input on research
protocol and policy implementation as the state moved towards deciding which sediment
diversions they wanted to model and eventually build. During their visits to Louisiana the group
met with scientists, took field trips, and had one day devoted to a public meeting. At the
meetings, CPRA presented updates on their diversion program and scientists from state, federal,
university, and NGO groups working on diversion-related research presented updates on their
most recent findings.

44

The Water Institute of the Gulf is a non-profit, coastal research organization established in 2012 by start-up funds
from the Louisiana CPRA and the Baton Rouge Area Foundation, a local philanthropic group. I conducted
participant observation at the Water Institute as a research scientist during my fieldwork between 2015 and 2018.
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From the outset, the Expert Panel was predominately concerned with confronting
uncertainty. As the first report notes: "Given the complexity of the science and engineering
associated with the design and operation of major freshwater and sediment diversions, and that
there are no analogs of existing sediment diversions at an appropriate scale [...]uncertainty is a
highly relevant and pressing topic for consideration" (ibid.). Uncertainty in all its forms, from
that associated with the natural environment and social impacts to more technical uncertainties
encompassed within the tools and methods used to evaluate the impacts of the project took center
stage at all meetings.
Eric was a regular presenter at Expert Panel meetings. Most of his report-backs,
sandwiched between a long list of other PowerPoint presentations from other scientists and
environmentalists, consisted of explaining his model’s most recent findings. During one meeting
in early October, Eric delivered his report and noted as he often did that collecting field data is
the greatest challenge to producing better and more accurate models. Eric's presentations were
frequently followed by those from the Corps, which was also modeling diversions in a separate
computer program. Having accurate data and enough of it, to be sure, was something most
audience and Expert Panel members agreed was key to reducing uncertainty in models. Bradley,
the engineer representing the Corps, however, took a slightly different approach to framing his
model. He prefaced his presentation by noting that "we," meaning the science and engineering
community, "use models to look at complexities. But that the complexities we are looking at in
coastal Louisiana are non-linear." As he went on to explain, the dynamic and multi-faceted way
that water, sediment, subsidence, coastal tides, multiple ecosystems and other biophysical forces
that come together in the lower river system are structurally contrary to the ways computational
models are built. In other words, the linear form of the algorithms that encompass the rules of the
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model and the possible combinations of outcomes a model can produce, flies in the face of how
the lower delta system physically operates. This is why, he went on to say, the capacity of
models to mimic the natural world of the delta is limited: predictive models are computationally
linear, building one algorithm upon another. Bradley's appeals echoed what science studies
scholar Paul Edwards notes about the epistemological function of predictive models: "The
assumption that observed historical trends can be extrapolated linearly into the future is itself a
model" (1999, 458).
There is not a one-to-one correlation between the virtual world of the model and the
physical world of water, sediment, and marsh, Bradley emphasized in his presentation. By
design, he went on to note, the model is a program and it does not deviate from what is
programmed into it (data) or what it is programmed to do (model runs). His point, to be sure, was
probably interpreted as an obvious one to members of the Expert Panel who have experience
with predictive models in other environmental restoration projects around the world. It was
reminiscent, though, of the most potent critiques of the model's incapacity to provide any
tangible prediction of the physical impacts of operating sediment diversions. Even personnel
within CPRA, including the Executive Director at the time, also acknowledged that the only way
to know what the diversion will do is to build one. Nevertheless, Bradley felt that the room
needed to be reminded of the ontological distinctions between how the model works, as an
algorithm or a "tool," and how the delta works, as a more haptic, non-linear system that does not
map directly onto coefficients in hydrodynamics or physics. Eric, on the other hand, stuck to
summarizing his most recent results, leaving theoretical questions aside.
Part of the reason Bradley felt it necessary to make these points was because he and Eric
use different hydrological modeling programs populated with different data sets to look at
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the impacts of river sediment diversions on surrounding estuaries and their models were
producing different results. With each subsequent meeting of the Expert Panel, the results from
the parallel modeling efforts continued to diverge: From different water inundation levels to the
number of years it might take for land to accrete, or build, the Corps and the state were not in
sync about what a future delta with sediment diversions would look like.
“Models don't speak for themselves. They require interpretation,” Bradley said during
one particular meeting when the Expert Panel pressed Eric and him to share their hypotheses for
why their models were turning up such different results. "It is not a question of which program is
right or wrong, they just give different answers." Bradley's interpretation of the divergent
modeling efforts underscored the fact that uncertainties were not politically generated across
modeling groups. Rather, to borrow from anthropologist Gregory Button, the different answers
each model gave reflected the ways uncertainties are part and parcel of the scientific process
itself. Uncertainty, in this regard, is a normative dimension of the process of science making
(Button 2010: 16, 186-189). This rather esoteric point that Bradley attempted to make, however,
was a challenge for his fellow scientists and other audience members to accept.
In response, many of the panel members, as well as Eric, emphasized that more and better
data would be needed to reduce uncertainties between the two models in order to move
towards consensus about what the impacts of diversions would be and decide if and how to use
them. In contrast, Bradley emphasized the opposite: models were not going to make decisions for
the state and that more data would not necessarily make a better model or more agreement
between the models. "At the end of the day,” he said after back-to-back presentations, "the only
accurate model will be the diversion itself.” And because of this, “it will be up to the wetlands
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community,” he noted, “to come to consensus about the data and models they would use to make
their decisions.”
This was not the report-back the crowd of state officials and environmentalists wanted to
hear. As the opening vignette indicates, for many of these sediment diversion advocates, science
and the scientific integrity of predictive models was the justification for allocating resources for
the projects and their shield against critiques from the scientific community and skeptical publics
in coastal areas. The models were intended to be a way around politics, to make decisions
clearer, not another pathway into making the decision to build diversions more complicated.
Bradley's comments seemed to fly in the face of what the Expert Panel felt to be scientific
integrity and it bothered them.
"How could more data not make the models better, further reducing uncertainty?"
one panel member passionately asked.
"The public is tired of seeing more studies,” Bradley replied. More data, he went on to
say, would not necessarily reconcile differences between his and Eric’s models. He pulled back a
bit, though, after the Expert Panel seemed to disapprove of his suggestion.
“Why did you say that we need wetland scientists' consensus when we do not even have
model verification?” another panel member asked in a somewhat accusatory tone.
"It's a philosophical question," Bradley conceded. "A matter of how we interpret the data
and rank uncertainties." Neither model is wrong or has bad data, he reminded the crowd. Rather,
it is a matter of which of the two models those in attendance wish to follow. At this point,
though, Bradley was exhausted with the conversation.
"We just don't have an analog for a large diversion going into the marsh," he said before
taking his seat with a defeated look on his face. The panel moved on to the next presenter.
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Knowing the river
After the meeting, I spoke with Bradley more about the comments he made in his
presentation that day. I explained that I was interested in why he thought that the conversation
about diversions could perhaps benefit from taking a harder look at what models are and how
they function. One thing that stood out to me about Bradley was how he framed that moment in
the Expert Panel within the larger context of his experiences working with the Corps and
traveling to other parts of the world to implement flood control projects. Like many of the people
I worked with over the course of my research, Hurricane Katrina heavily shaped his experience
and understanding of the work he does. He illustrated the impacts of Katrina on him as an
engineer by recounting a visit he had to Afghanistan, where he worked with a team of Corps
folks to help implement disaster planning in a small village prone to flooding. When he and
his colleagues met with locals he was told, "you [the Corps] failed in Katrina...so why should we
do what you tell us to do?" "He was right," Bradley noted as he told me the story. "But these
folks have an entirely different relationship to water," he explained. The people he met in
Afghanistan were not afraid of water, or "death" as Bradley put it, to the extent that residents are
in the US. "That's why there is so much energy around disaster planning here and not in [a] place
like that."
Perhaps because he had been confronted with the epic failure of his own organization in
Katrina, Bradley was more comfortable with the notion that what is produced in models can be
far removed from what happens in real life. Or, more generally, that he and his models can be
wrong. As he noted when we shifted our conversation back to Louisiana, "I've been wrong about
my models...I've been told by local fishermen that I was wrong and they were right!" Bradley,
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like Eric, had been trained on numerical models and spent the bulk of his career working "on the
river" in the virtual world. By the time he started working with the Corps, the days of engineers
like himself working on physical models and the river were over. He noted how some of his
older colleagues, those who came up through more field-based work and research on the Corps'
physical models, would often take a look at his numerical models and tell him right away
whether or not they would work. It was a trait Bradley admired. "These old guys have an
intuition about the river,” he said, a sense that Bradley had not cultivated in his time with the
Corps. "They have a sense of physics, of how things will move...particularly the river [...] that
isn't something you develop from working on computers all the time.”
Eric only gets out to the river here and there, particularly during flood events when the
river is high. The river is always much bigger and faster in its velocities than he remembers, he
noted as we talked about the difference between looking at the river on the computer and looking
at the river from a boat or the levee. "And [the river] is full of traffic!" he emphasized, raising his
eyebrows. "It really is a working river." But Eric and his team of modelers working 150 miles
from the coast do not visit the physical site of the diversion much, though he is sensitive to the
importance of staying connected to the river and the coast itself as well as the wider political
contexts through which his models are entangled. He notices that many of the modelers he works
with - an international crew of engineers, hydrologists, and geologists from the US, Portugal,
China, Bangladesh, Italy, and France - can quickly become disconnected from the river and the
wider environmental and political contexts their work cuts through. When he sees some of his
fellow modelers becoming “disconnected "as he describes, he encourages them to go to public
meetings to get a sense of what their work is surrounded by. "You have to learn that what you do
impacts somebody," he explains. But, overall, the culture of engineering has little to do with
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connecting to the broader networks diversion models are caught-up and entangled with. When
you start talking beyond the numbers, about culture or economics, he went on to say, most
engineers see that as "frou-frou" stuff. In short, most modelers distance themselves from reality,
he went on to explain. They see it as just a grant or a project.
Eric and Bradley, to a certain extent, are unique compared to a newer generation of
hydrologic modelers working on the river that have been entirely brought-up on computer
models. Fixation on model results reflects the ideology of restoration policy makers who often
seem more enamored of the possibilities that models can produce for "doing something big" than
the physical limitation and consequences that folks in regular contact with the river
understand. The irony is that modelers can simultaneously distance themselves from reality and
be staring at it every day. Or rather, they engage the simulation of possible realities, possible
futures, but they divine this through the field measurements and samples taken by their
colleagues in ecology and geology, while staying distanced from the politics and people that will
be dramatically altered by the diversions their models produce.
Intuition and experiential knowledge is what many of the modeling and diversion critics those in the anti-diversion camp - rested their hats on. These distinctions between simulation or
virtual knowing versus the intuition learned and cultivated over a lifetime of working and living
on the water came into play as scientists, environmentalists, and coastal communities, especially
fishermen, navigated very different personal and professional relationships to the coastal marshes
and the river. To be sure, many professional engineers and scientists acknowledged that
fishermen have a kind of knowledge, perhaps akin to the intuition Bradley refers to, about the
river and marshes that desk scientists have not developed. Yet neither of these groups hold
unanimous opinions on what the introduction of large amounts of river water and sediment into
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the estuary will do. There was little room in the Expert Panel meetings for local experts to
present their take on the impacts of sediment diversions. When the Expert Panel did open the
floor for an hour to one pro- and one anti-diversion fisherman, no one from the audience engaged
or asked questions of the men. Poignantly, though, despite their different opinion on what
sediment diversions might do to the waters they work in, they agreed that "it only takes a GED,
not a PhD" to know how the river would impact the marsh. "Nature showed me," as one of them
noted, "what builds land...I don't need a computer."
"Only God knows how much sediment will be in the river in 50 years," Greg, a retired
boat captain, said in a chiding tone as he walked up to the microphone during the public
comment section of the last Expert Panel meeting. "Do you all know if the diversions will really
work? Do you really believe CPRA and their scientists? Sediment diversions are based on
theoretical ideas. Unproven computer models [...] "I love science but...my problem is peer
pressure of the science committee. They feel forced to keep their mouths shut...This is not
science.”

Stewards of good science
Virtually all scientists recognize [scientific uncertainty] as a major, legitimate issue. Most see the
elimination of uncertainty as an asymptotically approachable goal, albeit never attainable. But
uncertainty has many meanings in science, and these receive unequal amounts of attention from
scientists.
-Historian of Science and Technology (Edwards 1999, 462).
The public suffers when scientists go against each other.
-Eric, engineer
Debates about scientific models are as much about the relationship between algorithms
and data as they are about the messy relationship between the virtual and material worlds drawn
together by scientific models (Edwards 1999). Yet, debates about models in Louisiana also show
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that they are infused with questions about social responsibility and ethics, something scientists
have a nuanced and complicated relationship with. For Eric, more so than most other scientists I
worked with, his role as a scientist at the center of developing coastal policy was something to be
proud of despite the hostility sometimes leveled at him and his colleagues about the use and
nature of his models. For him, being a scientist working on the sediment diversion project is akin
to a public service, something that enables him to connect his science to real-world problems and
problem solving.
That’s not to say he believes his work is infallible, although at times it was hard for me to
tell how open he was to disagreements among himself, fellows scientists, and other groups. “It’s
true,” he admitted to me one afternoon, "experts don't necessarily agree on what the outcomes of
building the large diversions will be." He resents, however, those scientists who decide to
publicly air their concerns and critiques, using what he called "sizzling titles" to critique the
work he and the state do. “It’s irresponsible,” he declared. "Don't claim you care about the coast
if you are going to say these things," Eric explained. "I know there are legitimate scientific
disagreements" he went on to concede, but many of the scientists who were making headlines
were far too radical in his opinion. "The public suffers when scientists go against each other."
Disagreements on what the outcomes of the diversions might be are normal and anticipated. To
Eric, however, those disagreements, chief among them that scientists and engineers lack an
existing example of a river sediment diversion, are not sufficient enough to stop the modelers
from moving forward. This meant that critiques from his colleagues should stop short of outright
opposing his research and the findings his models produce. "We need to be respectful of the
folks actually doing the work and taking the risk of responsibility for what happens," Eric went
on to say. For Eric, the instinct to open the black box of science-making and debate, as
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sociologist Bruno Latour might say, was stubbornly a pathway towards communicating with
coastal residents but also ran the risk of increasing their doubt in scientific truths.
Folks "driving the diversion plane," to quote Kelly, are brave in Eric's perspective. I
asked if he thought the diversions were an experiment, fearing that he might find my
characterization offensive. It was a term used by the likes of Kelly and others in a somewhat
derogatory manner to underscore the risky nature of attempting to re-configure the lower Delta.
"I don't particularly like that characterization of what we are working on," Eric replied. Rather,
he explained, "I like to think of it as a pioneering idea, because it is more than an experiment. It
is flexible and can change as need arises.” The nature of his models are such that they can be
calibrated and transformed in a way that is distinct, in Eric's perspective, from a traditional
scientific experiment. The flexibility of the model, the data inputs, the grids used to construct the
virtual environment of the river, have a quality that is more malleable than a more confined
scientific experiment. It is adaptable, as the structure is intended to be as well, which means that
the project itself will be open to change. The iterative nature of the model, its protean nature, is
what makes Eric feel confident that his work is not reckless but innovative and ethically
responsible. It was not a matter of playing politics.
"You know," he went on to explain, "we used to complain that we [scientists] were not
included." Since he, along with other scientists and engineers, are now a part of the process, he
believes that decisions about restoration moving forward will be better. "My science is making a
difference." But it also means that he has to be even more careful about being neutral amidst the
politics, making sure to present only the results of his work and not recommendations to the state
on what to do or to lash-out at other scientists who critique his work.
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At the same time, he is seriously concerned with building trust for his models among
fellow scientists and the public. We often had long conversations about ways to build models
that were more inclusive of traditional knowledge or the inputs of fishermen. For Eric, this was a
way to gain the trust of skeptical publics. To others, particularly the social scientists like myself
who he worked with, it was about trying to rethink the practice of knowledge-making itself.
These distinctions, however, were often difficult for Eric and his fellow modelers to understand.
At the end of the day, trust in the models never wavered for its creators. This reflects their
understanding of the models as tools, computer programs to play with and test that come with
certain rules and limitations. The wider political implications of what models examine, or not,
and how their results are used, however, was often of little concern to most modelers. Eric, due
to his higher profile role, had a better grasp of the ethical and political implications of
his research compared to those that work under him, hence his stance on being a responsible
steward of good, objective science for the coast.
To be sure, as members of the Expert Panel frequently noted, mistrust of models
stemmed to a certain extent from their virtual nature. To correct for this, they turned to peerreview, which Eric, James, and others also used to help substitute the validity of their methods
and findings. Yet, critics of diversion models were concerned with scientific integrity that
extended beyond research protocols. As the one fisherman in the bloodletting discussed earlier
poignantly noted, “how much money you get paid to make these diversions?” Much of the public
critique questioned the possibility of science being objective when it was so clearly propping up
the perspectives of state policy makers and environmentalists. You have to do work to offset
the “color of your money,” James and Eric often told me. “That’s why we publish in scientific
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journals,” James noted as we discussed the wider politics of the diversions. "To make sure it’s
understood that we’re not doing paid-for science."
As science studies scholars have long pointed out, these practices are central to the
production of the scientific facts, contributing to the durability of scientific facts as well as the
capacity for these facts to change over time (Callon 1986; Latour 1983, 2012; Kuhn 1967).
Discussions at workshops or conferences like the Expert Panel or debates in scientific journals
reveal the messiness of producing facts as much as they demonstrate the conditions of its
production. The extent to which scientists want to lean on revealing these processes to a wider
public, however, is highly circumscribed by the broader political climate they find themselves in.
Eric holds the simultaneously inclination to cultivate outlets of scientific peer review for his
research but also chides other scientists who, in his perspective, reveal too much uncertainty, to
the point where Eric feels the public's trust in science is undermined. Acknowledging the
uncertainties built into models might be the responsible thing for scientists to do (Edwards
1999), but it runs the risk of science becoming more vulnerable to public scrutiny. Striking a
balance on how much and how best to confront the uncertainty of models in coastal Louisiana is
particularly challenging because there is so much public engagement with the work people like
Eric, James, and Bradley do. Coastal publics care as much about facts as they do about the
processes through which they are made.
"You know," James said, in a tone much more matter of fact than Eric, "I’ve been yelled
at by fishermen and port officials and things like that. You’re the enemy. But my guideline is
that we were never going to tell someone who hired us what they should do. All we were going
to tell them is you decide what you want to do and we’ll tell you to the best of our scientific
knowledge what the result will be. And that is how you always stay hands-off from the
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stakeholder issues. I’m not telling you to build a diversion. You hired me to tell you what will
happen if you build a diversion. Now if you want to give me a couple beers one night in a New
Orleans bar and ask me whether I think it’s going to work or not that’s a different question. But
you can bet I’m not going on the record telling you what I think.”
For James, the line is clear. He does not see his work in the realm of advocacy, even
though he clearly understands that it is political. "Now other [scientists] won’t do that… [They]
cannot resist shooting their mouth off, because we are a bunch of people that live in this tiny
little ivory tower world where most of what we do most of the people in the real world don’t give
a shit about. So they can’t wait to get a bully pulpit. So I think that we as a science community
have done most of the damage. People don’t trust scientists because they can’t stop shooting
their mouth off, whether they really have a valid opinion or not.”
“[The public] think we’re in cahoots with the state. They’re paying us so we must be
giving them the answer they want to hear. Well maybe that works like that sometimes but I like
to think we don’t work that way.” James' observations reflected Eric’s as well, although Eric
walks a finer line between science and politics than James cares to. As one resident from a
community living just downriver from one of the proposed diversion sites stated at the end of an
Expert Panel meeting: "I do not believe that there is enough science to do what these people say
they are going to do [...] Give us policy, not science, so we can see what you are doing. We need
to see the politics." Or, as another audience member said more caustically, “don't let the politics
turn you into academician prostitutes” because not only would the diversions not build land but,
perhaps more importantly, diversions are ultimately a political tool to get a handful of groups a
lot of money at the expense of poorer, less politically powerful residents.
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To many residents, the science that the state uses is solely science that supports the
Master Plan which, in turn, compromises the integrity and credibility of the science behind it. "I
call them the Stepford wives," Mr. Percy told me once during a visit to his small community in
Plaquemines Parish. All those scientists are just programmed to say yes to whatever the
politicians tell them, he went on to describe. They cannot think for themselves. His comments
were reinforced by another statement he would often make at public meetings: "The science that
is used is solely science that supports the Master Plan...and remember that it is the Master's
plan.”
While folks like Eric and James make a concerted effort to keep themselves "out of the
politics," other scientists welcome the opportunity to get into the political fold. Some scientists
write blog posts for environmental groups that lobby to build sediment diversions. Others take to
“Letter to the Editor” columns in parish newspapers to debate the necessity of using river
sediment diversions to restore subsiding coastal land and the integrity of scientific research that
supports the state's decision to invest in sediment diversion research and construction. When
leadership in Plaquemines Parish attempted to deny soil boring permits to begin research on site
construction for diversions, a geologist from LSU wrote to their weekly paper proclaiming that
he appreciates public questions about whether or not sediment diversions will work as intended
and looking "critically at the science underlying our coastal knowledge" and "field testing ideas
about how nature works." But, to him, large diversions "passed the test."45 Such public
engagement on the part of scientists who felt called upon to defend science demonstrates how
deeply politicized modeling and river sediment diversions became in the span of a handful of
years.
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Plaquemines Gazette, July 2018.
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My experiences working with one of these research institutes on non-state funded
projects only seemed to underscore the powerful hold state politics has on the production of
scientific knowledge in coastal Louisiana. As I was writing up the findings of one of our recent
studies, my co-researchers both noted how we would need to vet our draft by CPRA before
finalizing it. I asked why that would be necessary considering that CPRA did not fund the
research. Well, they explained, we do not want to write anything that would make them nervous
or something that might contradict the Master Plan. While this did not change the language of
our report, what was most alarming to me was how much appeasing CPRA seemed to be a
central aspect of the culture of conducting and publishing research on coastal issues. Good
science is science that supports the Master Plan. It was hard not to feel like a Stepford wife.
The unique nature of the relationship between science, modeling, and the state was
especially true for individuals and institutions who hold, or previously held, a substantial amount
of state contracts. When the new CEO of the Water Institute of the Gulf - the group spearheading
modeling diversions since 2011 - got caught on tape in spring 2017 stating that diversions would
be built, and fast, many of the directors of the institute were taken aback. The new CEO was
confused. Didn't his organization, the researchers who made the models that the state was using
to justify the construction of diversions, clearly support the construction of diversions? When he
called a meeting with his directors the week after the incident he asked them point blank: do you
support the construction of diversions? Crickets filled the room. When the first of the directors, a
geologist, broke the silence, he laid it out to the new CEO that they do not want to be associated
with the politics of the diversions and saying whether or not they support the project is not their
job. Others nodded in agreement, except one of the modelers, who said he thought the diversions
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should be built. “Of course I support the diversion program, don’t you?” he said, looking on to
his colleagues. The room fell silent.
"We don't advocate," another director responded, "we conduct science."

Conclusion
Following the evolution of debates about the use of predictive models to build sediment
diversions teaches us that confronting unprecedented environmental and geologic change is tied
to the fate and role of science. This is especially the case in places like Louisiana where science
is increasingly used as an objective tool to analyze and radically transform environments in the
name of environmental protection, restoration, and resilience. Tracking the debates around
predictive modeling among and between scientists and residents demonstrates that these groups
understand that environmental and geological change raise existential and ethical questions
steeped in politics as much as they are simply physical processes occurring in the lower delta.
Alongside and entwined with the broader existential questions raised by predictive
modeling and scientific practice is the extent to which the different material qualities and
dimensions of the real and virtual worlds of the coast mediate the political life of the models. The
virtual world of predictive models transforms the possibilities of what coastal restoration science
can be, down to fieldwork in the marshes and river in the lower Delta. The models expand the
material possibilities of what restoration projects and science can be, and indeed set the course of
how scientific questions are formulated and how research funds are allocated. In this way, the
circuit between the virtual and material worlds of the disappearing delta magnify the messy
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process of scientific fact making and production - a process scientists are not entirely in
consensus about revealing in Louisiana and in wider climate change contexts.46
Ethnographically tracking the discussion about the uses of predictive models in coastal
Louisiana underscores that neither scientists nor their critics share monolithic understandings of
what science, or “good science,” is. Part of the reason why scientists like Eric are concerned with
how debates about his and his colleagues’ uncertainties unfolds in the arena of public opinion is
because he sees his role as fostering public good for communities in coastal Louisiana in the
present and for the future. Conducting science, designing models in a transparent, peer-reviewed
way that is accountable to the public helps Eric and others envision their science as science for
good. They know their science is not perfect, especially in model simulations of a deltaic and
riverine environment that is highly dynamic and subject to change. Scientists also know they are
making choices among different uncertainties, yet but they believe that making those choices is
better than the alternative, which is to do nothing. This situates them in a strange space where,
despite their best intentions to bring an ethical compass or humility to their research (Jasanoff
2007, 33), they still struggle to shake the latent paternalism in their assumptions that good
science is enough to foster public good. Compared to modernist environmental approaches, they
lay out uncertainties to the public in hopes that revealing at least part of their process will help
convince residents that their science is working to preserve a future for coastal communities.
And while it seems pertinent to note how some scientists in Louisiana are beginning to see
themselves as public servants, it is dangerous, when science assumes to define the publics they

46

Recent articles in the New York Times with natural and social scientists reveal the extent of disagreement among
scientists about whether or not it is wise to highlight the centrality of uncertainty to the process of scientific fact
making. See especially: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/opinion/a-scientists-march-on-washington-is-a-badidea.html
See also: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/magazine/bruno-latour-post-truth-philosopher-science.html

205

serve and the goods they provide, to fail to question the complexities of who the “people” are
and what “good” is for them (Benjamin 2014).
A closer examination of the social life of predictive models gives us insight into these
struggles and the ways that knowledge attempts to formulate itself on shifting ground. This is the
terrain of climate change and the Anthropocene which at once demands science to cultivate a
more robust analysis of changes to the physical world and leverage those observations in a
politically heightened environment. Predictive modeling introduces an epistemological
possibility of knowing and re-shaping the anticipated future of coastal Louisiana. But, in doing
so, modeling also reveals the tenuous and political grounds of science as it is used as both gospel
and political shield in Louisiana to confront coastal land loss.
This chapter has aimed to shed light on some of these questions through a close
examination of the ways seemingly oppositional groups - residents and scientists - confront the
history and politics surrounding the role of predictive models in efforts to restore coastal
Louisiana. Their interactions remind us what facts and what means we use to gain scientific
knowledge and the broader cultural and political worlds which surround them. And, ultimately,
how persistent changes to water and land force us to confront the political nature of scientific
knowledge and human-induced environmental change.
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4. Will your river diversion do justice for our community? The racial politics of land
restoration in the lower Mississippi River Delta
Technology is not only a metaphor for race, but one of the many conduits by which past forms of
inequality are upgraded.
- Sociologist (Benjamin 2016, 148)
“I understand that we have good sediment,
but will your diversion do justice for our community?”
- Resident, Ironton, Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana
“The Mid-Barataria diversion may very well be the most important environmental construction
project in the history of our country.”
- Executive Director, Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana47
Community conversations
It is a late Monday afternoon and the small church in Ironton is full. This meeting with
the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) was called by a local
councilwoman, Ms. Anne, to discuss the construction of a river diversion infrastructure that will
re-route 75,000 cubic feet per second, or approximately one-tenth, of the Mississippi River into
disintegrating coastal marshes one mile north of the small town. The Mid-Barataria Sediment
Diversion is the largest and most controversial piece of the state's Master Plan to protect coastal
areas from increased risks of coastal flooding due to unprecedented rates of land loss on the
coast. The project, long in the works at the state level, recently began its bid for a permit from
the Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter "the Corps") to make a cut in the 23-foot-high river
levee next to Ironton and begin construction. The goal is to use the sediment-rich waters of the
river to rebuild fragmenting marshland to the west of Ironton, which sits approximately 60 miles
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Quoted in: Westwood, R. (2017). Louisiana’s Plan to Punch a Hole into the Mississippi River Levee.
Motherboard/Vice Magazine and the Times Picayune. Accessed 3/1/18
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbb38a/louisianas-plan-to-punch-a-hole-in-the-mississippi-river
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upriver (i.e. northwest) of the Mississippi River Delta. Today was the first day state officials ever
set foot in the five-block-long African American community that neighbors the much
anticipated, and unprecedented, environmental restoration project.
Four men dressed in business casual stood at the front of the over 200-year-old church
looking out over the pews filled with about 30 residents who walked from their homes to the
church. It is the only community gathering space in the town.
"Our goal is to have the most amount of sediment with the least amount of water," one
official from CPRA said as he clicked through diagrams of the structure on a projector screen set
up in front of the pulpit. "And the most land will be built by you."
The audience was quiet at first, then began asking questions.
"How high will the levees be?"
"Will you be elevating everyone in the community?"
"Why are you putting this diversion in such a populated place? Couldn’t you put the
diversion farther south where there are less people?"
While I never considered Ironton a populous place, it is a sizeable community compared
to the vast tracts of orange groves, cattle pastures, fragmented marsh and open water that follow
the last highway south to the Gulf of Mexico along the west bank of the Mississippi River.
Officials explained that river diversions were modeled at sites south (downriver) of Ironton, but
diversions lower on the river did not build enough land in their environmental models. "They
[other diversions] did not perform well enough," CPRA officials told the audience.48
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In the 2012 Coastal Master Plan for Louisiana, there were six proposed river diversions for all of Plaquemines
Parish. In this plan, the Mid-Barataria Diversion and another diversion on the opposite side of the river were both
initially set to divert a maximum of 250,000 cfs of the Mississippi River, along with two above diverting 5,000cfs
each and two below diverting 50,000cfs each (CPRA 2012). After a series of predictive modeling studies conducted
between 2013-2105 to determine how much land each of these possible diversion might build, only the Mid-

208

Furthermore, CPRA officials emphasized that geologists identified this diversion site as
far back as the 1960s because of a particular curve in the river next to Ironton that contains a
large sand bar that can source the desperately needed materials the state needs for marsh
restoration. It is the river's geomorphology and expert hydrologic modeling, officials insisted,
that chose the location at Ironton; not, as they desperately wanted to make clear, any overt
discrimination against their town.
But historical and geophysical explanations were unsatisfying to residents, who
experience the diversion as the next in a long line of large industrial and infrastructural projects
whose impacts and ideal locations just happen to orbit around the entirely African American
town of Ironton. From my observations, residents had refused what sociologist Ruha Benjamin
calls the "reasonableness of racism" (2015: 148) that was embedded in the geophysical and
technological explanations CPRA officials offered them. As representatives from CPRA clicked
through images of land loss, infrastructure prototypes and graphics of the diversion's land
building potential to make their case for why the structures needs to be built next to Ironton,
residents continued to insist that the crisis on their mind was about how this project could
continue to reinforce a pattern of ignoring the needs of their community and potentially exposing
them to greater flood risk due to the tremendous amount of water the diversion would introduce
to the marshes surrounding their homes.
In her discussion of discriminatory design, Benjamin uses the example of the singleoccupancy park bench created to prevent loiterers from sleeping to explain the persistent
disconnect between the values of the designers of experimental projects and the values of the

Barataria and Mid-Breton diversions showed significant land growth. As such, in the 2017, the state determined to
move forward with these two diversions at a much smaller scale, 75,000cfs each (CPRA 2017).
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people who inhabit the publics whose public good ostensibly benefits from the "technological
fixes" of experts. As Benjamin goes on to elaborate, "just as the park bench reflects particular
social values, so is the lab bench imbued with a range of values...[T]he kinds of questions
scientists ask and who they chose to consult with are crucial for us to consider"(2015).49 In the
case of the sediment diversion, science's fixation on land subsidence and sediment formulates the
set of values and questions they bring to the table in their research design. The river, processes of
land building in deltas, and scientific methods dominate their framing of the land loss problem
and, in turn, its solution.
While residents posed question after question as to why good sediment is valued over
disruptions to their historic community, state officials are stuck in a refrain of defaulting to the
river and geophysical processes as the raison d'être for the diversion and its location. As they
continued their presentation, CPRA officials showed even more images of how the river built the
delta, attempting to reinforce the point that the diversions are natural, or what nature has done
and wants to do. To be sure, there is an air of arrogance that they can fully know and predict
what the river will or will not do. Scientists and state officials are not, as residents fear, overtly
prejudice. The prioritization of geophysical processes, however, leaves much to be accounted for
in terms of uneven the uneven social and geographic impacts the project might have.
Furthermore, it is the river and "best science out there," officials emphasize, not politics, that
chose Ironton for the location. In other words, the abundance of sediment and promise of new
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"Discriminatory design," Benjamin argues, "need not harbor any racial animus to exercise racism in [biomedical]
and so many other contexts...making technology one of the many conduits by which past forms of inequality are
upgraded" (Benjamin 2016, 148).
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land defines the set of values the state uses to rationalize the creation of sediment diversions and
their location, not racial animus.
Folks in the room seem largely unmoved by the CPRA's pleas to natural processes and
good science.
In the context of the biomedical and other sciences that recruit scientific and technical
expertise in the production of new technologies, critical scholars call attention to the ways racial
and other forms of discrimination need not be the impetus behind scientific innovation in order
to operate as "upgrades" of social inequalities (Benjamin 2016, 148). Scholarship on the
production of racial geographies and planning similarly point to the ways anachronistic and
technical approaches to regional and urban planning, especially around environmental restoration
and sustainability, frequently operate in a post-political ideological framework that does not
incorporate questions of justice (Checker 2011; Pulido 2000) let alone racial justice (Woods
1998, McKittrick and Woods 2007) into the values and evaluative, technocratic frameworks used
to assess environmental projects. Critical race scholars concerned with the formation of racial
inequalities in a “post-racial” moment echo these critiques of intent as the core of what produces
racial inequalities. As Bonilla-Silver reminds us, the color-blind racism of the current post-racial
moment "results in race-less explanations for all sort of race-related affairs" (Bonilla-Silva 2015,
1364; c.f. Bonilla-Silva 2013).
Ms. Anne, a veteran community organizer for racial equality in Plaquemines, attempted
to spell out the connections critical scholars make to CPRA officials in more simplistic terms as
they insisted the diversion is only about science and sediment, having nothing to do with justice
or race:
We understand that the scientists say it’s an ideal area. But someone needs to say, a mile
south is a community. We need some humanity...Why us? Why always us? Everything
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negative is next to a black community. Sediment is not bad but we’re hoping someone can
be an advocate for us. We’ve been here for 200 years.
Her comments drew silence from the men at the projector screen as the orange sunset radiated
multicolored light through the stained-glass windows. The residents of Ironton did not question
the integrity of the science, the use of the river as a restoration tactic, nor the importance of
sediment for combating land loss. Instead their questions suggest, following Benjamin's and
Bonilla-Silva's work, that the values of the Ironton community and the values "at the lab bench"
could not be further from each other. And, despite the absence of race, it was clear to residents
that river diversions are as much a "race-related affair" as they are a matter of water and
sediment.
As I left the meeting that evening I was curious about if and how the engineers,
geologists, and ecologists working with the state understood the questions about values, race, and
justice posed by Ironton residents that evening. Were scientists actually ignorant of the wider
political and racial stakes of their research? What would their responses be to the questions Ms.
Anne and others raised about river diversions if they were compelled to answer them? And what
values, scientific and personal, shape their work?

Environmental restoration, science, and black geographies
This chapter examines the ways residents from African American, Creole, and other
mixed-race communities 50 living along the last 100 miles of the Mississippi River and scientists
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A note on racial terminology. For the most part, I use the term Black to denote the range of communities of color
living in Plaquemines Parish. This reflects the usage of the term by participants and during public meetings during
my research. Scholars working in these and other coastal communities in Louisiana note the mixed-racial and ethnic
composition of residents eludes a simple black-white racial distinction, but has become integrated into common use
because of Jim Crow segregationist laws that imposed phonotype and ethnic distinctions in sharp black and white
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working on wetlands restoration projects understand the relationship between experiences of
racial discrimination and environmental infrastructures. Material is generated from participant
observation at several key meetings between black communities and state officials as well as at
community events and ethnographic fieldnotes and historical interviews with residents,
community leaders, fishermen, and scientists conducted between 2015 and 2018. Drawing upon
this material, this chapter argues that infrastructures for controlling the river for land restoration
are simultaneously geophysical and social processes through which the grounds of social
belonging and experiences of racial inequality are maintained and contested. Through an analysis
of the ways race and racial inequality come to take on meaning in restoration projects for
residents, scientists, and state environmental managers, this chapter considers how the logic of
natural processes obscures or displaces residents' racialized experiences of techno-scientific
projects to reshape of the lower deltaic landscape for land restoration. And, in turn, how
scientists confront and understand the ways their research and the movements of land and water
intersect with contemporary and historic productions of racial difference.
This work is situated in critical questions about the ways that formations of climate and
geologic change in the Anthropocene intersect with the production of racial geographies. These
are poignant questions to ask from the grounds of southeast Louisiana: a landscape forged by the
racial geographies of early capitalist plantation economies that simultaneously transformed the
lower delta land into its present, disintegrating state, and forged the contemporary social,
economic, and environmental vulnerabilities of African Americans who, once again, find

categories (Ware 2012). Prior to the Jim Crow era, southern Louisiana had a wider variety of racial and social
classifications, reflecting stronger similarities to French colonial and Caribbean communities. Today, many of the
participants I worked with note that they are "all mixed up," with Creole, French, Native American, African, and
other lines in their family.
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themselves at the center of environmental projects that have uncertain social, material, and racial
impacts.

Thinking environmental infrastructures, restoration, and inequality
Recent work in anthropology on infrastructures suggests that, beyond their technical
function, infrastructures constitute forms of political belonging and citizenship, as well as
collective forms of dispossession (Joyce 2003, Von Schnitzler 2008, Anand 2011, Fennell 2015).
These works point to the various publics that infrastructures bring into being and the technical
and political networks they are embedded within as the object and mediation of technical and
social processes (Larkin 2013). While most infrastructures that are the focus of scholarly
attention are largely associated with notions of modernity and technocratic forms of governance
(Mitchell 2002), environmental infrastructures, or environments that become infrastructures
(Carse 2012), occupy a slightly different material and ideological space. As Braun (2014) points
out, infrastructures for environmental restoration are situated within a reparative framework.
They are literally designed to bring a degraded ecosystem or area back to its pre-degradation
state.
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Image 19: Sediment diversion structure design and concept (CPRA 2017).

Distanced from the rhetoric of discipline and control (c.f. McPhee 1989), environmental
restoration - which can take various ecological, biological, and geophysical forms - is, as
representatives from CPRA presented to residents in Ironton, centered on nature and natural
processes. Nature, in this regard, takes on an agentive quality that is distinct from the world of
human politics, drives, and desires. Officials emphasize to members of the Ironton community
that the river sediment diversion will be a nature-based form of infrastructure. For the state, this
marks a distinction that they hope will favorably shape the ways residents will confront the more
challenging conversations about how the actual construction and operation of the sediment
diversion will impact their lives.
The nature-based restoration framework CPRA officials use to design and operate
environmental infrastructures frames the relationship between humans and the natural world as
existing within a mutually constitutive ecosystem. This particular way of confronting
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environmental problems and restoration became popular in the U.S. in the 1990s, particularly in
efforts to restore Florida's everglades (Ogden 2008). Within an ecosystems framework, humans
and the natural world exist as a holistic unit, with the activities of each influencing the status and
well-being of the other. The ideological framework of an ecosystems approach to restoration
assumes an environmental baseline which drives the work of scientists and environment
modelers. From a critical social science perspective, the ecosystem approach flattens differences
between social and biological systems, treating them as equal actors in systems of dynamic
relationships, equally shaped by the form and function of the other. This conceptualization of the
relationship between society and nature is largely undergirded by biological and, in the case of
Louisiana, the geophysical sciences that assume a knowable, yet constantly changing,
relationship between "complex human and non-human associations" (ibid. 23). The logic of
nature-based land restoration and protection is pervasive in Louisiana's Master Plan for Coastal
Protection and Restoration. Despite its seeming departure from modernist environmental
management approaches, it broadly reflects a conservationist approach to environment
restoration that ultimately sees the environment as an object that necessitates the technocratic
control of science and the state. When implemented, these forms of environmental conservation
are often completed at the expense of less politically powerful communities of color who inhabit
those spaces or hold alternative understandings of the way the at-risk environment should be
managed (Kosek 2006, Cronon 1995, Spence 1999).
Within this framework, restoring nature is akin to supporting social life and well-being as
a win-win association (Lewis & Ernstson 2017) because the status quo, or baseline, is the
ultimate goal of restoration efforts. This is an uneasy fit, however, in landscape where the
distribution and formation of marsh grass, water, and sediment are entirely entangled with
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human histories and politics. As my experiences in Ironton made clear, the question of racial
geographies looms large in these projects, especially those situated within highly racialized
landscapes, such as those in the U.S. South, and especially in the lower Mississippi Delta region.
Indeed, the colonization of the lower Delta region for resource extraction was fueled by an
economy that depended on the social and moral hierarchies imposed by racism to fuel, through
unfree labor, an extractive and ecological degrading relationship to the lower river environment.
Agricultural practices, settlement patterns, and the flood control infrastructures that attempted to
fix the landscape for racial capitalist expansion generated the social conditions that allowed the
coastal land building processes to outpace land growth in the lower delta. To see the landscape
and people as resources to be exploited led to the normalization of a culture of extraction that
laid the groundwork for the coastal land loss crisis. Environmental restoration efforts, though
ostensibly grounded in understanding the dynamic set of feedbacks between human activity and
environmental change, in some ways fail to see the similarities between their nature-based
approaches that envision the environment as something to conserve and the antiquated modernist
approaches that saw the environment as something to exploit.
To what extent can an artificial river diversion be considered natural? This was a
troubling discussion I often had with scientists working on the river diversion and other
restoration projects around coastal Louisiana. Yes, of course they understand the paradox of the
term and that they are mimicking natural processes but not actually being/making nature. More
than a material metaphor, nature-based and natural processes were predominately a signification
of the separation between restoration activities and politics: a rhetorical and material shield
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frequently wielded at public meetings to circumvent the messier side of "punching a hole into the
Mississippi River levee."51
Many critical scholars examining technocratic strategies for confronting climate change
under the guises of sustainability, resilience, and adaptation would have described the CPRA
official’s performance that evening as post-political or agonistic. Contemporary nature-based
approaches to environmental restoration and climate change adaptation attempts to supersede
politics - the politics of the all-knowing engineer as well as the politics of local communities positioning actors within the social-environmental system as equals in the benefits they stand to
share from restoring natural process or ecosystem functions. As critical scholars point out,
however, the dream of post-political sustainability (Checker 2011) or consensus carried by the
scientists, engineers, and policymakers championing the value and impacts of these kinds of
nature-based infrastructures can be undercut by historic and ongoing social and economic
inequalities, especially in the context of south Louisiana. As critical scholarship on coastal South
Carolina, Louisiana, and post-Hurricane Sandy New York City note, state- and science-led
technocratic approaches to sustainability, resilience, or adaptation - three terms often used
interchangeably to mean the same thing - reproduce agnostic or colorblind techno-scientific
approaches for human and environmental adaptation to climate change precisely because they
ignore histories entangled with the causes, and potential solutions, to immediate environmental
problems (Lewis and Ernstson 2017, Hardy et al. 2017, Koslov 2017). Despite the efforts of
well-meaning scientists and environmental managers to ground their projects in what the
environmental wants (its agentic desires), the rhetoric of natural processes side-steps historic
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social inequalities that produce social vulnerabilities that manifest along the entangled lines of
race, class, and topography. Furthermore, they try to ignore the fact that they might be literally
punching a hole through one of the most extensive levee systems in the world.

Contesting the terms of protection
In a post-racial era, subjugation is hardly ever the explicit objective of science and technology.
Instead noble aims such as "health" and "safety" serve as a kind of moral prophylaxis for
newfangled forms of classification and control
- Sociologist (Benjamin 2016, 150).
Back in Ironton, residents have a keen sense that coastal restoration is anything but
colorblind or natural. While state officials emphasize how the diversion structure would only
operate when sediment loads were highest in the river, residents quickly shifted the conversation
to issues about inequality and protection. "If you're putting that much water behind our homes,"
one woman asked, "do you plan to elevate everyone?" She explained how many elderly residents
struggled in the past to secure elevation grants due to the fact that most lived on family
properties where they do not have single ownership.52 Others also pointed out the inadequacy of
the back levees across the highway from their neighborhood that purportedly protect them from
flooding from the marsh side of the town. These back levees have failed several times over the
course of my research, most recently in August 2017, prompting the parish to fly and truck in
emergency fill and sandbags to attempt to plug the input of water. The back levee is the last
section of a 35-mile stretch of old levees that the Corps has slowly been upgrading to a "fifty-
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Many Black homeowners in Ironton and other parts of Plaquemines Parish struggle to meet the property rights
qualifications for federal assistance for home repair and elevation in the wake of disasters due to the fact that they
live on inherited property. The challenges Plaquemines residents face with inherited property has been explored by
legal scholars that argue this is one of the fundamental was African Americans are dispossessed of wealth and land
ownership (see Mitchell et al. 2001, Mitchell et al., 2009). See chapter two.
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year level of risk reduction," about half the level of flood risk protection residents in the New
Orleans metro area receive (USACE 2015). As of 2017, the Corps has yet to break ground here.
This is alarming to residents as they realize that the men standing at the front of the room are
proposing to put a significant amount of water behind their homes, exacerbating their risks for
backwater flooding.
"You know," says Ms. Jenny, who has spent the last two years in stressful exchanges
with contractors and the parish to elevate her home, “I don’t see anyone building levees in this
area. We’re going to end up being ground zero for hurricanes. Time is of the essence. We have
no levee protection from here to Wood Park. Why are we the last to be finished for the New
Orleans to Venice levee?"
At the mention of hurricanes, others asked about evacuation routes. There is only one
road in and one road out of the community. The diversion is currently planned to cut through the
road, with a new bridge built over it. "Could that be a problem?" one resident asked, drawing
affirmative acknowledgements from the crowd. "And what about jobs?" Mr. Gregory asked.
"With the parish layoffs recently, we're going to need something for folks to do."
State and local officials at the meeting attempted to assure the crowd that adequate levees
would be built before construction on the diversion, asking everyone to "take their word on it."
Funds for home elevation or the prospect of jobs for residents seemed more elusive. "Look, I'm
not going to sugar coat this," one of the CPRA officials started. " Right now, we don't have any
money for things like elevations although we would like to in the future." His comments were
met without much fanfare. State officials did not come with slides getting into the details of
potential flood risk for the community or mitigation strategies. They were prepared to discuss
technical and geomorphological functions, and tried their best to stick to that tack. Comments,
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however, continued to oscillate between residents' notion of material and economic protection
for their community and CPRA's notion of protection in the form of river diversions building
marshland.
In response to CPRA's encouraging characterization of the project as something the coast
needs and Ironton can benefit from, Ms. Pearl and others in attendance attempted to flip the
script on the project. Instead of embracing the notion that Ironton would receive the most benefit,
many in the room stepped up to the mic to suggest that the community might not need a sediment
diversion. What they do need, as Ms. Anne stated, is for "someone to be an advocate for the
community." Ideal sediment and geologic formations were one thing, which the residents did not
dispute, but envisioning the diversion as something that would "do justice for the Ironton
community" was not the framing upon which diversions had been studied, modeled, or
anticipated to be implemented. As critical research on ecosystem restoration and infrastructures
points out, the singular vision of public good that conflates natural process with social well-being
reflects the kind of master narrative of ecosystem thinking that equates environmentally resilient
landscapes with environmentally resilient people. Such an approach "ignores and obscures the
deep historical divisions and territorial conflicts" (Lewis & Ernstson 2017, 58) that characterize
local and regional governance.
Divergent understandings of public good is a particularly sharp issue for Ironton residents
who see racial and economic inequality in Plaquemines Parish coalescing around issues of access
to and protection of land and water as well as things like access to jobs and positions of power in
the parish (see chapter two). That is to say, understanding the environmental impacts of
diversions is significant for residents, but their daily concerns are consistently grounded in social
and environmental justice issues, such as the right to secure jobs with decent pay or equitable
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access to home elevation grants and flood protection infrastructure. For example, when residents
see wealthier and white parts of the parish “going up,” being elevated before areas that sustained
more flood damage from recent storms in poorer communities of color53 or levees being built
everywhere but around their community, they are reminded that these are not merely
technicalities but rather the persistent means by which their community, and the specific political
struggles of the parish's black communities, continue to be forgotten.
Environmental restoration and the concept of protection occupies a complicated place
within the different experiences and expectations of environmental managers and residents.
Sediment diversions are touted by many scientists and CPRA officials as first and foremost a
protection measure because the diversions encourage land stability and land growth in coastal
marshes that act as storm-surge "speed bumps" in the event of tropical storms. But this version of
protection is derived from environment models and cost-benefit analyses that define the meaning
of protection in terms of cost avoidance for potential monetary damages in the event of natural
disasters. Almost all coastal planning decisions are made within this objective, numerical
framework, which takes the market values of properties, infrastructures, and populations as the
justification (or data) to allocate public resources, such as the funds allocated for coastal
restoration and protection. In theory, to provide the most protection for the most people. In
practice, for residents in places like Ironton and other "less valuable" or "less expensive" areas of
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The most recent set of Community Development Block Grants from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development were used to elevate homes damaged by Hurricane Isaac in 2012. Many of the black residents I
encountered in person and at public meetings frequently complained that they did not know the grants existed or that
they were systemically denied. Over the course of 2016-2017, many of the homes elevated with those grants were
largely in areas of the parish occupied by white homeowners whose permanent residences were outside the parish.
Homes that were elevated are mostly used, or at least perceived to be used by Black residents, as second homes. The
fact that these newly elevated homes are essentially second/vacation homes, or “fish camps,” reveal the inequalities
of government and financial assistance systems for recovery from storms that many of the Black residents who are
permanent residents of the parish emphasize during conversations about environmental issues like restoration.
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Plaquemines Parish, this translates into becoming the sacrifice zone for the more populated,
more economically valuable New Orleans metro area.
How the state defines protection and where they choose to invest in protection is a touchy
subject for many residents I worked with. They referred back to their experience with decisions
about who lives inside and outside the 100-year flood protection system surrounding New
Orleans.

Image 20: Flood wall and gate in lower St. Bernard Parish (photo by author).

Residents usually spoke about it in terms of the wall: the 18- to 20-foot-tall floodwalls that cross
the two highways on each side of the river that residents must take to get in and out of the parish.
"When they built that wall," Mary Ann said to me one day as we talked about restoration and
protection, "it just did something to me." The walls and wider protection system were built after
Hurricane Katrina destroyed the region in 2005. For Mary Ann and others, the decision about
where to place the wall was less about economic rationality or an environmentally ideal area. It
was a line in the sand defining who mattered and who did not. When a storm comes through, the
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wall literally cuts off the southern end of the parish and everyone left in it. The sediment
diversion is often framed as a protection measure for these "other side of the wall" communities,
but residents struggle to see it that way. A levee is protection. Home elevation is protection. And
even job security, as mentioned above, is also protection.
If anything, sediment diversions feel more like a risk to residents, and scientists and
CPRA understand this to a certain extent. Sediment diversions are an investment in long-term
protection, they emphasize when the immediate, risky impacts of diversions emerge in casual
conversations and public meetings. In the long run, over decades, more land will make living in
Plaquemines possible. Residents mostly understand the concept of the diversions and why the
state and scientists point to them as something that makes environmental sense for confronting
coastal land loss - and dealing with land loss is an issue almost everyone in coastal Louisiana can
agree with. The trouble emerges, however, when focus comes back to the present and the recent
past for communities like Ironton.

Coal in the marsh
When Ms. Anne and I first discussed land loss and the plans for the sediment diversion,
she almost immediately pointed me to some of the ongoing struggles Ironton has had with
industrial development in the region. Prior to the sediment diversion becoming an officially
funded project, Ironton had been organizing against the construction of a new coal storage and
transport facility a half-mile north of their community, exactly where the sediment diversion is
slated to be built. When plans for the coal terminal to move in were announced, parish leaders
tried to convince residents in Ironton to relocate as opposed to denying the coal terminal the
permits it would need to begin construction and operation. Leadership in the parish "had the
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audacity to meet with the minister of our community and to try and make a deal," Ms. Anne
explained, shaking her head in disgust. The former parish president told the minister to relay to
the residents that the parish would re-locate the community. More broadly, she noted how this
was a part of a post-Katrina plan by some of the more powerful leaders in the parish wherein
they envisioned the southern end of the parish as empty and available for industry to move into
without resistance.
Ironton and other black communities in the parish have long been in battles with industry
who see their communities as empty or expendable, and therefore the ideal locations for
industrial operations. In 1983, International Marine Terminals (IMT), a coal storage and
transport facility, was up and running on land that was formerly home to the small black
community of Wood Park. IMT bought out the remaining residents of Wood Park and was
lauded in the local papers as bringing “black gold” to the parish. As time went on, the facility
gradually began expanding its footprint, quickly becoming a source of frustration for Ironton
over the contamination and regulation of coal dust from the mountains of coal piles sitting next
to the river levee and nearby towns (Rich 2014). When plans for the new coal terminal emerged,
this one on the other end of the town, Ms. Anne and others from Ironton led the charge for
organizing against it. Framed with discourses of racism and environmental justice, many
members of the Ironton community worked with environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club's
"Beyond Coal" campaign, to seek legal aid to fight against the permitting and construction of the
new coal terminal.
Ms. Anne's activism got her and other black leaders in the parish a reputation for being
troublemakers when it came to the process of getting new projects through the coastal permitting
process. As a parish founded on natural resource extraction and desperately attached to it as their
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economic life-line, standing in the way of industrial development often leaves a bad taste in the
mouth of parish leaders. At one meeting with the local coastal zone management board, the
parish group charged with approving all building permits in the coastal zone (which is essentially
the entire southern end of the parish), they got to talking about Ms. Anne and other activists from
the community. They recalled how she organized protests at council meetings and got the media
involved when the coastal zone permitting group initially went to grant the construction permit
for the coal terminal. They complained about journalists and lawyers calling them. "This is a
conservative parish," one resident from Ironton said to as we discussed political organizing
among the black community in the parish. "They don't like trouble or talking about certain things
like racism or inequality."
As I sat in the room listening to the men and women on the coastal zone board
complaining about how difficult and incendiary Ms. Anne and other black community organizers
were about the coal terminal, I thought of my friend's warning. Lucas, the youngest member of
the group, seemed aware of the awkward undertones of the pre-meeting banter. "Well I wouldn’t
want that terminal next to my community," he said, in an attempt to break-up the critical talk
about Ms. Anne and others. Although race was never mentioned explicitly, when Lucas called
me the next day asking what I thought about the meeting and the "race thing," it became very
clear that folks in the room understood their remarks to be racially charged. I attended many
meetings with Lucas, but this was the first time he ever called me to gauge my reaction. "Did I
do a good job of diffusing it?" he asked me. I assured him I thought it was good that someone
stepped in to cut the conversation off. It was one of many times I have heard parish officials
complaining about Ms. Anne and the outspoken complaints of other Black leaders in the parish
about lack of resources, jobs, and protection for black communities.
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Ms. Anne, who is also an elected councilwoman in the parish, understands that she is
viewed as an instigator in the parish, but is unbothered by it. "I vote my conscience and do what I
think is right," she explained to me as we discussed her proclivity for calling out inequality and
discrimination in parish policies in council meetings and frequently voting against her fellow
council women and men when she felt they were playing favoritism with politics. When Ms.
Anne saw how quickly CPRA was trying to push through construction permits for the sediment
diversion under the auspices of co-existing with the new coal terminal in early 2015, she rallied
to get her colleagues on the council to deny the initial permit, which was a surprise to her. "It
was a major blow to CPRA," she noted, "they did not expect that. CPRA came up with it fast
because they wanted to strike hard with everyone being new and young (in the council). But they
knew I was an old school veteran and that I wouldn’t fall for that."
The confluence of industrialization and restoration sounded an alarm for what would
happen to Ironton if all these projects moved in. Residents did not want to become a site for
industrial development or laboratory for techno-scientific experimentation for coastal restoration.
When both the state and industrial companies eyed the same small slice of property next to
Ironton for these intentions, it became difficult not to see sediment diversions as the next in a
long line of strategies for using the environment to "beat up" the black community in the parish,
as one resident candidly told me.
Some of the scientists working on the sediment diversion also saw the impending coal
terminal as a questionable enterprise, especially when they bought the land scientists identified
as the best site for the river intake structure of the diversion. "There was something fishy about
it," Eric noted as we talked about when the coal terminal project came onto the radar of the
planning for the sediment diversion. As we discussed negotiations between CPRA and the
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landowners who intended to put a coal terminal in front of the intake for the sediment diversion,
it became clear to me that Eric, alongside residents like Ms. Anne, also saw the project as
exploitative. "They kept asking us to move the intake farther south," Eric described, "and
anytime you move it south it's bad…[because you are] reducing the performance of the diversion
by 10 to 15 percent." As Eric was roped into conversations with the state and the landowners he
realized that they were not as much interested in moving the diversion to build their coal terminal
as they were in selling their land. They paid too much for the land and were "looking for
someone to sue" in order to cut their losses, it seemed to Eric and CPRA.
Even though Eric and the state had a keen sense that the coal terminal owners had little
interest in investing in the parish or doing any good for its neighbors, be it Ironton or the state, it
was still a challenge to see how the activities of those landowners could be compared to the
activities of environmental restoration that Eric and the state were involved with. The coal
terminal was fishy, but the location of the diversion was not – from their point of view – because
the location reflected the best location for sourcing sediment. And sourcing sediment, at least for
the state and Eric, are inherently positive activities. The extent to which his work could be
considered “fishy” never crossed his mind: sediment makes the decision, not politics. But natural
processes do not provide a language for addressing inequality or justice, the matters of concern
for Ironton and other residents who see little distinctions between a coal terminal and a sediment
diversion. Furthermore, when the social impacts become "tacked on" at the end of
environmental modeling efforts, as Eric and other scientists frequently acknowledge, residents
become even more firmly convinced of the fact that, whether for economic development or
environmental restoration, their communities are still the laboratories, or sacrifice zones, for
more economically and politically powerful groups to use at their will. This is a complicated
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position for someone like Eric and other scientists to understand. In part this is because they do
not share histories with people of color in the bayou region. Beyond this, though, it is because
scientists like Eric see themselves and science writ-large as marginalized within environmental
policy making. And though it is an achievement to be given a seat at the table, Eric does not see
how having someone at the table like Ms. Anne, whose expertise and experience is also
marginalized in environmental planning decisions, might also have an important impact on how
decisions are made about restoration science and projects, and in particular what questions are
asked in the process..

Geographies of nowhere
To Ms. Anne and many of the residents of Ironton, the fact that both projects were eyeing
the same piece of property next to their community was not coincidental, nor did it make sense
from an environmental perspective. As Mr. Gene, another black elected official, said to me
regarding the siting of the diversion next to the coal terminal, "if they were so concerned about
the environment [coastal restoration], then why are they pumping coal into the marshes?" To Mr.
Gene, the rampant favoritism in parish politics which led to communities on the southern end
largely being passed-up for infrastructure and civic improvement projects made it all the more
frustrating that the state would come in with a huge investment that appeared to contribute
nothing to the Ironton community. If local and state government cannot even maintain the local
park, clear drainage ditches, or fortify broken levees, why should residents feel confident that
this restoration project would do them more good than harm?
Much of industrial development concentrated in low-income communities of color treats
racial geographies, or more broadly non-white geographies, as invisible or forgotten in their
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processes of place-making. "Black subjects and their geopolitical concerns," geographers
McKittrick and Woods write, are frequently framed as "being elsewhere (on the margin, the
underside, outside the normal) a spatial practice that conveniently props-up the mythical norm
and erases or obscures the daily struggles of particular communities” (McKittrick and Woods
2008, 4). Ms. Anne's emphasis on Ironton's recent struggles with the coal terminal eloquently
captures the struggles black and other racialized communities face when they insist that their
marginalization is central to the material production of space, whether for its use as a coal
transport facility or an environmental restoration project. Cost-benefit analyses, property values,
and ideal environmental conditions, in this regard, work to bolster the belief that geography is
defined by capitalist and environmental values and that racial difference is not knowable or
visible in the production of space (ibid.). The invisibility of black and other non-white
communities, or the invisibility of their essential place-making role, characterizes an immense
body of critical work on environmental justice that indexes the material consequences not only of
being forgotten, but the misrecognition of the geographies and developments enabled by socalled forgotten and invisible communities.
Laboratories, too, similarly situate themselves as distinct spaces void of alterities beyond
the designs of well-intentioned scientists, and there is a long history of black communities in
particular being used as laboratories in this regard.54
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Prominent examples in the U.S. of black communities being used as experiments for science and engineering projects
span from the biological sciences to urban planning initiatives. Experiments on black men at the Tuskegee Institute,
where they were unknowingly infected syphilis and left untreated for decades (Jones 1981), and mid-century urban
redevelopment projects that razed black neighborhoods across the U.S. to accommodate capital investment and a
growing interstate system (Hirsch 1998), are just two of numerous ways black communities and bodies have been
experimented on by scientists and engineers in the U.S.
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A historically disadvantaged community
It’s like building the I-10 interstate right through the black community in New Orleans
and tearing-up Claiborne Avenue in the 1960s … there is no question that was done for racial
reasons because it was put through a black neighborhood instead of a white neighborhood …
there is a history of that in Louisiana. So yeah, I’d be suspicious if I was your basic person living
in Ironton.
-James, coastal geologist
Over coffee one hot September afternoon in fall 2016, I spoke with James, one of the
coastal geologists whose research has informed the modeling of the sediment diversion. He has a
friendly, unassuming air about him when we meet. While he characterizes himself as "merely a
scientist," it was clear from our conversation that he is keenly aware of how his research is
entangled in broader political contexts. "We’re the poster child for this thing [sediment
diversions]. The largest environmental restoration project on earth," he notes, rolling his eyes.
The project has made him and his expertise popular in the academic and wider public realms,
drawing him into the politics of coastal planning in Louisiana as well as other delta restoration
projects around the world.
"It's fun, but it can also be very difficult and not too much fun," he explained as we drank
down our coffees in the shade, "especially when you are being questioned by stakeholders, such
as commercial fishermen or local port authorities, who see you and your science as the enemy."
Describing my work in Ironton, I asked if and how Ironton had ever been brought up in
his research on sediment diversions, or if the community has been a topic of discussion among
scientists and coastal policymakers working on the diversion program. He acknowledged that
Ironton had not been represented in any formal way with advocacy groups but that they were
certainly on the radar as the state began moving forward with permitting the project. James
remembered that early on, when the state and researchers started going down the diversion path,
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that "they knew they had to stay away from Ironton because it was a historically disadvantaged
community.” The fact that the diversion was next to this “historically disadvantaged community"
was one of many factors, or possible impediments, James explained, to the federal permitting
process for constructing diversions. He went on to list all the possible issues that could hold up a
federal permitting process: "if there is a pipeline, that’s a problem. If there is a federal anchorage
point on the river, that is problem. And if there is a historically disadvantaged community that
most definitely is a problem." As he spoke, he never mentioned racial or class differences
specifically.
Even though Ironton was identified as a permitting problem, Ironton was not considered a
“constituency” or “stakeholder group,” James clearly pointed out, at least in the eyes of the state.
More broadly, James noted, whether the state considered Ironton as a constituency group or
“gave a damn” did not matter because the state’s first order of business is: “what does it take to
get a permit?” For Ironton, this means that the project is designed, approved, and begins
construction before they are ever formally engaged in the process. Yet in numerous public
meetings in Plaquemines Parish, state officials were told that they could not just ignore Ironton
or any community they were going to build their diversion within. At one aptly named
"community conversation" just a few months before the meeting CPRA held in Ironton, one
resident put this bluntly to state officials: "You need to go door-to-door in that community. You
[need] to persuade the folks in Ironton that they are not being discriminated against…They are a
historic community, a black community, that needs to be respected." CPRA officials nodded
their heads and took notes, asking how they could arrange such a meeting. Other
non-black residents sitting around the conference table where the small meeting was held
nodded their heads in agreement.
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After CPRA had their meeting in Ironton I caught up again with James. Describing
aspects of the meeting, I told James that residents asked CPRA officials why the diversions had
to be next to their community, in addition to a proliferation of other industrial and coastal
development projects. Then I posed the question to him, asking how he would respond if a
resident asked him why such projects always seem to be put next to their communities, black
communities.
"You can’t answer that question," James replied, looking down and somewhat pained by
my question. "Of course, you can tell the community about all the studies you have conducted
and why this area is the best to capture sediment based on those studies but," James doubtfully
added, “is that going to convince somebody? It’s not. …Most of the critics of coastal projects are
already suspicious of the government and folks from minority communities are especially
suspicious."
I agreed and pushed him a bit further. Is it a sufficient explanation to say that they just
happen to be in the best spot? "You can’t help but if it happens to fall between somewhere like
that,” he lamented. "It’s like building the I-10 interstate right through the black community in
New Orleans and tearing-up Claiborne Avenue in the 1960s. …There is no question that was
done for racial reasons because it was put through a black neighborhood instead of a white
neighborhood. …There is a history of that in Louisiana. So yeah, I’d be suspicious if I was your
basic person living in Ironton.”
James’ comparison to urban renewal projects of the 1960s in New Orleans, and elsewhere
in the U.S., struck a chord with what many of the residents had expressed in that February
meeting. Projects like the diversion and development projects to turn areas along the lower river
into economically profitable corridors operate with little care for, let alone support existing
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communities. Despite recognizing that certain projects, after decades of hindsight, were overtly
racist (i.e. the expansion of the interstate through black communities in New Orleans), James
went on to say, the reality is that you can't be honest and tell residents like those in Ironton that
some places are going to be sacrificed for the greater good. Agencies like CPRA have to make
tough decisions about what might help the most people and that some folks are going to end up
being negatively impacted because of that. “But you can’t say that to people in a meeting…I
can’t say that to people in a meeting,” James noted, adding that he was grateful not to be
politician. Most meetings in which James played a part were strictly about the feasibility of
constructing diversions that would build land, he said, not about their effects on local
communities. Or, at least, those were two separate issues in his understanding. There were never
discussions about locating the diversion at river mile 60.7 to intentionally expose or sacrifice a
disadvantaged community for the greater good of the coast. “As a card-carrying liberal,” James
went on to say, “I would be horrified by such things.” At the end of the day, in his experience,
conversations were really about obstacles to permitting that would make construction costs too
much to bear from a cost-benefit analysis. "It’s a cold way to think, but it’s really what it comes
down to."
The extent to which he felt that the questionable impacts to Ironton should be a more
prominent topic of consideration was left ambiguous, mostly because he is careful with how he
speaks on the record. James' choice though reveals a seemingly paradoxical situation wherein
Ironton has not necessarily been invisible to coastal scientists and planners, but rather deemed as
not significant enough compared to the prioritization of building land and abating land loss. The
state's insistence on the separation of research, permit, and engagement processes is part of the
reason why such divergent understandings of the meaning of land, loss, and protection have
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developed between science-led restoration practices and communities of color. It is also why
residents continue to feel invisible to the eyes of science and the state.

Beyond racism
It is important to sit with the perspective of the "card-carrying liberal" whose research
supports the creation of a large environmental restoration project that clearly intersects with
racial issues. As with CPRA officials in the Ironton meeting, my conversations with James and
other scientists and engineers often revolved around the topic of intentionality as it relates to the
siting of the diversions next to Ironton. For critical race scholars analyzing race-making
processes in seemingly post-racial spaces, such as the biomedical sciences and the U.S. at-large,
the concept of colorblind racism helps to provide a language for analyzing the connection
between persistent racial inequalities in an unintentionally racist world (Bonilla-Silva 2008). As
numerous scholars in critical studies of race and racism have articulated, the production and
maintenance of racial difference and inequality exceed overtly segregationist tactics associated
with slavery and Jim Crow-era race relations. If we understand racial formations as the social,
economic, and political practices and policies that normalize and enshrine racial difference (ibid.,
Omi and Winant 1994), then we must understand those processes that generate and maintain
racialized experiences and inequalities need not be explicitly about racial beliefs or attitudes in
the first place.
To be sure, the people of color I worked with rarely invoked race or racism directly in
their exchanges with policymakers and scientists because for them the issue was the racialized
impacts of the work of science, not whether scientists were racist. Yet, when confronted with
questions about the unequal racial, economic, or geographic impacts of their research and
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projects, many of the scientists I worked defaulted to the language of intentionality as it is
associated with race. This perspective, although important, does not fully grasp the range of how
racism operates in a post-Jim Crow, post-Civil Rights era.
Critical work on colorblind racism, particularly in the field of science studies, contends
that institutional structures, not necessarily personal beliefs, function to subtly yet formidably
maintain racialized social and material hierarchies. Science, as an institutional formation of
knowledge production that holds itself apart from political struggles in ideology and practice, is
emblematic of the "civil" and post-racial ways that racism continues to manifest itself. A singular
focus on basic science and innovation, as critical research on the biomedical sciences and social
inequality points out, can exacerbate racial inequalities that have life and death consequences for
communities of color, poorer people, and other marginalized groups especially when they
become test subject's for corporate medicine (Benjamin 2013). In this regard, the notion of
objectivity in scientific practice is particularly dangerous, as it can reinforce and potentially
"upgrade," to borrow Benjamin's term, historic racism and social inequalities under the guises of
scientific innovation. Recent work in geography and anthropology examining the extension of
racial formations into coastal and climate change planning policy justly notes that simply
ignoring racial histories - whether out of ignorance or a motivation to move beyond racial
categories - does not result in the production of racial equity (Hardy et al. 2017). Rather, it
becomes yet another form of colorblind racism, as seemingly non-racial structural mechanisms
produce racial difference (Bonilla-Silva 2008, 2015).
These practices run the risk of contributing to the normalization of racial hierarchies;
both the card-carrying liberal scientists and disenfranchised communities of color understand
this. Yet these groups are situated in politically disparate roles. The scientists are at the table with
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state officials making decisions, guided by the scientists' professional input, whereas Ironton
residents are merely informed that their homes and lands will be subject to the decisions made by
policymakers and their scientific advisors. According to James, Ironton is not even considered a
stakeholder. These facts point to the social hierarchies embedded within the state's approach to
applied coastal restoration science that operates through cost-benefit analyses, feasibility studies,
and sediment loads - approaches that put agency on non-racial entities like sediment, science,
and economics in a manner that seemingly absolves state officials and scientists of responsibility
for unequal outcomes. Even though these more powerful groups are beginning to openly
acknowledge that restoration and protection will indeed create "winners and losers," they still
struggle to break away from an ideological framework that structures environmental decision
making in a manner that reproduces and maintains the inequalities indexed by the histories of
communities of color like Ironton.

Rogue scientists
When I caught Dale he was pulling up to the only store in Pointe à la Hache, a
convenience store that sells food and occasionally hot lunches. It's next to the shell of the old
parish courthouse, all of which was destroyed in a fire over a decade ago except for the front
brick facade and clock tower. Pointe à la Hache is on the east bank of the river in Plaquemines
Parish adjacent to Breton Sound and across the river from Ironton. Dale had the afternoon free,
so he welcomed my questions. He's used to calls from journalists, documentary filmmakers, and
social scientists curious about the black oystermen in Plaquemines. We drove over to a local bar
and hang-out spot that could easily be misread as an abandoned gas station if there were not a
small circle of weathered black men sitting in a circle under some shade softly chatting. Most of
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the men who hang out here at Vic's Place used to work in the bayous in Breton Sound regularly,
where the state leases public oyster bottoms for a few dollars an acre. But in the past few years
oystering has become an all but defunct industry around Pointe à la Hache. "The east bank is
dead!" Dale told me in a voice hoarse from smoking a pack or two of cigarettes a day.
The east bank is dead in an environment and economic sense, he explained. Since the
2010 BP oil spill, the oyster reefs Dale and others in his community depended on for food and
livelihoods have been out of commission. The spill, though, was just one of a series of factors
that has led to the decline of oyster production in Breton Sound, including river diversion
restoration projects, which Dale and I got into the murky details of that particular afternoon.
As we sat down at the bar, we got to talking with Yap, the bartender, about dead oysters,
scientists, and river diversions. Though oystermen in Pointe à la Hache often get riled-up over
the impacts of the Caernarvon Diversion, which began operating in 1991, today they are
particularly incensed by a newer diversion closer to their community, Mardi Gras Pass.55 Dale
began our conversation by telling me about Mardi Gras Pass and all the scientists coming down
to the community to study this so-called “natural river diversion,” Dale said in a mocking tone.
Mardi Gras Pass is a cut in a section of natural river levee on the east bank of the Mississippi
River just below the terminus of the federally-maintained levee system south of Pointe à la
Hache. The smaller levee that kept the river from overbanking and entering the adjacent brackish
estuary to the east of the river began eroding during the high river event of 2011 and
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The Caernarvon Diversion was the first river diversion built for coastal restoration purposes by the state and the
Corps. It began operation in the early 1990s and quickly over-freshened oyster bedding areas in Breton Sound,
causing widespread mortality of valuable oyster leases. Black oystermen, among others, were hit particularly hard
financially. In the wider public debates about whether to build sediment diversions, Caernarvon is often cited by
oppositional fishermen as evidence that river diversions destroyed coastal lands and fisheries. See chapters one and
two for more details on the longer history of river diversions and their relationship to racial formations in
Plaquemines Parish.
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subsequently broke through the levee to form a 630-foot-wide channel in 2012 (Camillo 2011,
Lopez et al. 2014).

Image 21: Left, Regional maps with Mardi Gras Pass on the northern boundary of Bohemia Spillway. Right, Closeup of Pointe à la Hache community and location of Mardi Gras Pass (Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation 2013).

When the crevasse opened up, environmentalists championed it as a free diversion,
encouraging the Corps, who had initially planned to close the crevasse due to potential impacts
to navigation on the river, to leave it open to facilitate natural land growth in Breton Sound.
Environmental groups who have tacitly or explicitly supported the construction of large sediment
diversions, like the Mid-Barataria project in Ironton, see Mardi Gras Pass as "an important case
study in riverine-deltaic processes that helps inform critical discussions of artificial river
diversions...providing an opportunity for important scientific study of potential environmental
benefits to adjacent marshes [that] could prove a cost savings to tax payers" (ibid, 10).
When the pass formed in 2012, it blew out a service road to a local oil and gas company,
who subsequently applied for a permit from the state to repair the road and the broken levee.
This mobilized several environmentalist groups, environmental groups who actively advocate for
the construction of river diversion among other forms of coastal restoration, to step-up and
defend leaving the accidental diversion to remain open. For the scientists working with these
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groups, the opening of Mardi Gras Pass was not only a free diversion compared to the over $1
billion price tag accompanying the construction of CPRA's diversions, but also a new laboratory
for understanding how river diversions can work to build land.
During a mandatory public hearing the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources held
for the local oil and gas company to acquire the permit to rebuild the road that Mardi Gras Pass
washed-out, several representatives from environmental groups in the region were on hand to
offer public comment on why the permit should be denied in order to give scientists more time to
study the crevasse, or "natural diversion." “What we have here," one ecologist noted during
public comment, "is a unique opportunity to study an evolving channel, and we have this test of
the State Master Plan, the core strategy of which is using the river to rebuild the marshes. So are
we going to stand up for that or is it just going to roll over? In this opportunity at Mardi Gras
Pass we have an opportunity for a good experiment to see what the river can do […] the more we
learn here, the better for the entire coastal restoration program.” His sentiment was echoed by his
colleagues who followed: "What we’re asking today of DNR is that, before it makes a decision
on this permit, it thoroughly study that question, what would the effect of closing off this
flooding be?…I don’t know the conclusions of that study will be…I can only say that that has to
be what drives us when we make decisions."56 Their comments reflected a stance on coastal
restoration science that was decades in the making. It also established, albeit in a fairly polite
way, that the restoration science community was not going to easily back-out of this fight: In the
name of science, they wanted to keep the crevasse open.
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The landowners who filed for the permit to rebuild the road and effectively shut-off the
"free" diversion, prior to 2011, had only a peripheral understanding of the politics surrounding
the construction of river diversions and their impacts as a restoration strategy. As a
representative from the company noted during the hearing, he spoke with a number of state and
environmental groups and learned that this river diversion is a small piece of a very large puzzle
aimed at figuring out how to restore Louisiana's disappearing wetlands. He had not expected to
be drawn into debates about coastal restoration when he sought to fix the broken levee and repair
the road to his facility. Sympathetic to the need to maintain and repair the eroding marshes along
the coast, he expressed a mounting mistrust in the groups advocating for keeping the diversion
opened. He pointed out the fact that some groups said it would remain a small diversion while
others spoke about making a more permanent structure for a larger diversion at the site. In short,
he received mixed messages from the restoration science community, which made him think
there was more than scientific inquiry at the root of the pushback he got from environment
groups. While he was not opposed to keeping Mardi Gras Pass open, he was not pleased with the
onslaught of mixed messages he was receiving from the scientific community about Mardi Gras
Pass - particularly its characterization as "natural" and the extent to which it is helping land to
accrete in Breton Sound.
"I call it Henny Penny," he said during the public hearing. "They want to scream the sky
is falling, and they want to get the public all worked up that we've got to leave this place open. I
don't know if that makes sense. I don't know if it doesn't make sense." He then goes on to
describe many meetings and phone calls he has had with the scientists who want to keep Mardi
Gras Pass open: “I’ve sat with those people and I’ve heard them — I’ve seen them [put] up slides
that will say all this is going to have this effect, look at turbidity here. It’s all good sediments,
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and I ask, well, where did you take that sample? Well, we took it in the channel is scouring, isn’t
that creating additional sediments as a result of the scouring [not the river water]? Oh, well, we
have other evidence and they will provide you another slide."57
He went on to point out how scientists use slides and charts to prove that the channel is
forming in a safe way that is actively building land, but that their evidence is meager at best.
While his ultimate concern is that, in the absence of repairing Mardi Gras Pass, the river is
controlling the flow of the water, he makes clear that the political and environmental interests
invested in keeping the crevasse open points towards rather nebulous, or perhaps misleading,
scientific arguments for keeping Mardi Gras Pass as an active diversion. Several other attendees
at the hearing made similar comments.
Dale was not at the meeting, but he echoed the skepticism present at the hearing as we sat
chatting with Yap. Many of the black oystermen and residents from the lower east bank have
advocated strongly for its closure, pointing to the fact that it continues to make the waters of
Breton Sound a dead zone for oysters by introducing too much freshwater and sediment to their
oyster beds. Any discussion of river diversions, especially on the east bank, gets oystermen like
Dale and Yap fired up. Dale half-jokingly suggested that a coastal scientist working with a local
environmental organization, Dr. Jovan, had come down to the east bank and personally opened
Mardi Gras Pass with a shovel. Dale did an imitation of Dr. Jovan digging, causing an outbreak
of laughter from Yap and others who pulled up a seat as we were talking at the bar. "Jovan
knows he cannot come down here without a group of people," Dale said with a smile. Chiming
in, Yap said that if the Corps or the parish did not do anything about Mardi Gras Pass soon, he
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and other guys might get too fed up with Mardi Gras Pass and just go sink some barges and old
cars into the crevasse one night to block it up. Everyone laughed. Dale shook his head, noting to
me that "they were only talking." Yap went on to talk about how he missed the days when he
could go out into the bayou for a few hours and be able to roll up to the bar with cash in his
pocket. The bar continues to be a hang-out spot, but mostly because it’s the place where folks
come to share food caught in the bayou or hunted in the woods and because the bayou is dead.
Jovan's reputation as a rouge scientist willing to do anything to keep Mardi Gras Pass
open made him one of the most frequently mentioned "enemy" scientists of residents living on
the lower end of Plaquemines Parish. Often called out by name, Jovan also stands-in for the
mounting pressure the state puts on science to create a pathway towards building diversions diversions that oystermen like Dale and Yap envision as the final death knell of their way of life.
Dale's characterization of Dr. Jovan as being so determined to have a diversion as to make it
himself, though, is not entirely hyperbolic fantasy.
While most scientists understand and are, to a certain extent, sympathetic to Dale and
others, they cannot understand why residents have fixated on Mardi Gras Pass as one of the main
diversions to fight. Often, I have often found myself speaking with both residents and scientists
about this relatively small diversion that does puts at most 1,000 cfs of river water into
surrounding estuaries, according to James and Eric. Why, Eric asked me as we talked about the
Mardi Gras Pass controversy, do they care so much about such a small diversion? Yes, he said,
the Breton Sound estuary is mostly fresh, making it less than ideal for oyster production. But the
fishermen must either not be aware or just ignore the two larger river crevasses downriver from
Mardi Gras Pass that combined dump almost 156,000 cfs of river water into the estuary.58 "I
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don't know why [Mardi Gras Pass] is bothering them. It's like a tiny hole next to [a] gaping
wound," he noted, describing the difference between the two crevasses.
As I reflected on Eric's comments it occurred to me that one of the reasons residents in
Pointe à la Hache fixate on Mardi Gras Pass is because many local scientists, not necessarily
Eric, have made it a very public restoration experiment. Folks like Dale and Yap, much as Ms.
Anne and others in Ironton, are tired of having their land and water turned into sites for
experimental restoration science. Compared to many, though not all, of the scientists working
with the state who champion themselves as a laboratory for the world when it comes to climate
change adaptation,59 residents in Pointe à la Hache do not want to be a laboratory for the rest of
Louisiana or the world. Yet pressures and an onslaught of scientific studies from environmental
groups have kept the Mardi Gras Pass open since 2011. Over time, Mardi Gras Pass has become
integrated into the suite of coastal restoration projects that CPRA uses to champion the
effectiveness of river diversions for land building. Dr. Jovan and his colleagues, perhaps in
disguise, continue to monitor and research Mardi Gras Pass.

Conclusion and discussion
Across the experiences and understandings of sediment diversions among black residents and
self-ascribed apolitical scientists is a persistent recognition that a diversion structure is more than a
"natural process." Wrapped up in the movement of water, sediments, and natural processes are divergent
understandings of protection, public good, and equity. More broadly, what a close investigation of
encounters between communities of color, environmentalists, and scientists demonstrates is that
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scientific practices do not exist outside the realm of racial histories that carve inequality into coastal
landscapes. Risk and vulnerability, as communities of color in coastal areas experience it, do not solely
emanate from water or subsidence, factors environmentalists in the region often cite as making them
vulnerable and in need of restoration and protection projects. Rather, experiences of vulnerability and
feeling sacrificed are in many ways ushered in by scientific research and practices that attempt to sidestep questions of uneven political power as it is distributed between communities living coastal land loss
and scientists attempting to understand and abate loss.
The experiences of Ms. Anne, Mary, Dale and others from Plaquemines suggest that the
interaction between the science and coastal policy making of diversions and local histories as well as
racial and other social inequalities remains an elusive and somewhat tangential afterthought for the state
officials and research scientists whose work feeds the production of large-scale river diversion
infrastructures. While the state hopes the application of techno-scientific logic and values to
environmental problems can operate at a meta-level above historic or contemporary environmental
crises, because it examines environmental problems from the elongated timeframes of geology and
natural processes, many residents question the extent to which their communities must be the laboratory
for cutting-edge restoration science. For them, the difference between polluting industry and rogue
scientists is minimal because they both participate in the practice of using their community's lands and
waters to their personal benefit, leaving residents often powerless to fight them off.
While scientists and policy makers would like to debate the terms of whether to build diversion
on the grounds of sediment size, land accretion rates, and peer-reviewed science, residents pose a more
challenging question: Will your diversion do justice? Which is perhaps a kinder way of saying: are your
diversions racist? Or, rather, will your diversions reproduce the racial inequalities that shape the terrain
of everyday contemporary life for people of color living on the coast? As many of the black residents of
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Plaquemines I came to know over the course of my research suggest, environmental crisis and the
seemingly apolitical scientific solutions to these crises often recast past forms of discrimination in their
efforts to produce environmental good.
Research in political ecology has long examined how the discourse of environmental
preservation and environmental good as a universal public good has produced environmental
injustices faced by indigenous and minority communities with little political power, including
the dispossession of land and land use rights (Spencer 1999, Kosek 2006), toxic exposure and
pollution (Bullard 1990, Pulido 2000 Checker 2005), and the uneven environmental, cultural,
and economic impacts of natural disasters (Nixon 2011, Adams 2013, Browne 2015). This work
critiques the ways ideologies of environmental conservation emanating from mainstream,
economically supported environmental science continues to insidiously reinforce unequal
formations of racial and political belonging as opposed to heading appeals to equality and social
justice that many people of color and other politically and economically disenfranchised
communities desire.
The question of whose values and worldviews are "at the bench," to echo questions posed
earlier in this chapter, resonates deeply when struggles over diversions in communities of color
are closely examined. Compared to questions about the integrity or wisdom of science that
circulate in public debates about the use of predictive models (see chapter three), to pose the
question "will your diversion do justice" forces us to confront the political alliances different
epistemologies and knowledges of the world bring to the table. Our experiences and our values
shape the questions we ask, whether as an advocate for minority fishermen or an engineer
conducting basic science.

246

As recent work in critical race and science and technology studies has pointed out, the
discursive distancing of science for what is typically construed as "political" matters (such as
racial and economic inequality) leaves groups who are the willing or unknowing subjects of
scientific experimentation left to shoulder the burdens of discriminatory design "built into the
machine" or techno-scientific object or practice, with little recourse to action or reparations for
disproportionate exposure to bodily and environmental harm (Benjamin 2013, 2016; Braun
2014). What kinds of restoration could be possible if the framework for what coastal restoration
could be was expanded to incorporate questions of justice, history, and humility?
Residents from Plaquemines like Ms. Anne and Dale suggest that land loss and sciencebased restoration do not operate at a meta-level above historic or contemporary political issues
but are shot-through with the politics of the past, particularly racial inequalities. They insist that
the policy makers and scientists look at the project through their experiences and histories rather
than the state's preferred optic of measurement, modeling, feasibility, and natural delta building
processes. In other words, they do not allow environmental crisis or seemingly apolitical
scientific solutions to efface difference but rather double-down on the connections between longexperienced forms of discrimination and the logic of science as it is used to justify the
manipulation of land, water, and marsh.
To insist that science can be about integrity and justice in addition to objectivity opens
the realm of possibilities for how scientists can make strides towards producing new
environmental knowledge – a type of knowledge that can account for the ways science is
entangled with racial histories and potentially do reparative work for communities like Ironton
and Pointe à la Hache in addition to the degrading marsh that surrounds them.
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IV. Avulsion
In delta geomorphology, avulsion is the process by which a river delta changes course,
switching to a short, steeper route to the coast. The entirety of coastal Louisiana from Cypremort
Point south of Lafayette in western Louisiana to St. Bernard and New Orleans to the east is
formed by the various avulsion patterns, generally referred to as delta lobe switching, that have
occurred over the past 7,000 years. Over that span of time, the river switched back and forth, east
to west, every 1,000-1,500 years, depositing silts, clays, and other sediments along with seasonal
flooding before taking a turn to change course.

Image 22: Historic delta lobe formations on the Lower Mississippi River (Gagliano et al. 1970).

In the wake of the river changing course the old river channel is left as an abandoned bayou.
Along the banks of the old channels is the natural high ground, places where the largest
concentration of sediment settle. Contemporary settlement patterns in south Louisiana tack
closely to these ridges, which look like series of fingers that stretch out from north to south in the
coastal area.

248

The current delta, the Birdsfoot Delta, at the river's mouth is only about 500 years old,
resting at the very end of Plaquemines Parish. In fact, Plaquemines has two of the most recent
delta lobes, the Balize and Plaquemines lobes, dating back to about 750 years ago. Geologically,
Plaquemines Parish is home to some of the youngest land on earth and one of the most powerful
engine of land building in the world: The Mississippi River. The geophysical capacities of the
river to build new land shapes the state's current attempts to re-route the Mississippi, manually
changing its course to reactivate its land building potential. That same logic of natural processes
and inevitable change extends to the political and technical strategies coastal groups are
increasingly turning to in order to re-align the relationship of residents to the changing coastline
with less land, more water, and increased vulnerability.
Since the release of the 2017 Coastal Master Plan, which revealed that such large-scale
engineering projects would not ultimately be enough to keep pace with a sinking coastline,
changing course became a framework for reconstituting coastal residents who would be, and to a
certain extent have long been, the losing half of the "winners and losers" left to reconfigure their
relationship to the changing delta. Reflecting the turn in coastal planning towards dealing
explicitly with people, resilience and adaptation became the political and epistemological
framework for cultivating new kinds of deltaic citizens: Citizens equipped with the capacity for
self-determination and adaptation against the backdrop of a changing delta. These new efforts for
coastal planning are described by planners as experiments in direct democracy through the use of
co-design techniques: Experimental public engagement efforts aimed at reconfiguring regional
coastal planning as a grassroots effort against the top-down, technocratic planning regimes of the
state Coastal Planning and Restoration Authority (CPRA).
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The imperative to change course reflects the state's desire to physically alter parts of the
lower coast in order to sustain remaining marshlands. As this dissertation has discussed,
however, attempts to change course are not only subject to the whims of the river, but highly
contested by residents and scientists alike who question the wisdom of appropriating the natural
logic of delta geomorphology into plans to re-engineer the lower river and the people who call it
home. The final section of this dissertation follows the efforts of planners and residents working
on projects to make new kinds of resilient citizens suited to living in a climate changed coastal
Louisiana.
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5. Resilient Citizenship
Scenes from a plantation
It was the end of a long day of discussing climate justice, making "asks" from local and
state politicians, and coastal zone planning. One of our guest visitors who led us through a
discussion of climate justice asked us all to get up out of our seats.
"Alright," she explained, "we're gonna do a little sing along to get everyone going here;
shake that afternoon lull."
We had been gathered in the church turned event hall and bar at the Woodland Plantation,
forty-five miles south of New Orleans, since the early morning. I carpooled down to Woodland
with two younger women of color who were part of the first cohort of LEAD (leadership,
education, advocacy, development) the Coast trainees with me. As we pulled up Tricia
exclaimed, "I cannot believe they are going get me into this plantation. Is this meeting really at a
plantation?" We laughed about it, despite how uncomfortable this space made us feel and how
strange the past few Saturdays of our training on how to be coastal leaders had been.
By now I'd become somewhat used to Woodland Plantation as one of the few down the
road places where events for coastal restoration are held. First the Expert Panel on Diversions
hosted by CPRA and environmental research groups, then the Wine for the Wetlands gathering
hosted by local environmental NGO groups, and now the final coastal leadership session hosted
by a community capacity building organization, Foundation for Louisiana (FFL), who has
recently joined the environmental NGO scene. We met at Woodland because the plantation
owner is a fellow trainee and has been catering our leadership meeting meals.
After we walked into the church turned event hall and bar and the presentations got
going, it was hard to remember that we were on a plantation. As with the first training sessions
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we had, a handful of guest speakers and PowerPoint presentations stood between us and lunch.
The first presentation was "how to have an effective conversation with an elected official." "You
need to have a note taker, a talker, and an observer in addition to the main person talking" our
presenter from a local environmental law and advocacy group noted. "And try to keep your
audience captive if you can so you can deliver your elevator speech."
The next presentation was entitled "what does it mean to listen?" It was facilitated by a
sociologist. "Eye contact is key," she noted. We discussed how to deal with tough moments in
community meetings and the different types of people you encounter in these spaces: "the
negative person, know it all, and the eager beaver."
The next presentation is "how to deal with failure." The presenter is having a difficult
time getting the audience engaged. "Let's share our failures with each other," she says
encouragingly. No one seems enthusiastic for the task.
After another forty minutes or so of discussing how to "power map" elected officials,
Tricia asked the group why were having discussions about how to play political games and map
power with elected officials. "Elected official should be accessible" she said, "I don't want to
have to do the power map games to get to the officials."
One of the presenters from Justice Louisiana, a lobbying group, stood-up in the back of
the room and started defending the approach. She told us that this is just the reality of how things
work. This got the room into a weird space and Tricia became visibly frustrated. It was the first
time any of us threw out a question without being prompted by our facilitators. A back and forth
ensued between Tricia and the woman who was trying to explain to Tricia how it is a tactic for
getting what you want out of public officials. After a few minutes one of the main organizers
from Foundation for Louisiana (FFL), the organizers of the event, jumped in to diffuse the
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situation, stating that this is a good situation but we're running behind schedule and need to get to
all our presenters. Halfway through the next presentation about state restoration tactics and costs
another participant, this one a representative from one of the local Native American tribes in the
region asked, "how we can be investing so much in coastal restoration when we are allowing oil
companies to continue to cut through out marsh with the Bayou Bridge pipeline60?" No one in
the room seemed to know what the Bayou Bridge pipeline was, particularly not our
environmental NGO presenter. "Good questions," the organizers encouraged, "but we don't
really have time to get into all of that."
As lawyers, academics, lobbyists and other shared their tactics for organizing, Kelly,
Tricia and I were going back and forth over group text about how patronizing the presentations
were. As two o'clock rolled around the end of the day was in sight. The last presenters - a white
sociologist who has been working with indigenous communities in coastal Louisiana for the last
decade and black lawyer who has been working on issues of racial equity in climate justice also
for the last decade - wanted to get everyone up and engaged again.
"Let's get on our feet for this one," they said. Everyone stood up.
"Okay," our presenter explained, "this side of the room is going start singing after me:
Organize, organize, organiiiize. Organize, organize, organiiize."
Everyone gradually started singing, reluctantly. After a few rounds she stopped us.
"Okay, now this side goes: Si se pueeeedeee. Si se pueeeedeee." The group rehearsed,
again reluctantly.
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Tricia and Kelly gave me a look of disapproval. Our presenter got animated and clapping
began. The rehearsal is meant to fire us up but has rather mixed impacts, feeling forced and out
of place. From the back of the room, organizers from Foundation for Louisiana (FFL) were
filming the song. After a few rounds we finished, and the collection of NGO individuals who
presented at and organized the meeting applauded. "Yes, that's what we like to hear. This is how
we build community!"
On the ride back Tricia and Kelly went off.
"Can you believe that? That singing! And the looks they gave us when we were asking
them questions! I know that lady Zoe doesn't like me. You see how she shut me down?" Zoe was
one of the directors from FFL. To Kelly, the leadership training workshops appeared like
planners were trying to turn residents into mouthpieces for the organizers’ agenda. "They say it's
about the people, but they just trying to tell us what to think and do. And I know they don't like it
when we ask questions."
The lack of space for questions was true: Each day of training had been overbooked with
speakers from environmental organizations, state agencies, lawyers, planners, and others
teaching us about Louisiana's coastal land loss issues and how to navigate levels of governance
and to explain the coastal land loss crisis.
"They want us to say and think what they tell us, but I know better than that," Tricia said
on the drive back up the road. Tricia spent a number of years representing the small black fishing
community on the east bank she hails from in a local environmental justice NGO. She had
experience in many similar meetings where she was trained by NGOs how to advocate on behalf
of her community.
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"You have to be careful who you trust and not let on that you smarter than you present
yourself to be. You don't want them to know how close you listening, so I often keep my mouth
shut. You can see whenever you ask them questions they don't like it."
"Yeah," Kelly said as we drove along, "what do you think they really want us to do?
They don't want to know what we think. They want us to go in and tell their ideas to the
community.... they want us to bring people in! But I'm not about it. I'm just here for the money."
Tricia laughed.

Making resilient coastal citizens
This chapter focuses on the reconfiguration of land loss within an ongoing suite of
experimental design practices and leadership training efforts aimed at transforming the at-risk
residents of Plaquemines Parish into more resilient citizens politically equipped to live in a future
environment with more water and less land. Specifically, this chapter highlights how residents
like Tricia and others engaged in a co-design planning processes and leadership training
negotiate diverse visions for becoming resilient coastal citizens. Through participation in these
workshops and events, I ethnographically trace how the aspirations of a new wave of coastal
planning efforts attempting to shift the discourse and practice of coastal planning towards
bottom-up, grassroots community engagement, particularly for historically marginalized and
underserved communities, encounter the aspirations and expectations of the resilient coastal
citizens they attempt to make.
As a critical anthropology of design and resilient citizenship, this chapter examines the
"cultural imaginaries and micro politics that delineate design's promises and practices" (Suchman
2011, 3), asking what new forms of belonging and exclusion resilient citizenship produces in
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coastal Louisiana. I focus in particular on the extent to which resilience thinking and planning
delivers on the discourse of democratic inclusion and social justice, especially as it pertains to
political empowerment of racially and geographically marginalized groups. In what ways, if at
all, does it transform their relationship to land loss?
This chapter draws from participation in fifteen coastal design workshops and meetings
between 2016 and 2018, ten semi-structured interviews with planners and participants from
workshops, discourse analysis of media and planning documents generated from planning
efforts, and regular ethnographic research alongside several key community leaders from
minority and fishing communities in Plaquemines.
The chapter examines the formation and contestation of resilient citizenship in several
sections. First, I introduce how environmental groups in coastal Louisiana mobilized the concept
of co-design into several community-based planning and leadership projects aimed at
democratizing the process of coastal planning. Next I examine the concept of resilience thinking
and co-design and their relationship to principals of self-governance/direct democracy and how
this is situated within scholarly critiques of resilience thinking as neoliberal form of
environmental governance. After these sections, I analyze variations on making resilient citizens,
examining the ways co-design and self-governance play out in the context of climate change
planning and the extent to which these practices both affirm and complicate critical analyses of
resilience. In the final section, I turn specifically to the ways race and racial difference are
confronted and made meaningful through these co-design and leadership efforts. I conclude by
examining how dominate frameworks for resilient citizenship are contested by residents and
explore what their visions for resilience look like.
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Making Louisiana Safe
As awkward as signing songs about community organizing in a plantation was for Tricia
and others, our Saturday afternoon choral was a remarkably different closing ceremony
compared to most meetings about coastal land loss and planning. Directly invoking traditions of
grassroots and civil rights organizing in black communities in the south, as one of the chorus
leaders noted, the song reflected the ways that LEAD the Coast (Leadership, Education,
Advocacy, Development) set itself apart as a coastal planning and education program.
Created as a six-week crash course in the scientific and political issues surrounding
coastal Louisiana’s land loss crisis, LEAD was designed to take a small group of community
leaders and curious citizens and present them with the tools they need to navigate the political
and environmental complexities of climate change in Louisiana. The sessions and curriculum
were put together by New Orleans-based NGO, the Foundation for Louisiana (FFL). LEAD was
a variation on workshops FFL hosted in New Orleans over the past ten years aimed at cultivating
civic leaders from economically under-resourced and minority communities in New Orleans. For
LEAD the Coast, organizers focus on working with black, indigenous, southeast Asian, and other
racial and ethnic minorities from remote coastal areas. My friends Kelly, Tricia, and Mary Ann
were among several black and minority residents invited to participate in the first round of
LEAD training.
FFL got its start as the Louisiana Disaster Relief Fund in the years following Hurricane
Katrina with the goal of fostering community development in the greater New Orleans area.
Rebranded as the Foundation for Louisiana several years later, the group inherited leftover funds
from another regional philanthropic foundation, the Blue Moon Fund, to develop a coastal arm of
their organization called their Coastal Resiliency Leverage Fund. With a $2 million startup, FFL
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began developing partnerships and potential programming to begin their coastal activities.61
Their goal was to act as a facilitator for civic engagement to accompany the multiplicity of state,
federal, and philanthropic agencies and monies pouring into Louisiana to cultivate coastal
resiliency. By providing a proverbial "place at the table" for residents like those who I sang with
on that Saturday afternoon in Woodland Plantation, FFL situated themselves as a group that
could make Louisiana's coastal planning efforts more robustly grounded in the political will and
needs of less politically powerful coastal residents. Commensurate with national efforts to
ground climate change planning in community engagement, FFL sees LEAD and other efforts as
having the potential to "lead to long-term social, environmental, and economic benefit but also
serve as a national and international model for equitable and constructive climate change
adaptation."62

Beyond checking the box
As a top-down, state agency, CPRA approaches planning for coastal land loss with an eye
towards maximizing the benefits of restoration for the entire state. Making decisions about what
projects to fund and build with a limited budget focuses on the use of scientific models, the
consultation of natural scientists and engineers, and cost-benefits analyses (Colten 2017). For
residents from small coastal communities, the results of these bureaucratic decision making
processes favoring investment in, and protection of, more densely populated and economically
valuable areas like New Orleans. To many of the residents I worked with living in rural coastal
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areas, these decisions reflect the notion that their lives and communities are of little value to the
rest of Louisiana. CPRA has faced this critique often alongside regular frustration with their
lackadaisical approach to public outreach and community engagement.
Residents from these coastal communities are keenly aware that their voices and opinions
count for little when it comes to state-wide coastal planning. "They've [CPRA or the US Army
Corps] already made their decisions," residents often say. Public meetings, in this regard are just
"checking the box." This was especially the case for frontline communities like those in
Plaquemines Parish which, according to the cost benefits analysis of state planners, are too small
and geographically isolated to invest large amounts of resources into to fortify them against
persistent coastal flooding. They are the communities that live outside the floodwalls, bitter
physical reminders that land loss, and the risk that accompanies it, is uniquely their problem.
As the predictions of hydrological models show the limited capacity and cost
effectiveness of environmental projects for communities in low-lying, rural coastal areas, FFL
and the Louisiana Office of Community Development (OCD)63 became increasingly involved in
planning efforts to help these communities adapt to inevitable environmental change. Their work
aspires to help bayou communities confront a transition to living with land loss and do so with a
mind toward amplifying the voice of residents to dictate how they want to "transition." The goal
was to fund community development/adaptation projects for communities through "bottom-up,"
grassroots and more democratic coastal planning techniques. Groups like FFL hoped more robust
engagement and listening on the part of policymakers and planners could encourage the most
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vulnerable coastal communities to feel empowered towards making decisions about how they
want to adapt to the increasing risks sinking land and rising seas pose to their homes and lives.
Planners dubbed these new local-level efforts a co-design process, which they described
as a means to develop "community centered solutions that empower residents to plan for
themselves how to adapt to the changing landscape" (FFL 2016).64 Their approach planning for
land loss - or "future environments" and "adaptation," as FFL called it - got its start in
Plaquemines Parish in the spring of 2016. It was spearheaded by FFL, New Orleans based
community planning and design firm Concordia, and a host of environmental groups from the
New Orleans area. Bolstered by grants from several foundations, including the Walton Family
Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, planners set out to integrate principles of direct
democracy into tailoring a parish specific adaptation plan for Plaquemines. Positioning
themselves as the ideal go-between among state and community groups, FFL began carving-out
its reputation for expertise in meaningful and robust community engagement aimed at cultivating
equity in an otherwise unequal political environment for coastal projects and funding.
Plaquemines stood at the center of their experiment.

Plaquemines as a laboratory for resilience
The pilots of each of FFL's programs were held in Plaquemines Parish. With one of the
highest water to land ratios across the coast, Plaquemines is projected to lose up to 55% of its
coastal marshland over the next fifty years in the event that anticipated coastal restoration
projects are not built (CPRA 2016).65 For places like Plaquemines Parish, largely out of federal
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hurricane and flood protection levees, projected flood inundation over the next 50-100 years
anticipates anywhere from 3 to over 14 feet of flooding (CPRA 2017). Living with the risk of
inundation is nothing new for most of these communities, though. Neither is a persistent
frustration and fear that they are and will continue to be literally (physically) cut-off from the rest
of Louisiana coast by the placement of levees and anticipated destruction of tropical storms. This
is a fervent concern for residents who look at the siting of the post-Katrina 100-year storm
protection floodwall in the northern most city of Belle Chasse and location for two large river
sediment diversions in the southern part of the parish as clear indication the lower end of the
parish will be sacrificed to save the more valuable resources and communities, like New Orleans,
to the north.
Predictions for losing Plaquemines Parish to coastal subsidence go back to the late 1960s
(Gagliano 1972) but have ramped-up since many of the predictive models used by CPRA to vet
protection and restoration projects produced grim predictions of flood inundation levels for
Plaquemines. "It’s [Plaquemines] the parish that represents what will happen in other parishes
fifty years from now" one of the planners noted to me as we reflected on the process during one
FFL facilitated meeting. "There is [also] controversy over restoration projects [sediment
diversions] and it's [Plaquemines] the central point of ecological disaster. It was hardest hit and it
will continue to be hit hardest, and has some of the highest flood risks across the coast."
Plaquemines' vulnerability and the assumption on the part of planners that residents in
Plaquemines are in denial about their environment risks because they chose to stay there, made it
particularly appealing to planners as the first test site for their co-design approach planning for a
future environment defined by land loss.
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One of FFL's first goals for intervening in the coastal planning scene was to establish a
relationship with a network of small minority communities in Plaquemines alongside designing a
methodology for coastal planning that produce a community driven plan for coastal
development/adaptation.66 In early 2016, FFL launched a series of programs and partnerships.
These coalesced as three separate but inter-related efforts. The first two: the Plaquemines Parish
Resiliency Planning Process and Louisiana Strategic Adaptations for Future Environments (LA
SAFE). The former, a pilot project for the latter, were both parish level adaptation planning
projects that sought to develop a grassroots framework for coastal planning projects that could
amplify the needs and desires of local residents. The third program, LEAD the Coast (hereafter
LEAD), was a leadership training program that provided environmental education and political
organizing training to coastal residents, many of whom were directly involved in the former
parish wide planning adaptation process.
With an eye towards having the tough conversations about coastal land loss, FFL and
their partners, environmental groups and community planning firms, wasted no time getting
started. By the time of the first meeting in early summer, FFL had established a remarkable
rolodex of parish leadership. This was thanks to Chad, a homegrown environmental
conservationist who had a passion for saving the coast and significant social connections in the
parish. FFL were also introduced to residents in the community by Mary Ann, one of a handful
of black female leaders in the parish, who was motivated by the promise of having a more direct
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role in shaping the policies and funding priorities of new coastal projects focused on helping her
parish.
Not long after the first core committee meetings with academics and community leaders
like Chad and Mary Ann from Plaquemines, FFL hosted their first two community meetings
under the title of the Plaquemines Parish Resiliency Planning Process. These meetings focused
on developing a framework for engaging parish residents in a shared coastal planning effort. This
encompassed working with a select group of invited parish residents, approximately sixty, to
discuss the best strategies for community engagement in the parish and what some of the
impediments to previous parish wide planning projects were. Chad was kind enough to invite me
to these first, semi-public meetings.
Sitting around numerous round-tables with maps, Post-It notes, and short surveys, each
breakout group responded to questions such as: What does building trust mean to you? What
does engagement look like and how can we achieve it? How can we be inclusive? What does
organizing from the bottom-up mean to you? What is informed participation? And what are key
knowledge gaps?
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Image 23: Youth participants at the first Plaquemines Parish Resiliency Planning Process (photo by author).

Facilitators took notes and encouraged the residents to write their responses on large
butcher paper that outlined the questions. Participant responses represented a range of
experiences with bureaucratic processes in the parish that left many of them feeling transparency
and building trust was a challenge that had yet to be achieved for efforts like adaptation
planning. At the table I sat with there was significant concerned voiced by leadership from
several black women that the history of racism in the parish is important to acknowledge but
largely ignored by parish officials and other planners. The history and presence of the parish's
indigenous communities is often overlooked, too, by local and state projects or the allocation of
resources, they emphasized. When prompted to talk specifically about environmental issues
others participants, along with these women, voiced concern about the uneven impacts of land
restoration projects like diversions on poorer and less politically powerful communities in
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addition to fishermen. This was a particularly pressing concern for leaders from one of the local,
non-federally recognized tribal communities - the Grand Bayou Atakapa Tribe - who live
eroding ridges in Barataria Bay. Their homes are only accessible by boat. Land loss and storms
have encroached on their community at a rapid pace over the last thirty years (Bethel 2010).
The second meeting presented a series of information stations to participants. Attendance
was significantly down at this meeting. The stations consisted of storytelling stations that
outlined how land loss unfolded over time. Another station displayed a series of FEMA flood
maps and projected storm inundation risks over the next fifty years. The accuracy of these maps
was debated among the participants in my group, reflecting the sense that official maps of flood
risk do not map easily onto residents' perceptions of risk for their homes. When some of the
youth in our group asked why certain areas of the parish had better levee protection than others
our facilitators left it to the adult residents to explain that those decisions were made by the
Corps. The final station was more interactive rather than educative. Called "the cone of
uncertainty," the facilitators asked participants to define what they understand as valuable from a
list of several possibilities - schools, government, homes, culture, economy etc. - and locate them
on a ten to seventy year timeline that was juxtaposed on a second axis between "we" and "me."
This latter scaling exercise was meant to prompt participants to distinguish between their
personal values and what they think is best for the community. It was a technique to try to
narrow down what priorities are for residents when they are faced with decisions wherein they
cannot value everything equally. Some residents balked at the schematic, how could housing and
schools be valued separately? Why do we have to choose? The facilitators patiently listened as
residents made their cases for why certain issues needed to be prioritized over others or if more
than one things needed to be prioritized.
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These two pilot meetings encompassed several of the key strategies planners infused into
their self-described bottom-up, listening centered approach to coastal planning. These included:
education on delta geomorphology and flood risk; brainstorming, then prioritization; robust
documentation of resident input; and strategic efforts to bring minority voices to the planning
process. Through these efforts planners aimed to cultivate more resilient and empowered coastal
citizens that could "continue to prosper" in the face of land loss (FFL 2016).
Planners also framed the process within a wider set of goals to develop a replicable,
exportable model for resilience planning. As was often emphasized in these first leadership and
planning meetings hosted by FFL and their partners, coastal Louisiana was a laboratory for the
world not only for techno-scientific innovation to combat land loss, but developing more
democratic processes for shaping the relationship between changing landscapes, state
institutions, and vulnerable residents. Louisiana, in other words would be a laboratory for
empowering residents to define how they want to live with land loss.

Cultivating resilience: Co-design, self-governance, and the new ecologies of expertise
The combination of efforts to re-design bureaucratic planning processes and educate
coastal residents about climate change and political organizing was a unique characteristic of
planners' efforts. These approaches to climate change and disaster planning in coastal Louisiana
reflected a shift in funding priorities for disaster mitigation at the national level aimed at
retrofitting disaster response from mitigation of past impacts to adaptation and resilience
planning. This transition was largely introduced by the influence of the Rockefeller Foundation
on the HUD funded Rebuild by Design competition for New York and New Jersey, which was
generated in the wake of the unexpected devastation wrought by Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The
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emergence of resilience planning encompassed two primary changes compared to older disaster
response projects: first, rebuilding with an eye towards enabling communities and their
infrastructures to become resilient to future climate change risks, as opposed to merely
rebuilding in the same ways (reproducing the same vulnerabilities); and second, towards
widening the pool of expertise for developing rebuilding plans (Collier et al. 2016, Bisker et al.
2015). Instead of disaster response, resilience planning reflected an increasing awareness of the
need for municipalities to change the way they live with, as opposed to mitigate from, anticipated
impacts of climate change. That is, to reimage how communities collectively plan for climate
change and their attendant social and economic transformations. The resulting grant competition,
the National Disaster Resilience Competition, took the form of a design competition and
awarded $1 billion dollars towards state, local, and tribal groups around the U.S. who sent in
proposals to fund local resilience initiatives. Louisiana won several of the NDRC awards, with
approximately $40 million going towards the development of the LA SAFE (Louisiana Strategic
Adaptations for Future Environments) community planning process facilitated by the Louisiana
Office of Community Development (OCD) and FFL for six coastal communities, including
Plaquemines Parish. The LEAD program, rolled-out a few months later, served as a way to
recruit local facilitators to help bring coastal communities to LA SAFE planning meetings. This
co-design process was described to residents in Plaquemines as a means to develop "community
centered solutions that empower residents to plan for themselves how to adapt to the changing
landscape."67 It was not only premised on the idea of more robust community engagement but recasting residents as experts, whose knowledge and input at planning meetings was held on the
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same playing field as more traditional scientific and bureaucratic experts. In this regard, codesign appears ideologically as a critique of the exclusivity of expertise while, at the same time,
reinforcing the power of expertise as a tool for apolitical, non-partisan planning.

The promise of co-design
The idea of a co-design or co-planning process, as defined by FFL and their partners,
draws on the notion that listening to the "wisdom of the crowd," as planners often said at
meetings, produces better solutions to pressing problems than a room full of (scientific) experts.
The planning team developed this approach for Plaquemines from a selection of literature in the
social sciences on for-profit consumption practices that find incorporating the perspective of end
users (consumers) into product design gives companies and edge on their competition. That is,
consumers are more likely to be satisfied with the end product if they are involved in its creation
from the beginning, as opposed to only being consulted after the product is produced (Cea and
Rimington 2017, 101). With more people, planners explained, errors among the crowd will
cancel each other out, leaving only the most accurate information. The framework planners drew
from also emphasized the roots of co-design in civil rights and social justice organizing
principles intended not only to make better outcomes but address power inequalities and citizen
empowerment in practices of allocating philanthropic funds or urban planning projects (Cea and
Rimington 2017).
This two pronged history of co-design oriented at once towards product design and social
justice was mobilized by planners in coastal Louisiana as a means of democratizing the process
of planning to produce a plan that residents, in theory, had ownership over. Inclusivity, in this
regard, achieves a social and political goal of amplifying voices, particularly of residents who are
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politically marginalized due to geography, class, race or other forms of political inequality. For
planners, this approach stood in stark contrast to traditional planning practices with a selfgoverning process that cultivates self-determination on the part of coastal communities.
Though the histories from which the co-design process draws might, on the surface,
reflect similar goals and methods, their ideological foundations for inclusivity are quite distinct.
One is grounded in capitalist accumulation and focused on making a more profitable or better
product. The other has its roots in civil rights organizing and principles and situates inclusivity as
a route towards deconstructing persistent social, economic and political inequalities in society.
The latter is particularly poignant in Plaquemines, where legacies of staunch racial inequality
entrenched by management of land and natural resources continues to manifest in conversations
about where and how projects to protect residents from rising seas will be built (see chapters two
and four).
The relationships between these two tacks of co-design planning were complicated for
planners working in Plaquemines. In parish wide planning efforts like the LA SAFE program,
distinctions between buy-in and social justice were largely absent, reflecting the sense that
community empowerment and a sense of ownership over the plan could be achieved through an
extensive engagement processes. In this regard, engagement was equated with enhancing the
democratic processes, opening-up the field of political power to residents who do not necessarily
hold government positions or traditional coastal and climate change expertise.
Invoking the language of expertise was one of the key ways, at least rhetorically, planners
came to envision their process as commensurate with direct democracy and self-governance.
What they solicit at meetings is not public comment but expertise which, from the perspective of
planners, would enable them to produce a better final product: a coastal adaptation plan suffuse
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with the values and ideas of residents, not bureaucrats or scientists. “You’re the experts, not us,”
Jenny, one of lead planners, emphasized to residents attending the first Plaquemines planning
meetings.68 FLL and their collaborators emphasized that they were there for guidance but not as
decision makers. The axis of power thus hinged on re-casting public participation as expert
consultation, to a certain extent. Opening up the field of expertise is what set planners' efforts
apart from projects like the Coastal Master Plan which largely left the coastal areas that LA
SAFE and FFL targeted out of possible protection projects. The state and their experts, in other
words, had shortchanged the most environmentally vulnerable citizens. In the face of this, FFL
and their partners aimed to repair this strained relationship between coastal planners and coastal
citizens through leveraging their work as directly serving these communities and re-casting them
as experts, not victims, of land loss through restoring their political power in the planning
process.

Resilience, inequality, and citizenship
Critical approaches to resilience thinking often point to its resonance with neoliberal
forms of governance that focus on the individual and community as the locus of political
transformation as opposed to wider political and economic structures that shape political
subjectivities (MacKinnon and Derickson 2013). Resilience as a political and regional planning
project has its roots in ecology and systems theory, where it refers to the ability of an ecological
system absorb and recover from a shock and reassume its normal function (Holling 1973, Walker
and Salt 2012). While a relatively useful concept for delineating the interconnected relationships
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between biological systems and species in the natural world, its transference to political and
human worlds has often been messy. As a framework for analyzing social relations, it is
frequently deemed conservative because of its overt concentration on retaining the status quo - or
the existing ecosystem of social and political relations (MacKinnon and Derickson 2013, Walker
and Cooper 2011).
Its transference to resilience thinking and practice by city planners or federal agencies
like HUD has resulted in a singular focus on mitigating risk and securitization against
environmental hazards that would disrupt social and economic relations. Critical scholarship on
resilience thinking emanating from the social sciences vehemently critiques the unproblematic
stance resilience practice and thinking neglects when defining what the terms of resilience mean
for the communities their planning efforts serve. The most poignant critique scholars raise is that
resilience thinking fails to interrogate or attempt to dismantle the power structures that produce
the uneven social vulnerabilities associated with climate change. That is, the processes by which
individuals and communities set-up to become vulnerable to hurricanes, floods, or land loss in
the first place. Resilience or capacity to adapt to climate change, in this regard, is emblematic of
the post-political world of climate change governance. This is because it does not attempt to
radically transform existing power structures and, instead, focuses on the individual or
community to figure out how to adapt to unfolding environmental changes (and risks) around
them (Swyngedouw 2009). Such an uncritical, apolitical approach to resilience thinking is
reflected in the ways scientific expertise, in particular, is largely framed by policymakers as an
uncontested framework through which to shape policies regulating the relationships between
people and volatile environments. Following this line of thinking, because environmental risks
are conceptualized as uncontrollable, individuals and communities become the target of reform
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or adaptation to environmental changes as opposed to economic or environmental governance
structures that sustain geographic, economic, and political inequalities that are exacerbated by
weather events and climate change.
Recent ethnographic work examining urban sustainability initiatives and environmental
restoration projects echo these critiques, documenting how restoration and sustainability
practices manifest as predominately top-down strategies. Outlined by urban or regional
authorities, individual citizens are subject to and enrolled within these processes without any real
power to define the frameworks through which resilience is conceptualized or made (Checker
2011, Maldonado 2014, Cattelino 2015). This is particularly problematic in light of the fact that
many of the most vulnerable individuals and groups around the world are disproportionately
exposed to environmental risks due to climate change are overwhelming poor, people of color,
and largely politically disempowered (Nixon 2013). As these scholars have pointed out in their
research, such an uncritical application of resilience to society and ecological restoration projects
privileges scientific rationality over social needs, resulting in social difference and inequality
becoming “glossed over” (MacKinnon and Derickson 2013, 258). Moreover, it conflates
environmental risk with social vulnerability to the extent that relationships to the environment
become the target for policy and social transformation to address uneven distribution of risk as
opposed to the historic and persistent unequal distribution of economic resources or political
power, each of which shapes environmental policies (Checker 2011, Cattelino 2015).
Resilience thinking writ-large, as critical geographers have pointed out, is “imbued with
notions of individual self-reliance and triumph over adversity” (MacKinnon and Derickson 2013,
259) that echo other forms of neoliberal governance that inevitably put the onus of
being/becoming resilient on the part of the individual or small community. Ultimately, resilience
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thinking divorces the process of political subject making from the state and, instead, reframes
claims of citizenship and belonging through the language of vulnerability and adaptation that is
the responsibility of the at-risk subject or community. Such a move inflects with a broader body
of scholarship on citizenship that traces the ways claims of political belonging in the context of
globalization are increasingly less about an individual's relationship to the state and, instead,
dependent on citizens become abject - sick or vulnerable - in order to invoke their rights (Ticktin
2006, Thomas and Clarke 2013).
This body of work argues that non-state centered discourses of belonging that appeal to
seeming universal concepts like care and moral/ethnical obligations that exceed or stand apart
from the state often manages to sustain and further entrench economic and racial inequalities
around the world. Scholars ethnographically analyzing how non-rights based forms of citizenship
taking hold under the guises of humanitarianism, biology, and inclusivity argue that deviation
from a rights-based discourse of citizenship attached to the state often unintentionally
exacerbates mechanisms of racial inequality, political exclusion and bodily harm (Maskovsky
2006, Ticktin 2006). As rights-based discourses of citizenship are supplanted with humanitarian
or multicultural frameworks for belonging, inequalities among groups seeking political
recognition and rights are magnified (Hale 2005, Thomas and Clarke 2013). Political subjects
find themselves cast not as citizens that demand and are entitled to certain political rights, but as
refugees from political turmoil, poverty, or environmental catastrophe. This has increasingly
become the public depiction of some of coastal Louisiana’s Native American communities,
which the New York Times declared in 2016 as "America's first climate refugees."69 Such
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frameworks within the broader context of globalization and specifically in resilience theory tend
to “normalizes the uneven effects of neoliberal governance and invigorates the trope of
individual responsibility with a renewed 'community' twist” (MacKinnon and Dericksen 2013,
262, Walker and Cooper 2011).
In the absence of a state-centered rights framework that can define and enforce claims for
citizenship and care on behalf of citizens, access to the market and capital more broadly become
the means by which social belonging and well-being can be cultivated in the face of climate
change. Environmental anthropologists have called this "adaptation privilege," pointing to the
ways resilience and climate adaptation policies are limited in their accessibility to historically
marginalized groups and work to reinforce structure inequalities along racial and class lines as
opposed to rectifying them (Marino 2018). This is particularly the case in landscapes deeply
shaped by colonial encounters that have now become ground zero for experiments in climate
change adaptation (Hardy et al. 2017, Maldonado 2018).
Such work reflects the broader challenge racialized and other minorities groups face
when trying to claim rights within a neoliberal, multicultural framework for climate change
adaptation that at once embraces racial and cultural difference as significant in social sense yet
rejects them as foundations upon which to grant certain political rights, such as sovereignty and
reparations, that would transform relationships to land and governing bodies.70 The notion that
everyone is equally impacted by global climate change - we are all in this together - obfuscates
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the fact that the vulnerabilities that accompany climate change does not impact all groups equally
(Thomas and Clarke 2013). As such, the existing conditions of racial and economic inequality
are ignored or subsumed within broader appeals of resilience and adaptation planning to a shared
experience with environmental risk that offers little in the way of confronting the economic and
political conditions that produce vulnerable citizens in the first place. Instead, the object of
resilience governance is the values, behaviors, and attitudes of vulnerable individuals and
communities, not state apparatus of state/sovereign power that make "bouncing back" a
challenge for some communities and not others (Chandler 2013).71 Instead of addressing long
standing structural inequalities and the political systems that produce them, resilience thinking
frames “communities of the 'vulnerable' [as in need of] empowerment and capability building to
overcome conflict, underdevelopment, or climate fluctuations” (Chandler 2013, 222).
This is an important departure from what scholars have theorized as environmentality:
forms of political belonging that seek to internalize individual subjects’ relationship to the
environment through particular forms of governance enacted by the state (Agarwal 2005). To be
sure, resilience thinking is certainly attempting to craft new relationships between people and the
environment and is highly circumscribed by institutions of scientific expertise. But unlike the
practices of environmental governance tracked by Agarwal (2005) and others who examine the
ways state governing practices craft new forms of environmental subject formation, specifically
environmental stewardship or caring for the environment (see also Singh 2013), resilience is less
about care for the environment or transforming the ways citizens interact with the environment.
Rather, resilience calls forth a reconfiguration of the self/citizen in the face inevitable climate
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change; one in which the vulnerable/at-risk citizen is confronted with the imperative, not choice,
to adapt.
In the context of coastal planning processes in Louisiana, this took the form of an
approach to co-design framed at the meta-level with the inevitability of land loss, which is a fact
of life for the future of Plaquemines. As such, sediment is no longer a solution to land loss (even
if CPRA still pursues its). Rather, political organizing and co-design become the way to confront
a future where land loss is no longer a question or problem that might be resolved or restored.
Thus, becoming resilient coastal citizens entails transforming residents into new land loss
citizens that are equipped to confront challenges of the future ahead. The question that remains
is: can this approach to adaptation planning overcome the shortcomings critics of point out?

Designing new land loss citizens
Resilience frameworks, like those in coastal Louisiana, to a certain extent, perform the
seemingly apolitical relationships between the state, residents, and climate change outlined by
critical takes on resilience and neoliberal, multicultural forms of citizenship. This is reflected
most strikingly by the fact that NGO groups like FFL take the lead on new forms of coastal
planning independently and in partnership with the Louisiana State Office of Community
Development (OCD). In both their parish-wide planning efforts with LA SAFE and their
targeted training sessions with smaller cohorts of LEAD trainees, FFL and their partners center
their pedagogy on outreach and community engagement. Being able to visit the small coastal
towns too far away for state officials to venture to, seeking out minority communities that are
barely represented in public meetings for state and federal projects, and educating residents about
climate change is Louisiana were cornerstones of resilience planning and training efforts.
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Overall, FFL and their partner's goals are to focus equally on regional planning and retooling residents’ understanding and affective relationship to land loss. “We’re the ones who go
in and have the tough conversations,” one member of the FFL organizing team described to me
reflecting on the process. “And people are ready to have those tough conversations.” Mediating
those tough conversations meant not only reaching out to a wider variety of citizen-experts, but
also making citizen-experts. Environmental education, in particular, was a crucial aspect of all of
their projects. Thus, one of the key aspect of being a resilient citizen is becoming knowledgeable
about the causes and realities of the coastal land loss crisis and, most importantly, becoming a
community leader that can communicate that knowledge to diverse and geographically disparate
coastal communities.
Indeed, planners recognized that the facts of climate change and adaptation might only
stand a chance of being understood meaningfully by residents in coastal areas if that knowledge
was communicated by other residents.
"You can't tell them a scientist said this or that about climate change," one of the trainers
from the LEAD sessions told us. "It has to be your knowledge. Only then will people listen to
you and perhaps trust your knowledge."
The effort re-code expertise, in this way, entailed residents using their deeper social
relationships and personal connections to residents to make what could seem to be distant and
combative environmental knowledge familiar and thus believable. Residents would have to
understand and trust the underlying physical processes at hand before they would be open to
taking certain adaptation strategies, such as relocation, seriously. And this is a process
individuals and small communities undertake.
Making new land loss citizens also entailed a commitment to regular attendance and, in
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some cases, facilitation of public meetings for developing coastal adaptation plans.
Understanding the ins and outs of political structures and how legislation on coastal matters is
made were key topics planners often elaborated upon during planning or leadership training
sessions. Alongside this, learning tactics for grassroots community organizing was particularly
important for planners to cultivate in trainees and residents who attended their public meetings.
Planners would often do their best to lead by example in this regard: running larger meetings as
small group discussions with interactive materials and engaging facilitators who took grain pains
to document resident input.
These techniques became most legible in the LEAD training sessions, which hone-in
specifically on four primary topics: environmental education, political advocacy, community
organizing, and a latter category, climate justice, that was often missing from larger adaptation
planning meetings.

Making coastal leaders
"How did we get here?"
This was the opening question for the first day of our LEAD the coast session. Around
the table at Roscoe's Kitchen in northern Plaquemines Parish that morning were about twelve
individuals from Plaquemines and adjacent parishes. Several of them were familiar faces, people
who I had met from other coastal work in the parish. Mary Ann was there, which was no
surprise. As a woman who is a key leader in the predominately African American lower east
bank area of Plaquemines Parish, she has recently been drawn into the networks of numerous
environmental NGOs as representative of the minority experience from the coast. She is
outgoing, vocal, and willing to put in the time to go to what seem like endless meetings with
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groups from New Orleans to Baton Rouge in order to make sure her community is represented in
environmental planning processes. Since FFL first decided to use Plaquemines as a test case for
their methods, she has been at the table as a semi-frequent collaborator.
Chad was also there, as were my friends Tricia and Kelly, who I introduced to Chad a
few months earlier. Both are young black women who grew-up in Plaquemines. Tricia, in
particular, had experience working in alliances with several other indigenous and African
American environmental justice groups, which made the setting feel a bit familiar to her.
Unbeknownst to me at first, Chad had personally reached out to them to invite them to
participate in training. Acknowledging that they understood that part of the reason why Chad
sought them out personally was because FFL wanted to be connected to the black community,
they insisted I attend the training as well to see how things would "play out."
Our training, the organizers described, would be focused on education about coastal land
loss and learning what they call "soft skills" - tactics for engaging with, negotiating and listening
to audiences ranging from elected officials to long time neighbors. As FFL describes: "LEAD the
Coast was developed to enhance local capacity and recognize the thought leadership, traditional
knowledge, and valuable input that exists within a community. It is an opportunity for residents
to become more informed about their future as it relates to coastal land loss and to become an
organizer and facilitator around conversations related to this within their communities (FFL
2017)."
The organizers relied on partners from local environmental non-profits, universities, and
the CPRA and OCD to achieve these goals through a series of presentations scheduled over the
sessions. The key for training sessions was to make sure participants were armed with accurate
information about coastal land loss and restoration plans and to give them the tools they need to
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be community leaders on these topics in their hometowns and parishes. Before the first
presentation began we were given a schedule of presentations for the day and a binder to compile
our notes and materials from the sessions.
We heard first from a representative from CPRA. He explained that the Corps built
levees around the river, disrupting the natural cycle of land growth and subsidence by funneling
all the river's sediment past deltaic lands and out to the Gulf of Mexico. On the projector, we saw
slides of wetland deterioration over time and a striking map of solid land to wetlands in the state.
While one of the guest presenters from the back of the room made the note that the distribution
of solid ground, concentrated around old tributaries of the Mississippi River along finger bayous
reaching out to Gulf of Mexico, has not changed much since the 1930s, certainly the rapid loss of
wetlands is cause for alarm. Many of the participants in the room expressed shock later in the
meeting that the land loss situation was that bad. “I never even knew,” one woman noted.
After speaking at length about the origins of the land loss problem, he turned our
attention to solutions: Sediment. The Master Plan, he went on to say, "is all about sediment." We
know that the levees have a negative impact on the region’s geomorphology and we know
subsidence will continue. That is why the state is so focused on sediment. We pump sediment
and are developing more projects to get sediment back into the wetlands. “Sediment is the
answer,” he affirmed.
Mary Ann chimed in with a question at this point.
"I love all of this and learning more about what you are doing to save our coast," she
emphasized. “But what are you doing for the east bank of Plaquemines Parish? I understand you
are protecting everybody else, but what about us? I see that wall every day, I see it right here.”
What Mary Ann referred to was the twenty-one foot high flood wall that bisects Highway
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39, the only road in and out of the communities on the last reaches of the east bank of the
Mississippi River. It rests at the St. Bernard - Plaquemines Parish line and ties into the larger
Hurricane Risk Reduction system built by the Corps of the Engineers in the decade following
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 that encircles the greater New Orleans area inside 133 miles of
floodwalls, levees, and storm surge barriers. In response, he told Mary Ann she has the
Caernarvon river diversion project, which is helping to protect her community by building new
land from sediment diverted from the river. But at the mention of Caernarvon Mary Ann invokes
the worries of fishermen in her community, telling the presenter from CPRA that the diversion is
killing the oyster beds and livelihoods of people from her community.
“That is a misnomer,” he replied in a snappy tone and slightly raising his voice. “If you
look at the science,” he went on to say, it is not the cause of the oyster beds dying off.
“I didn’t say it was the cause” Mary Ann retorted. “I just said it was a problem.”
But her counterpart was already in defense mode. He emphasized that many oystermen
had asked for river diversions to help sustain the estuary with enough freshwater to keep salinity
levels at the ideal balance to cultivate oysters. “I know,” Mary Ann acknowledge, but she
continued to press on to voice her perspective.
“I see everything is being done opposite of what needs to be done. How long is it going
to take before we have no land over there and we gotta move over here? I can tell you that ain’t
happening.”
Her comment got a few laughs and prompted him to emphasize that he could bring a
panel of scientists in to discuss the actual impacts of diversions.
“We’re trying to save everyone from the Texas coast to the Mississippi River,” he
retorted, getting more visibly upset. He complained about how CPRA’s work is constantly
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misrepresented by local politicians and the media.
"Look," Mary Ann responded, “we want everybody saved but I don't want us to be
forgotten or put on the back burner because we’re a small area and you feel like we don’t exist.
We do exist and I’m loud and I’m proud…the world barely knows Phoenix, Davant, and Pointe à
la Hache exist…it’s just when I saw that wall being built over here...it did something to me, it
really did.”
For Mary Ann, that something was a concretization of her community’s invisibility and
dispensability in relation to coastal protection. While the official from CPRA did his best to
argue that projects like river diversions are a form of protection, Mary Ann reminded him that
protection is a contested terrain that cannot be easily explained away with science and
engineering. Beyond this, though, Mary Ann invoked common language used around denoting
spatial and racial inequalities in Plaquemines Parish. Local African American historians and
residents in the parish often refer to themselves as the “forgotten people,” reflecting a shared
experience of political disempowerment and uneven distribution of resources for black
communities throughout the parish (see chapter two). While the “loud and proud” comment
clearly invokes a reference to James Brown’s “say it loud, I’m black and I’m proud,” Mary Ann
stopped short of directly invoking race. Instead, she relied on cultural referents and geographic
cues to spell out the problem of invisibility for the handful of predominately black communities
that live on the other side of “that wall.” The floodwall is another physical barrier, much as the
river is, that cuts the parish in half from north to south. In doing so, the wall reinforces historic
political and racial inequalities attached to segregationist policies that have simultaneously used
racist ideologists and environmental features to normalize racial and economic inequalities, and
now environmental vulnerabilities, in Plaquemines Parish.
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Before things became too heated, another guest from a local environmental organization
cut in to note that we’d have plenty more time over the coming weeks to discuss restoration and
protection projects.

You're here because it's not okay
After going through the causes of coastal land loss, projects for restoring the coast, and
outlining the political terrain of governmental and non-governmental organizations at our first
meetings, FFL brought in an anthropologist from Tulane with experience in qualitative research
methods to lead us through how to begin having tough conversations in our communities on land
loss.
Jennifer, our presenter, dove in quickly. “What is the hardest thing about facilitating a
meeting?” Acknowledging the fact that many of the attendees in the meeting were already
veterans at leading community meetings, many had ample experiences to share. “People who
take up too much space,” one participant said. “Or those that are too quiet” another chimed in.
“Or that they won’t come back.”
“I have two rules when I facilitate" Jennifer noted, moving at a rather fast clip. "The first,
it’s not about you. It’s about what your community thinks is important, not you. And second,
never facilitate alone.” And active listening, she emphasized, “is absolutely key.”
She paired us off and asked us to spend two minutes telling a story to our partners, with
the listener never interrupting the storyteller. At this point the crowd became more convivial,
both because we were finally given a space to talk and because many had insights and stories to
tell about the struggles of facilitating meetings. I was paired with Mary Ann.
For two minutes she told me about how she was thrown into the mix about coastal
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restoration her community. “I didn’t know about it until a pastor from my church introduced me
to it [but now] seeing our kids and not knowing if they might not have a future or a place to
live…and that these levees could fail at any time…I just didn’t know what was going on…but
it’s the youth that drives me.”
“Stop!” Jennifer yelled after the two minutes was up. “Take a minute to evaluate your
partner who was listening. How did you know?” People around the described eye contact (but
not too much), head nodding, and leaning in as visual cues for a good listener. “Above all do not
interrupt someone.”
Satisfied with the first round of short partners interviews she moved on towards
strategizing for what to do in certain difficult moments: What to do when someone cries, what to
do if someone says climate change is not real, and what to do if someone demands to know who
is paying us or what our political platform is? Her transitions were rather abrupt but the group
followed along. Jennifer prefaced her comment about the crying person as an experience she had
when conducting a focus group about hurricane Katrina.
“I thought I threw out a low ball question about family and all the sudden he started
crying. It was my first question in an hour and half focus group. It may happen. And even though
this is science that we’re learning, it’s real personal. It’s really personal. So somebody might
really cry, or get upset, or walk out of the room. So what are some strategies that might work?”
“Tell them it’s okay…. acknowledge that it is okay to cry” one woman said. “Excellent,”
Jennifer responded. “And here’s what you’re not going to say to them…It’ll be ok. It’ll be fine.
Those are words you are never going to say. You’re here because it’s not. So it’s okay to cry but
it’s not going to be ok”
“Can I say I relate to your pain?” Mary Ann threw out after Jennifer’s response.
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"Maybe," Jennifer said, clearly a bit hesitant to qualify her instructions. From here the
group went back and forth about when it would be appropriate to invoke a shared experience.
Jennifer qualified and said that would depend on the judgement of the facilitator, but even in
acknowledging shared experiences, the facilitator should not forget that the conversation is still
not about themselves but the people at the meeting. “As long as you don’t tell your story…and
it’s still about them.”
Moving forward Jennifer asked the group what they would do if someone in a meeting
said, “you know what, I just don’t believe in climate change?"
“I’d say they are entitled to that opinion,” one member of the group chimed in.
“Okay, maybe” Jennifer replied, “you’re not going to challenge them.” Others debated to
what extent they should try to persuade the hypothetical climate change denier that their
perspective is wrong.
“Ultimately you’ll have to build a relationship with that person over time so they can
trust your knowledge. That’s the way. Because if you just say, here let me give you what every
scientists says they are not going to be convinced.”
From dealing with tough topics we transitioned to talking about inequality, specifically
racial inequality and climate justice, as an important aspect of our training. The presenter, Laura,
already knew several folks in the room. She is a lawyer and community activist whose work has
focused the impacts of environmental disasters on communities of color. She was the only
person of color trainer over the course of the sessions. “I just put race right out in front,” she said
as she began. “It’s what we talk about in the Gulf South.” She situated land loss in the context of
a longer history of racism and resource extraction. Race is enshrined in the law, she explained,
and revealed in existing structures of wealth inequality in the US and ecological inequality. The
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latter part, ecological inequality, is key to understand for communities living on the front lines of
climate change.
Up until this point in the training, the sessions only danced around the idea of inequality.
Laura was the first presenter to give us a framework for thinking about race and coastal issues.
The key for her is a larger societal dependency on natural resource extraction going all the way
back to slavery, an early form of resource extraction. Understanding the relationship to land loss
and histories of colonialism, slavery, and our society's current reliance on oil in south Louisiana
was a key point of her presentation.
“Land loss is a symptom, not a cause, of racism, capitalism, and white supremacy,” she
said in a loud voice that projected across the room. "And because land loss is a symptom of
racism," she went on to say, "the solution to land loss does not solely rest within the realm of
science and engineering." Distancing herself from the language of deltaic processes and political
advocacy, Laura advised the trainees to recognize that the state’s Master Plan may not explicitly
confront questions about race in actual language, but it is nevertheless tied to the longer history
of racism and resource extraction in south Louisiana. Her broader point was that even if the
scientists and policymakers do not say race, race and racism is still an aspect of the histories that
inform the present and future of the coast.
Laura’s focus on ecological equity created many head nods and excited note taking
around the room. Situating racism and capitalist natural resource extraction as the root of climate
change struck a chord with several participants in the room. One woman from a local indigenous
community noted how this process of “connecting the dots” was overwhelming but so important
for her to understand what climate justice, and climate change moreover, encompasses. The point
of this session, Laura re-iterated, was to show that “those the least responsible for the climate
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crisis are going to feel the effects the greatest.”
“I’m the one they bring in to talk about race and the other hard stuff,” Laura reminded us,
laughing a bit. Race and racism is there whether or not we want to acknowledge it, she reminded
everyone. "If it makes people uncomfortable we need to push through that," she encouraged.
“Because we have nothing to lose...at this point you gotta go down swinging. And we might as
well be swinging with some real information and some real knowledge.”

Democratizing expertise and confronting difference
To be sure, FFL's approach to using design processes as a mechanism for coastal
planning banks on the notion that intensive community participation is a means towards
achieving more democratic coastal policies. This is first and foremost about inclusion and
assumes that the more voices at the table the more likely the outcome will reflect the collective
values of participants. Such an approach, as some scholars have argued might not necessarily
create the best outcomes for the environment (Lazar 2008), yet seemingly opens the door for
residents to have their voices heard in a meaningful way.
Yet planners run the risk of assuming that inclusivity and self-governance or direct
democracy is inherently the same processes, carrying the same goals. As governing practices
aimed at transforming political systems, enhancing democratic participation is not only about
making sure everyone has a voice, but addressing systemic problems within governing
structures, typically those that sustain political and economic inequalities among groups (Polletta
2002). Such practices are about political transformation, not necessarily participatory planning
that are project specific. The LEAD process, as a participatory planning process based on
principles of participatory governance that "operates beyond the state" is perhaps best
understood, as geographer Swegedouw writes, as a: "populism 'based on a politics of ‘the people
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know best’ (although the latter category remains often empty, unnamed), supported by an
assumedly neutral scientific technocracy, and advocates a direct relationship between people and
political participation. It is assumed that this will lead to a good, if not optimal, solution”
(Swyngedouw 2009). In this regard, the participatory governing and planning aspirations of
planners are evacuated of any possibility for being palpable mechanisms for political
transformation because they necessarily operate at the level of the individual, not the state, and
cease to fully elaborate the people or publics their process aspire to serve beyond geographic
locations of risk.
One way of the ways FFL and their partners attempt to overcome these limitations is by reframing the notion of expertise as a collectively shared knowledge base that residents, not
planners, have. As with design thinking informed planning processes in New York, this
redistributions and reconstitution of expertise seeks to extend some form of power within the
planning process to residents by explicitly reconfiguring the hierarchy of coastal knowledge.
Indeed, the invocation of the people's expertise was one of the ways planners attempted to
distinguish their meetings from public input sessions. Whereas an appeal to social justice and
self-governance in other urban planning or sustainability initiatives foregrounded inclusivity,
making sure minorities and less politically powerful residents were at the table, the early stages
of the LASAFE project leveraged technical and scientific authority - knowledge itself - as the
measure of enacting self-governance through their community planning efforts. To be sure, many
of the first meetings were more akin to listening sessions, where facilitators asked questions
where to hold community meetings, how to reach out to residents throughout the parish, and
what needed to happen in this new planning process in order for it to look different, and
hopefully have different outcomes, than previous coastal planning efforts.
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The rhetoric of expertise as it was mobilized to leverage citizen interest and commitment to
the planning process can be interpreted in several ways. First, it can be interpreted to reflect what
Checker (2011) describes as “the rise of technocracy, managerial governance and consensual
politics” to confront environmental issues, especially those concerning climate change (214).
That is, calling resident's experts folds them into technocratic, neoliberal practices as opposed to
challenging the capacity of these frameworks to achieve the democratic and social justice
mission planners hope to achieve.
The appeal to expertise, however, could also be interpreted as a way to destabilize the
existing technocratic order that bolsters science as an apolitical shield and mechanism through
which to craft coastal policy. That is, it could be interpreted as a challenge to apolitical science
becoming the parameters through which relationships between the state and citizens can be
realized in the era of climate change. In this regard, if citizen expertise takes on the level of
scientific expertise to dictate coastal adaptation policies there is an argument to be made that,
through the democratization of expertise, residents stand to transform their relationship to the
state and, more broadly, the environment. In this regard, they become better equipped to make
demands upon political leaders through the capacity to leverage their political desires through the
discourse of expertise. In a re-performance of state power as it pertains to neoliberal,
environmental governance, such an approach undermines the universality of scientific expertise
upon which political authority is based vis-a-vis environmental restoration projects. In doing so,
such acts underscore the highly political nature of science as it is mobilized to shape
relationships between the state, citizens, and the environment. That is, it serves as a reminder that
scientific practices and ideologies of objectivity shape political subjectivities despite their
disavowal of bias or politics.
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Many environmental anthropologists working in Louisiana and other contexts within the
U.S. and around the world have advocated strongly for the integration of traditional ecological
knowledge (TEK) into western scientific environmental knowledge, especially as it pertains to
climate change (Maldonado 2014, Cruikshank 2005, Crate 2008). In Louisiana, TEK has taken
on increasing visibility as a means for politically and geographically marginalized communities
and their academic allies to insert the knowledge and political desires of indigenous, black, and
other minority groups into state environmental planning processes. Maldonado (2014), in her
work with indigenous groups in coastal Louisiana, appeals to the notion of a "multiple
knowledge" approach to coastal planning as a means of empowering marginalized indigenous
knowledge crafting environmental policies. Other researchers in Louisiana have gone so far as to
actively collaborate with residents as paid researchers, labeling them "TEK experts," gathering
their input on coastal restoration projects and attempting to braid together traditional and
scientific expertise as a means of achieving more just restoration projects (Bethel et al. 2011,
2014).
To be sure, however, many of the residents I followed throughout the LASAFE planning
process found such appeals to transparency and community expertise to lack when it came to
finalizing pilot projects for the state to fund. Chad, who at once had been incredibly excited at
the prospect of a parish led adaptation plan, felt his social capital to be used up by planners, who
ceased to include him once they were able to get people to their meetings without Chad's help. It
went from a people's process, Chad explained to me, to being a bunch of "experts making the
plan in a back room." Chad could only describe his feeling as "bitter" after the almost two year
long process of envisioning the LASAFE program.
Mary Ann similarly had mixed experiences of sharing her expertise and social networks
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with planners. She not only attended numerous pre-planning meetings, but also recruited many
of the local youth from the east bank to participate as meeting facilitators and participants. This
was something planners from FFL welcomed, reflecting an engagement process that took into
consideration the perspectives of the youth who would inherit the problems of land loss and to
provide leadership opportunities for them. But she and the youth from the east bank began to run
aground with leadership from LASAFE early on when state officials and other planners felt that
the kids were being disrespectful to residents at meetings and generally not taking their roles as
facilitators seriously enough. While waiting for her husband to pick her up after one LASAFE
meeting in summer 2017, Mary Ann explained to me her frustration with the behind the scenes
critiques of her and the young people she brought to the meeting. She was offended that they
would consider her disrespectful and the implication that she would allow the youth to be that
way as well. She noted how the planners did not understand how much she was helping them out
by encouraging the youth to be facilitators. “They [the youth] don’t want to be here. They’re
only here because I tell them it’s important.” By the end of our conversations Mary Ann said she
was not going to bring the youth back, and indeed they did not attend another meeting after that.
“I just don’t want them exposed to that or to be treated that way,” she related. Far from
interpreting the kids' actions as disrespectful, she saw the actions of the planners as disrespectful
to her and the labor and goodwill she put into their process.

Self-advocacy
In their critique of resilience thinking, MacKinnon and Dericksen (2013) note that too
often resilience planning efforts focused on enhanced public participation continue to
subordinate the needs of individuals and communities to the greater needs of the state’s
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imperative. This circumscribes resilience as something defined by technocratic frameworks of
security for the wider population - something that ultimately needs to be actualized by individual
citizens despite the fact that it does not necessarily reflect their needs (MacKinnon and Dericksen
2013, 261). In response, they offer the concept of resourcefulness as an alternative to resilience
that can more concretely address the “uneven distribution of material resources and the
associated inability of disadvantaged groups and communities to access the levers of social
change” (263). This proposal echoes what LEAD participants would often emphasize at
meetings, “we need resources.” Those resources were diverse: the need for more jobs beyond
low wage, contingent labor, more investment in programs and activities for youth, and better
levees for communities in the southern end of the parish. Planners leading these sessions could
not promise these things, but did believe that the tactics they outlined in the training sessions
could be the valuable tools residents would need to begin organizing for those resources.
To a certain extent, these meetings were providing the tools and language for changing
existing social relations based on principals for grassroots organizing as well as the vital skill
sets to understand policymaking and political power as it relates to coastal planning. In this
sense, the hybrid approach to democratic organizing and coastal political education took vital
steps towards equipping residents with a basic set of knowledge needed to begin building more
concerted organizing efforts to amplify the needs of frontline coastal communities. To a certain
extent, LEAD could be interpreted as shifting the frame from resilience to a politics of
resourcefulness which MacKinnon and Dericksen (2013) define as: resources, skills sets and
technical knowledge, indigenous and folk knowledge, and recognition (264-265). Rather than
meetings about input, the focus on education and training opened the space for conversations
about the material resources communities need and skills they could mobilized to achieve
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cultural recognition within the broader complex of state actors. This was unique among the many
coastal meetings I attended over the course of my fieldwork.

Inclusivity as resilience
The efforts of planners in both the LASAFE and LEAD programs to confront questions of
climate justice and racial inequality head-on were largely limited. To be sure, there was a
generalized recognition of economic, geographic, and racial difference, yet in many of the spaces
organized by FFL, planners rarely spoke about racism or racial difference as something to be
confronted through coastal planning.
In many ways, the singular focus of the LASAFE program on adaptation ultimately
subsumes climate justice within its framework as a priori achieved through the co-design
process. Planners largely relied on their own political and social networks within coastal
communities in order to ensure there would be a diversity of participants at meetings. That is,
using leaders like Mary Ann from the black community or others from the Vietnamese and
Cambodian communities, to bring their constituents, and thus issues of climate justice, to the
table at meetings. As mentioned earlier, this caused a certain amount of tension between Mary
Ann and organizers when they did not see eye to eye on issues.
Relying on community liaisons like Mary Ann and others to do the work bringing diverse
voices to the table also created an interesting disproportionate representation of certain racialized
grievances over others, especially when it came down to deciding final projects for the LASAFE
program. This was most clearly elucidated in planners' relationship to the Vietnamese and
Cambodian participants in the Plaquemines LASAFE process. Planners went out of their way to
ensure all meetings had translators, even going so far as to have entirely separate meetings for
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the Vietnamese and Cambodian community. They were able to reach this community through
partnerships with other environmental NGOs who advocate strongly on behalf of these groups.
To a certain extent, this reflects how ethnicity and nationality is a much more comfortable space
of confronting difference than categories of race, at least in the Louisiana context. There were
never separate meetings for black communities which, to be sure, reflects the fact that black
residents are not as politically organized as Vietnamese fisherfolk have been in the parish
recently. The only time a member of the fishermen's organization from the east bank of
Plaquemines was at the request of another local leaders to sub in his absence for the kids. Sitting
at a table with him during that LASAFE meeting, he often shook his head, commenting that he
had been sitting through such meetings for forty years. He did, however, stick it out because, as
he told the young black residents at his table, it is important for them to stay involved and
plugged into these issues.
The more consistent participation of Vietnamese fisherfolk stood in stark contrast to the
participation of other minority groups. This could in large part be ascribed to the fact that the
Vietnamese and Cambodian communities were seen as a linguistically distinct group, which
made it more possible to isolate them out for entirely separate meetings. Beyond this, they had a
strong advocate who worked on their behalf and pushed FFL and other organizers to make
special efforts to reach these groups and understand their needs. Their efforts certainly paid off
when FLL and its partners decided to fund a mental health and substance abuse clinic with their
HUD funds, a service desperately needed within the Vietnamese and Cambodian coastal
communities. That is not to say that others in the parish would not benefit from these services,
but the idea was generated and supported by the large turn-out of Vietnamese and Cambodian
participants at meetings and reflects some of their most pressing needs as a working class fishing
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community in south Plaquemines Parish.
Racial difference did, however, frequently emerge in conversations I had with other
trainees, especially when they discussed FFL’s recruitment practices and their agenda. The need
to fill the "black box," one fellow trainee said to me, was obvious, even if FFL did not want to
admit it. Furthermore, their need to train ambassadors or fellows from diverse communities
reflected the fact that they understood that race mattered, especially in terms of building trust.
For FFL, the language of community leaders glossed over the specifics of what those leaders
needed to have which, beyond the trust of the community, was also a similar racial and economic
background. FFL also made great strides to reach-out to community groups that served specific
racial communities, yet it was only the Vietnamese community and indigenous groups that were
regularly invoked by racial/ethnic terms.
Thomas and Clarke (2013) point out the glaring challenge for racialized and other
minorities groups faced when trying to claim rights within a neoliberal, multicultural framework
that at once embraces racial and cultural difference as significant in social sense yet rejects them
foundations upon which to grant certain political rights, such as sovereignty and reparations. To
do so would transform relationships to territory and governing bodies on the basis of racial
difference. In this regard, the standards and stakes of racial belonging are almost too high for
members of racialized or indigenous groups to achieve in order to access rights as a historically
disenfranchised group. In simpler terms, the multicultural, neoliberal discourse of resilience
recognizes racial inequality as one of many factors, including economic value and geography,
that produces patterns of environmental risk, yet solutions for mitigation or adaptation cannot be
framed in the language of racial inequalities. Instead, the environment and economic value
continue to dominate frameworks for adaptation. To be sure, that material conditions of coastal
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land loss and flood risk are necessarily a dominate aspect of how decisions are made to adapt to
the changing landscape. Yet without the capacity leverage racial inequalities alongside
environmental risks, processes of racialization stand to be reinforced.

Outcomes
To an invite-only crowd of journalists, politicians, and local NGOs, the governor of
Louisiana announced in spring 2018 the outcomes of the LASAFE planning process for all six
parishes. This encompassed the twelves pilot projects that would be building across all parishes,
reflecting their inputs, votes, and time. "The LASAFE team," he noted, "emphasized grassroots,
community-based planning by hosting seventy-one individual public outreach and engagement
events over a nine-month period during the past year, in which nearly 3,000 residents from the
six parishes participated. As a result, the state will invest approximately $40 million in these six
parishes over the next several years to demonstrate the types of catalytic interventions that
comprehensively address the effects of land loss and flood risk."
As he spoke I scanned the crowd. One other anthropologist was the only non-NGO or
government official that I recognized. It was not necessarily an event for community members,
although it certainly celebrated the success of a grassroots process. "We were excited to bring
expertise, financial resources, technical support and thought partnership to this work," the
director of FLL noted, speaking after the governor. "But as much as anything, we wanted to
ensure that the project included and respected the wisdom of local residents. They had a seat at
the table in making decisions that affect their future in an equitable and inclusive way."72
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Press release, April 20, 2018. Accessed 6/1/2018: https://lasafe.la.gov/2018/04/20/gov-edwards-unveils-major-lasafe-flood-resilience-projects/
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To have a seat at the table led to several outcomes for residents. To a certain extent, the
LASAFE program was the most robust set of public engagement for coastal planning the state of
Louisiana had ever made and proposed to invest in. This is significant in that the meetings and
charrettes did not end in another report on the shelves of a library or government office, but was
backed by financial investments on the part of the state. For Plaquemines, this meant access to
$1.5 million to build a mental health and substance abuse medical facility in the lower end of the
parish. It also meant there would be $4.5 million for the parish to retrofit commercial fishing
harbors on the southern end of the parish to better protect large commercial fishing vessels
during storms. These are much needed resources for residents living in southern Plaquemines
Parish.
The capacity to measure the success of respecting the wisdom of participants or turning
residents into more savvy civic leaders, however, was more difficult to measure. While
discussing some of the outcomes of the LASAFE program, one key leader relayed to me that she
personally felt that the positive outcomes of these intensive community engagement sessions
reflect what can happen when equitable planning efforts that acknowledge the importance of
inclusionary practices and social and economic justice are used. As I spoke with participants
from the LA SAFE process in Plaquemines and other parishes though, it was not always clear to
me that planners were intentionally trying to address social and economic justice and,
furthermore, that the winning projects actually reflected the people's choices. One leader from a
tribal community in south Terrebonne Parish jokingly noted to me as an aside during one
conversation that the planning team ignored the votes of residents - who during a community
dinner put tokens into clear plastic tubes to denote their preferences for projects - and ultimately
chose whatever project they felt was best. It was the transparency of the tubes, the fact that she
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saw with her own eyes what residents did and did not vote for, that convinced her that there was
not transparency in the project selection processes on the part of FFL and OCD.
For many of the participants in the LEAD and LASAFE programs, the possibilities for a
people's coastal plan to be realized through participation in these programs were mostly
defensive. That is, many folks showed up to keep tabs on this new process and to make sure that
Plaquemines was not being inaccurately represented in the process. With news of the state
funding an $80 million relocation of a tribal community a few parishes over from them, many
residents were adamant that relocation was not in their future. As such, they attended to be sure
they would not be forced to leave. Mary Ann was very clear that she did not see relocation as a
part of any future that the parish should have, but that getting more jobs and economic
investment would be a priority for her. This would also be a means to stop talking about
relocation because the resources would be there for investment. For her, the question was
whether or not the LASAFE program could bring something like that to the community. Mary
Ann, like others, wants to have the option to stay and, beyond this, they want to move away from
the conversation about relocation. For her, resilience was about figuring a way to stay and thrive
economically and environmentally - not to relocate to higher ground.
"I want to live and die in Ironton," Jenny, an African American woman I sat with during
an LA SAFE meeting noted. Ironton, an entirely black community, like other communities on
the southern end of the parish has had a hard time retaining residents due to hurricanes and the
risking costs associated with maintaining a home in a coastal flood zone. When prompted by
planners to discuss culture, economy, and sustainability - "what does it mean to you?" - she
spoke about her concerns with maintaining the value of her home. "Would I be able to see it if I
needed to?" she said to our table of about eight residents. And the costs of flood insurance, she
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noted, is becoming too much for many folks to carry. If we want to stay here and thrive, she said,
we're going to need to find a way to bring resources, more jobs, to this community. Jenny's
sentiments reflected a trend I found throughout my research with black communities in
Plaquemines: the great pains many black residents have gone through to stay in places that
sustain the fabric and social values of their coastal communities.
At the same time, Jenny also reminded folks at our table that one of the "cultural"
problems in the parish was its conservative climate and proclivity for political corruption. "There
is favoritism and covert racism," she noted to our table of mostly black participants. "The social
ills in our parish has a steep history and that plays a role in how people exist as neighbors and coworkers...it still exists." Our facilitator, a young black man from the east bank, wasn't quite sure
where to put her comment on the chart of community culture, jobs, and environment.
Our discussion that evening also went in the direction of tangible projects residents felt
needed to be built. Storm water management, clearing ditches to keep water moving, those are
the kinds of things that need to be maintained. Residents at a meeting across the river on the east
bank a few weeks later echoed these practical sentiments. This was mixed with critiques of the
fact that the parish does little to maintain their existing drainage infrastructure now and that
residents often take-up that burden to protect their properties.
Many residents, particularly those from black and other minority communities, were also
concerned that their communities were represented accurately. Mary Ann's initial concern when
she first became involved with the process was that planners did not understand the unique
culture of Plaquemines Parish. As she told me during one conversation, “[planners] were
comparing us to another, like, Arizona or some kind of other city or state and I’m like no, we’re
a small community that is close knit and everybody looks out for everybody and we’re all aiming
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for the same goal, and that is that fifty years from now we are still a community that is resilient
and that is not going to go away…no, we’re still going to be here. I think they figured people just
wanted to give up. I’m like, that’s just not the case.” This stood in direct opposition to what
planners wanted which, in a global sense, was to use Plaquemines and other parishes as models
for coastal resilience and adaptation planning around the world. Creating an exportable model
was as much a goal as democratizing planning processes and sharing tactics for political
organizing.
For planners, adaptation strategies are framed first and foremost by science, which is the
starting point for self-governance and civic engagement projects. But the environment is not as
circumscribed an actor for Mary Ann and others. In part this is because she and others have been
told they are disappearing for years. In another part, it is their history of going through so much
in light of the predictions of land loss and decline and the fact that they are still there. “Your
maps tell me one thing, but history tells me something else,” Mary Ann noted as she described
why things like faith in God for her and her community were more powerful than faith in climate
change. Even though we’ve seen change, it’s gonna take a lot more than that to scare the
community into doing something radical. Again, she emphasized that this is because her
community has been through a lot, particularly when it comes to the risks from hurricanes like
Katrina in 2005 or even ones like Betsy in 1965 that completely tore their communities apart.
Maps of projected land loss are not enough to turn them into resilient subjects that are open to
relocation.
The possibilities of transformation, for Mary Ann, are not circumscribed or fixed by the
maps of land loss. Rather, she sees land loss contextually and, as such, is open to a variety of
possible futures that can support communities. She remains more hopeful about this than Chad,
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whose frustration with the process reflects the fact that he sees a replication of power structures
that are confining the promise of radical openness for adaptation planning that brought him into
the process in the first place. The farther he was drawn into LASAFE/LEAD projects, the more
disillusioned he became that any substantive change could actually happen. For him, it was as if
the experts had already made their decisions and the public meetings were merely performative.
This was all the more evident after the final meetings when he saw bike paths and wetlands
education centers as the final outcomes of the LASAFE process. "They are bullshit options" he
said to me when we reflected on it. “What people really want is levees and home elevation…yes
we have options to vote on, but they aren’t real options.”
“It was supposed to be a neighbor to neighbors thing” he went on to say. But in the end
many of the designers resulted to looking around at google earth to decide on project sites and
not using any of the public engagement at all to design their projects. This reflected the ways the
project leadership became increasing outsourced to consulting and landscape design firms who
were not from the community nor did they participate at all in the year long process. For Chad,
folks were not able to think outside the box once it came down to project design.
"You have to meet people where they are," he emphasized, which means understanding
that people are already in the middle of retreat. He was referring to the increasingly limited
supply of gas, telephone lines, post offices, and cable run to the southern and eastern ends of the
parish. For him, the real question for adaptation was not elevate or get out. Rather, the most
pertinent question was “how do you improve people’s quality of life alongside transitioning them
to live with climate change?” Like Mary Ann, Chad understood that residents were already
feeling the burdens of living in a disappearing place, geographically and economically.
Addressing these simultaneously and having an understanding of adaption as rooted in more than
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retreat were the possibilities Chad and others hoped practices like the LASAFE program could
achieve.

Conclusion and discussion: Adaptation otherwise?
Measuring the success of FFL's endeavors is a challenge. Several of my friends who
participated in the first round of leadership training never showed up to a single LEAD or coastal
meeting after. Others, like Mary Ann, continued to attend and be a community liaison for LEAD.
For her, the trainings were educational, but it was difficult to sense whether or not her
participation was making a difference. "They reach out to us more and now I think they know
who we are," she noted as we discussed her feelings about the program. It has not, as of yet,
resulted in specific economic or infrastructural investments for the small African American
communities she hails from. She is hopeful, though, that maybe one day it will.
Participants from the local Vietnamese fishing community, however, had other
experiences. The combination of training and advocacy opportunities enabled leaders from their
community to win the funding of a mental health and substance abuse facility. The facility, one
of several projects that won funding from a series of HUD Disaster Response Grants LASAFE
worked on, stood in stark contrast to more typical coastal adaptation projects such as living
shorelines, education centers, and harbor improvements. At least for members of Vietnamese
community, it represented not only a long standing need, but the possibilities of finding a way to
re-shape the framework of what coastal adaptation should look like beyond natural processes.
Their involvement with LEAD and other FFL programs led to the project being proposed and
ultimately winning funding.
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To be sure, as this chapter has indicated, many of the co-design frameworks reflect a
neoliberal approach to making new coastal land loss citizens. Yet, at the same time, many of the
planners made significant efforts to make a space for residents to define how they want to be
land loss citizens - how they can plan to stay despite dire land loss predictions. In this regard, the
fears of Mary Ann and others that FLL and their partners were in Plaquemines to convince
communities to relocate did not ultimately come to pass. If anything, many of these meetings
reinforced a fierce connection to place and a desire to stay despite predictions of sea level rise.

Image 24: LASAFE Plaquemines Parish meeting (photo by author).

Attendance of many of the black residents I worked with at leadership and planning meetings
was as much about gaining skills and knowledge about adaptation options as it was about
keeping an eye on how these new public-private partnerships might shape their futures, making
sure FFL, OCD, and other group were not planning for these communities without their consent.
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In other words, individuals like Mary Ann, Jenny, and Tricia were at meetings to voice the needs
of their communities and protect their communities from yet another attempt to reconfigure the
social and material geographies of their home. Though at times planning and leadership training
practices were overdetermined by a rhetoric of democratization emanating from outside the
experiences of residents, these new coastal planning processes did offer a space for residents to
define, in part, how they want to be land loss citizens.
These departures from critical expectations of what adaptation might look like points the
possibilities of adaptation being otherwise. Making the shift from environmental priorities to
community priorities indicates a potential new approach to what human-environmental
relationships might look like in the context of climate change: that it can about health, care, and
resources to support coastal communities. These mechanisms for adaptation do not look like
typical environmental protection or adaptation projects yet they do speak to the resources
communities need.
To a certain extent it is easy to see how disempowered communities of color often get coopted in resilience and adaptation planning processes: given a seat at the table but not given any
way to change the seating arrangements, venue, or format. Yet the LEAD program and other
affiliated programs, in their efforts to put power inequities up front, are perhaps doing the
necessary work to keep spaces and opportunities for structural change open in terms of coastal
planning and community empowerment. For some participants, like Mary Ann, empowerment
might be the capacity to become a necessity for coastal planning groups, even if her desire for
more levees or recreational opportunities for youth are not met by those planning agencies.
In other words, ethnographic attention to the desires and tensions between planners and
participants shows that critical scholars should be cautious as we analyze groups' engagements
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with these processes as they are not only complex, but might run counter to expectations about
what empowerment might look like when it comes to engaging marginalized communities in
these coastal adaptation processes. This is not to say these new adaptation experiments might not
be new frontiers for racial capitalist development or the pre-cursor to a comprehensive relocation
plan for places like Plaquemines Parish. Rather, it is a proposition to use ethnographic inquiry to
carefully explore how historically disempowered and dispossessed groups interpret the structures
of power they encounter and how they navigate diverse visions of what democratic inclusion or
political power might look like within a changing environment.
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Conclusion
Beyond land gained and land lost
As the official permitting process for the construction of the Mid-Barataria Sediment
Diversion with the Corps moves forward with an anticipated construction date of 2022, debates
about the geophysical integrity of the diversions for building land and the legal standing of the
state of Louisiana to force Plaquemines Parish to permit the diversions at the local level continue
to dominate the public conversation about coastal restoration. During this time period, summer
2018, environmental NGOs deeply invested in the construction of diversions have redoubled
their efforts to refute the critiques of a widening group of anti-diversion advocates, including the
majority of the elected officials in Plaquemines Parish. Every week they publish a blog post on
their website featuring the expert opinions of scientists that attempt to debunk the biophysical
critiques that diversions will not build land or will exacerbate land loss. In early fall 2018, local
environmental NGO Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana (CRCL) released the results of a
public opinion poll on whether or not residents across the coast support or oppose sediment
diversions, in addition to other questions, such as “do you support the Coastal Master Plan?”
Results show high support for diversions, the Master Plan, and coastal restoration in general. It is
hard to imagine, however, how an organization who has devoted the last thirty years to
advocating for coastal restoration in general, and sediment diversions in particular, would show
results that reflected anything less than overwhelming public support. In short, restoration groups
continue fight for the integrity of the diversions on the grounds of scientific expertise,
geophysical processes, and within the broader arena of public opinion.
If the debates about coastal restoration were entirely interpreted through the language and
frameworks of groups like CRCL and other environmental NGOs it would be difficult to
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understand debates about coastal restoration beyond a pro and anti-restoration and diversion
camp. Framing coastal restoration under the auspices of a collective, imagined future for all
coastal publics - “our coast, our future” - or imagined deltaic geographies of natural
geomorphological processes polarizes the terms of what land loss and restoration mean and how
it unfolds. Such a polarization of coastal restoration eschews the complexity of understandings
and experiences attached to land and water in the lower coastal region and over simplifies the
perspectives of two of the most central groups brought together by coastal restoration activities
and debates: scientists and residents. Their work, lives, and livelihoods are intimately connected
to the scientific, biophysical, and political stakes of coastal and loss and restoration. They are the
foundations upon which the restoration machine thrives yet, as this dissertation shows, these key
groups have relationships to water, land, and science that cannot be entirely or easily captured by
the popular discourse of restoration.

Race as an environmental formation
For many of the communities of color living in the footprint of unprecedented large scale
coastal wetlands and delta restoration projects, land and water are tied more intimately to desires
for, and achievement of, political and economic autonomy from oppressive racial capitalist
regimes that have dominated land and water use in the region from the eras of colonization and
plantation economies to the present. The capacity of groups like the residents on the east bank
who fought for equal access to oyster fishing grounds or running water for all black towns in
Plaquemines Parish, demonstrate this. If we look back to the plantation era, it is clear that land
and water occupy a material and political space that refuses to neatly adhere to the needs and
desires of landowners who would use unfree and low wage labor and science to control the river.
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As with subsequent eras of river engineering and political transformation in the region, land and
water unpredictably work to enable and undermine projects of economic and environmental
exploitation alongside projects for challenging the dominant modes of political occupation and
power.
This dissertation acknowledges that racial formations - racial histories and politics and
social structures that sustain racial hierarchies in society - are certainly an aspect of how
environments are shaped. Scholars writing on the racial geographies of the plantation point this
out (Woods 1998, McKittrick 2006, 2013), yet this work rarely comes into dialogue with
scholarship on the geophysical transformation of coastal environments. To be sure,
contemporary research on environmental racism and environmental justice issues that point out
the ways structural racism generates risky and toxic environments similarly demonstrate how
histories of uneven development in minority communities across the U.S. in rural and urban
contexts “race” the material characteristics of the environment (Checker 2005, Bullard 1991,
Pulido 2000, Checker 2005). Scholars in the fields of critical climate change studies build upon
this work, pointing out the ways inequalities along the lines of race, class, ethnicity, and
nationality are sustained through changing regimes of environmental knowledge production
(Maldonado 2014, Hardy et al. 2017). This work also shows the limitations of the discourse of
resilience and climate change adaptation practices built upon (European) capitalist/neoliberal
understandings of things like property ownership and value that sustain mechanisms that produce
economic and racial inequality (MacKinnon and Derickson 2013, Marino 2018).
This body of scholarship provides a crucial foundation for foregrounding racial inequities
at the center of how we theorize environmental change. Critical work on the racial geographies
and ecologies of the plantation, this dissertation argues, expands how we can theorize the
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relationship between the making of racial difference and the material work the environment
plays in these processes by situating the environment as a dynamic mechanism of autonomy and
oppression. This dissertations uses frameworks from writings on the racial geographies of the
plantation in the U.S. and Caribbean to elucidate the ways science, race, land and water work not
only in parallel but intersecting ways to shape the meaning of racial difference in the lower Delta
region. Retracing the history of relationships between race and place provides the necessary
historical context through which to analyze the ways contemporary environmental restoration
efforts articulate with the making of uneven racial geographies. Furthermore, highlighting
moments of convergence between racial politics and the techno-scientific engineering of the
Mississippi River situates the role of the non-biological sciences in the production of racial
difference through its use and transformation of the environment.
Beyond elaborating the record of how the environment is racialized, the dissertation
demonstrates how a close study of the environment - land, water, ecosystems, sediment - and the
techno-scientific practices that transform the environment, can expand the ways we theorize race.
I do this through tracking not only the ways communities of color are historically and at present
situated as laboratories for environment experimentation but how the environment is used as a
laboratory by these communities for experiments political and economic autonomy. This is
evidenced by the work of black leaders in Plaquemines Parish in the post-Civil Rights era to
leverage their political power and economic autonomy through access to and reclamation of
coastal wetlands and waters. From fights about oyster harvesting practices and the salinity
regimes of deltaic ecosystems to attempts to protect inherited, black-owned land from
encroaching waters and predatory real estate investors - the material and physical qualities of
deltaic lands, high ground to wetlands, and water are part of the ways meanings of racial
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difference are made and contested. In short, I draw on ethnographic material to show how race is
made, in part, through the environment and the livelihoods and forms of social reproduction its
diverse and multifunctional capacities sustain. I offer this not as an iteration of environmental
determinism, but rather an expansion of how we theorize race: one that underscores what a close
investigation of the environment as a dynamic and malleable actor in the wider area of social
relations brings to our critical understanding of what produces racial formations in their forms as
structural inequality as well as freedom and political autonomy.

The work of land, water, and sediment
The potential for land and water to exceed the expectations of techno-scientific rule whether under a framework of the plantation, flood control, or coastal restoration - creates spaces
where alternative ideas about what land loss and land restoration can potentially be or look like.
As this dissertation shows, the environment is central the production of livelihoods for black
residents as well as other racial and ethnic minorities who live in coastal areas in Louisiana.
Land, water, and marsh are actors that enable the cultivation of livelihoods that suture meanings
of racial difference and identity to the coastal landscape. The environment, in this regard, is a
crucial actor that participates in the production of social relations and the deeper sense of cultural
and personal attachment residents feel to the area. The livelihoods the marsh supports give shape
to the rhythms of everyday life in many of the black communities I worked in as well as for
others like Indigenous groups in the region. For these historically marginalized groups,
subsistence uses of coastal areas constitute cultural traditions and sustain communities
(Maldonado 2018, Bethel 2010). Beyond this, though, subsistence uses of the environment
generate the social rhythms and structure of interactions among residents in different
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communities and also provide the grounds upon which to demand forms of political belonging
and power in a place that historically denied these remote coastal groups political autonomy and
equitable rights due to their marginal racial, ethnic, cultural, and geographic status. Autonomy is
an important distinction here, as many of the black communities I worked with, as well as Native
groups in the coastal area, cultivated social worlds with the coastal environment that enabled a
degree of independence from the reach of white, settler colonial rule. Inclusion and desire for
equal political rights was certainly an aspect of the political battles black communities fought
with existing structures of white, upper class politics in Plaquemines Parish. Yet, as a close
examination of the work of black leaders from the Fishermen and Concerned Citizens
Organization described in chapter two illuminates, the bayous provided freedom from racial
oppression within the parish which, when compromised, brought the question of rights into an
ongoing battle for autonomy fought on the unstable grounds of coastal marsh and waters.
Attachment to place, through this history, highlights longstanding patterns of community
formation and racial place making that bind people, political leaders, and networks of care and
livelihoods maintained over generations to the coastal environment. In this regard, the material
dimensions of the coast are a critical node in the networks that cultivate a long march towards
justice for the communities I worked with in Plaquemines Parish.
When human relationships to the coastal area are framed in one-dimensional language,
such as that of restoration or even cultural heritage, it obfuscates the multifaceted ways land and
water act with and upon coastal communities. Geography and racial inequities worked together
to justify the exclusion of many of these groups but, at the same time, are re-worked by these
groups to leverage not only a voice or seat at the table but political power. Land and water, in
other words, can do more than just restoration: they provide livelihoods, political autonomy, and
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the possibility of a departure from plantation and capitalist economies rooted in racial
hierarchies.
These histories are part of what emboldens black leaders in Plaquemines, and the
communities of elders and youth that look up to them, to pose the possibility that something like
justice, as opposed to land restoration, as a framework through which to analyze restoration and
adaptation projects like the Mid-Barataria Sediment Diversion. It points to the capacity of land
and water to provide a route towards racial justice and political power. The fight for control over
the use and meaning of deltaic lands and waters has been a key part of what shapes the social
fabric black and other minority communities in coastal Louisiana.
In short, land and water cannot be subsumed within the framework of science based
environmental restoration any more than it can be under the rubric of racial justice. It exceeds
both which makes it a unique actor within the broader performance of coastal restoration that
cannot be subsumed within anthropocentric models - whether those of scientists or coastal
residents - of coastal land change. This makes restoration open to the capacity to achieve justice
or call into doubt technocratic rule as much as restoration can reproduce or upgrade older forms
of racial inequities in its manipulation of the lower delta’s geographies.

Locating the role of the physical and engineering sciences in practices of race making
In Omi and Winant’s work on racial formations, biology and the biological sciences
shape the fundamental basis of racial difference in the U.S. Race, in this regard, is predominately
a social category masquerading as a biological one. From here, ideas of racial difference rooted
in social and cultural ideas about biological distinction defined by racialized blood (i.e. the one
drop rule) validates the network of social and political structures that sustain inequality between
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groups. Beliefs carried by European colonists that non-Europeans were of a fundamentally
different species from themselves set in motion the connection between scientific (as well as
religious and moral) understanding of “others.” Within their framework we see not only race at
the "center of the American experience," (Omi and Winant 1994, 6) but science and scientific
reason at the center of how racial inequalities are justified and subsequently forged into social
institutions that entrench them into law, political disenfranchisement, and economic inequity.
My work seeks to expand Omi and Winant's focus on social and economic structures by
looking at the ways meanings of racial difference are entrenched and contested through
geography and the physical and engineering sciences that reshape material geographies. Through
a focus on geography and the material transformation of the lower delta landscape, this
dissertation argues that physical environment and sciences also work to materialize and
naturalize racial difference, making ideas about biological and moral difference more durable. A
focus on environmental engineering projects, historic and at present, is not only meant to show
uneven racial development in the lower delta region. Rather, I use the case of the lower
Mississippi River Delta to elaborate how techno-scientific reason and rationality works across
the physical, natural, and engineering sciences as a means of making race. Despite the fact that
past and contemporary riverine sciences do not transact in the language of racial difference, this
does not equate to their past or current participation in the creation of racial inequalities as solely
colorblind. To be sure, as theorists of colorblind racism continue to point out, simply because
race is not addressed in particular practices or discourses, or merely because we live in a postCivil Rights Era, do not necessarily mean racism does not exist (Bonilla-Silva 2015). Persistent
social, economic, and geographic inequalities between racial groups is evidence of racism. By recasting the histories of river engineering and uneven development as entangled and co-
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constitutive of one another, this dissertation challenges the idea that coastal restoration or
adaptation is merely a product of colorblind racism.
Though scholars such as Hardy et al. (2017) rightfully point out that ignoring racial
histories as they have been embedded in the landscape, particularly climate changed ones, risks
reproducing uneven racial geographies all over again under the guises of resilience and
adaptation (see also Maldonado et al. 2015, Marino 2018, Whyte 2016), the framework of
colorblind racism does not entirely capture the mutual constitution of racial difference and
environmental engineering practices. By tracing the transactions between past and contemporary
river engineering projects, my research suggests that science and scientific logic is not colorblind
but rather central to the production of racial difference, particularly in the former plantation
turned coastal climate changed restoration spaces of the US South. By tracking the
interconnections between engineering the coast and histories of racial politics as they are
entangled with coastal geographies, I aim to show that science and the common sense
understandings of the environment that it produces have long been operationalized to justify the
disenfranchisement and displacement of communities of color.
To this end, the question raised by my participants about the possibility of restoration
being about racial and social justice eloquently captures the fact that how science interacts with
and manipulates the environment does not stand apart from racial histories. To the contrary, it
has been and continues to be a vital tool through which racial inequalities are created and
rationalized as normal. The discourse of natural processes, as well as the material processes
themselves - or rather the very idea of nature - has worked, in this regard, to naturalize the
existence of racial difference. Following More et al. (2003) and Kosek (2006), this dissertation
elaborates on the transactions between scientific rationality and environmental projects and the
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insidious ways ideologies and discourses of nature and natural processes materially forge yet
rhetorically distance themselves from the production of racial difference.
Critical work on the plantation as a racial, scientific, and geographic formation helps to
historically situate the relationship between racism and geography particularly for black
communities in the U.S. The mobilization of science from its origins racist eugenic sciences to
its participation in the production of plantation geographies and institutions, remains central to
the production of racial difference. The advancement of river engineering and flood control
projects, as chapter two points out, was heavily predicated on racialized labor hierarchies of
slavery and post-emancipation social norms. Without racialized bodies and geographies, early
levees and floodways designed ostensibly for the public's protection do not get built. Likewise,
contemporary restoration projects reflect a pattern of scientific experimentation in river
engineering predicated on the transformation coastal geographies central to the livelihoods of
black and other minority communities. The convergence of "good sediment" and black
communities, as residents from Plaquemines tirelessly pointed out to me over the course of my
research, is a geophysical phenomenon infused with the maintenance of racial difference. Good
science, in other words, inescapably entangled with race. But the stakes of land loss and
restoration not only threaten to extend a pattern of geographically entrenched racial inequality:
they also threaten to undermine the ability of black and other minority communities to sustain
places that have historical and political value to the, and that they have protected at great cost.
This is why, as my participant suggest, coastal restoration can at once be an extension of
histories of dispossession substantiated by the power of scientific knowledge and geophysical
processes, and potentially be a site for generating racial and social justice.
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Can your diversions do justice? Or, what can land and water do that is not just
restoration?
Ethnographic and historical research shows how land and water are more than the binary
of environmental vulnerability and restoration that dominate the public discourse and
representation of the lower delta at the moment. The possibilities of livelihoods and political
autonomy, which the lower delta has provided alongside and in spite of violent oppressions, is
the alternative to restoration that residents from black and other minority communities
demand. The dynamism of land and water operate as contingent actors in this regard: neither
fully committed to the project of exploitation and sacrifice nor projects of environmental
restoration and freedom. Land and water call into question the universal power of technocratic
rule by creating spaces where alternative ideas about restoration can do or what coastal futures
are possible.
What would it mean, to paraphrase McKittrick and Woods (2007, 55) to place river
sciences as the service of the dispossessed? The only way scientists have been able to consider
how their work could do more to produce a notion of justice is to account for alternative ways of
knowing the coastal environment and giving that knowledge some kind of institutional weight.
This framework has led to widespread interest in traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) as a
mechanism for developing more equitable restoration practices. Anthropologists and
geographers, particularly those working with indigenous communities in coastal Louisiana, have
not only argued for TEK to be incorporated into coastal planning (Maldoando 2014) but also
developed research techniques and tools for translating TEK into knowledge forms recognizable
by coastal scientists (Bethel et al. 2011, Bethel et al. 2015). The harvesting and use of TEK,
however, still largely hinges on a definition of environmental knowledge fundamentally
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circumscribed by a coastal restoration agenda. That is, coastal scientists and planners are
interested in TEK only to the extent that they can fit that knowledge into a framework of acres
recovered or sustained along the coast. The extent to which the state has been successful in
translating even basic TEK knowledge about restoration into official planning is limited, as many
residents and coastal research invested in TEK projects frequently lament.
Beyond environmental knowledge, though, there is an attendant social justice agenda
built within indigenous knowledge systems that reflects the experiential conditions through
which environmental knowledge is forged for historically marginalized communities. Compared
to scientific knowledge, indigenous knowledge bares the mark of struggles for justice as they are
wrapped up in the environment. Woods (2007, 58) captures this point well in his articulation of
the blues epistemologies of the Mississippi Delta. Knowledge, for these groups, is not easily
disentangled from racial experiences. That is, the forms knowledge and inquiry take for different
groups is as much an empirical observation of the material environment as it is a reflection of the
life experiences that shape how a particular environmental problem is envisioned.
This conceptualize of the relationship between experience and knowledge production
point to questions an emerging field of critical race scholars raise: what are the values of the
scientists at the lab bench?73 And how do those values and life experiences shape the questions,
findings, and recommendations that they produce? My ethnographic research among scientists
and residents indicated that geography as much as disciplinary training carried a significant
weight land loss and restoration is approached by different groups. Among scientists, diverse
interpretations of the promise of predictive hydrological models, for example, were frequently
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I am drawing this question from sociologist Ruha Benjamin's 2015 TEDx talk on discriminatory design: “From
Park Bench to Lab Bench: What kind of future are we designing?” TEDx
Baltimore, Accessed 1 October 2017: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8RrX4hjCr0
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associated with different engagements with the flows, sediment loads, and salinity differences of
the Mississippi River and the relative correlation of virtual models to physical, environmental
processes. Detachment from physical processes is part of the reason why Kelly, a coastal
ecologist introduced in chapter three, has long been highly skeptical of investment in predictive
models for designing coastal restoration projects. Beyond this, though, Kelly also feels that being
a scientist who grew up in the bayous of Plaquemines Parish gives him a more nuanced sense of
unpredictability and dynamism of the coastal region. His personal background also gives him an
important measured approach to projects for coastal restoration that draw from his scientific
training as well as his deep, personal understanding of the tenuous relationship between coastal
cultures, water, and marsh. Hence why the implementation of large sediment diversions for Kelly
means "complete biological and cultural genocide" for coastal communities. His personal
relationship to the coast was not a hindrance to his scientific expertise but a crucial lens through
which to develop questions and approaches to abating land loss - something he is deeply invested
in.
Modelers like Eric and geologist colleagues like James are also invested in abating
coastal land loss. Yet the attendant social impacts that cascade from large-scale transformations
of the coast to reinvigorate the land building capacities of the Mississippi River are still emergent
and elusive questions for them. Unlike residents of Ironton who have long understood that land,
water, and environmental management are racialized and imbued with unequal relations of
power, the lack of more intimate relationships to the coastal landscape, I suggest, is part of the
reason why Eric, James, and other scientists' research operates in a seemingly colorblind fashion.
Coupled with disciplinary training that characterizes even brief historical or political
contextualization as "frou-frou stuff," to quote Eric, natural scientists and engineers are hard
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pressed to understand the structures that link the reproduction of inequity and objective scientific
inquiry and practice together.
Yet as much as science tries to side-step or ignore the conditions of its production, all
positions are indeed, as feminist science and technology scholars note, partial (Haraway 1991).
This can be seen by mainstream science as a limitation. However, many of my research
participants as well as other marginalized communities around the coast, particularly indigenous
ones, find these partial perspectives crucial for forging engagements with the environment that
can break the cycle of their persistent dispossession. For indigenous communities, this can look
like adaptation practices such as community relocation as tribal unification for non-federally
recognized indigenous groups or, for black communities in Plaquemines Parish, restoration
projects as opportunities to cultivate economic and environmental justice for communities by
investing in local jobs and improving existing flood protection infrastructures.
Coastal restoration can be about justice. But this is more than science being done with
humility, though the practice of foregrounding the ethical dimensions of scientific research is
certainly a step towards bringing science and justice together (c.f. Jasanoff 2007). This requires
digging deep into what justice looks like for the communities who call for it and how, in the case
of coastal Louisiana, justice is connected to land and water. How might a justice framework deal
with land loss and land restoration differently than current dominate frameworks of coastal
restoration?
The desire for economic autonomy and equal proprietorship over public institutions for
coastal communities are starting to make their way into coastal planning processes, as is
evidenced with the community development planning processes examined in chapter five.
Indeed, though planners from NGO groups still situate questions about adaptation within the
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geophysical framework of land loss, their efforts to figure out ways to make space to discuss
racism and define a resident driven vision for the next fifty years for disappearing Plaquemines
Parish make small, but important interventions into the denominate dialogue about coastal
restoration. And NGO groups like FFL are increasingly situating themselves as indispensable to
groups like the CPRA as a bridge to frontline coastal communities and their needs. Though it is
difficult to measure the extent of FFL's success or whether their representation of justice reflects
the diverse conceptualizations of justice held by residents, they are at least introducing the idea
that climate justice is something related to how Louisiana approaches coastal land loss and
restoration planning.
What might this mean in practice? It was clear from my time in Plaquemines Parish that
the bureaucratic challenges of securing black and minority owned property in the face of
changing flood risks and insurance costs was of the upmost importance to residents.
Ameliorating this entails reconfiguring policies, such as qualifications for elevation and flood
proofing grants for homeowners that can, for example, enable black residents who own homes on
inherited property to qualify for elevation grants without being forced into a property succession.
With the anticipated rise of flood risk due to sea level rise, coastal subsidence, and forthcoming
river sediment diversion projects, figuring out ways to reconfigure the bureaucracy and cost of
holding on to family property is significant for many coastal communities of color.
Another key aspect of integrating a justice framework into coastal restoration planning
would be ensuring current forms of water and marsh access are maintained with the possibility of
increasing levels of general public access to coastal areas. One of the frequent fears of coastal
residents regardless of race is the extent to which outsiders are gentrifying the bayou: that is, as
locals can no longer afford to maintain coastal properties, wealthier and whiter "weekend
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warriors" are buying coastal property and turning it into fish and waterfowl hunting camps.
Though championed as a way to boost economic development in coastal areas with recreational
fishing and hunting, many residents worry that the influx of these groups, coupled with the
economic and geographic displacement of established communities, will disrupt the social fabric
of coastal communities. This happens both in social and material ways, especially as it pertains
to property taxes, voting, and other social institutions structured by property ownership. Figuring
out ways to keep land in use for subsistence and smaller scale commercial fishing and shrimping
operations is a central concern for coastal communities. Whether it is through expanding public
use areas, docks and boat launches, or changing fishing and hunting policies, ensuring that longstanding coastal communities continue to have equitable access to coastal lands and waters as
they change would help relieve much worry about losing vital social and subsistence connections
to coastal waters.
Finally, many of the smaller-scale oystering communities are urging the CPRA to preemptively invest in oyster lease buyouts prior to the implementation river sediment diversions.
Reflecting bitter memories of the battles over oyster lease compensation covered in chapters one
and two, adequate compensation in economic or other forms for anticipated losses associated
with the changing salinity of the estuaries would be a vital step towards cultivating and
attempting to sustain economic autonomy for many of the less wealthy communities of color that
stand to have their leases impacted by restoration projects. In 2018, leadership in Plaquemines
Parish has gone so far as to deny coastal use permits to the CPRA to do initial environmental
impact assessments for the Mid-Barataria Sediment Diversion precisely because residents on the
southern end of the parish want to see a mitigation plan before the CPRA moves forward with
building the diversions.
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While translating the aspirations of coastal communities into fundable projects is still a
challenge, a process that seeks to identify community values before project selection moves in a
direction towards changing what the meaning of adaptation might be in a future where land loss
is inevitable. Bringing the engineering and geophysical sciences into the service of these climate
justice aspirations requires re-working the terms upon which research is designed in the first
place. Such tactics would fundamentally shift the values at the center of Louisiana’s coastal
restoration agenda.
A close examination of the interactions of communities of color with land and water over
time shows that the human-environmental relationships of the past and future lower delta are not
circumscribed by coastal land loss or restoration: it can give them livelihoods, political
autonomy, a departure from capitalist/plantation economies. When the meaning of protection and
land is expanded to encompass different visions that can encompass financial security,
livelihoods, and cultural heritage, this can shift the discourse and practice of coastal restoration
beyond a zero-sum game of winners and losers, inside and outside protection. The extent to
which values oriented around confronting material and social inequities across the coastal
landscape can be integrated in coastal science and planning will ultimately determine the
possibility of environmental restoration and science contributing to the production of justice for
subsiding communities.
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